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ABSTRACT

Content weakness in textbooks is a major obstacle to effective social studies teaching. Chapters 1-3 of this book provide the Education for Democracy Project's Statement of Principles, a consideration of history's role as the core of social studies education, and the role of textbooks in teaching world history. Chapters 4-14 examine five selected world history textbooks in terms of included information about and treatment of: (1) the purpose of history instruction; (2) the Greek legacy; (3) Rome's fall and legacy; (4) Judaism's and Christianity's basic ideas; (5) the Middle Ages as a source of representative government; (6) the 17th century English Parliament; (7) ideas from the Enlightenment; (8) the American and French Revolutions; (9) major ideas of the 19th century; (10) nation-states, nationalism, and imperialism; (11) World War I; (12) totalitarianism; (13) U.S. foreign policy; and (14) democracy in the world since 1945. This book concludes that these world history textbooks tend to neglect democracy's ideas, principles, origins, needs, and significance and that, when included, these concepts are not systematically presented. Teachers may not be able to rely on world history textbooks to convey and teach the concepts of struggles for freedom, self-government, and justice. (JHP)

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

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DEMOCRACY'S UNTOLD STORY

What World History Textbooks Neglect

BY PAUL GAGNON

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The American Federation of Teachers is a union with a membership of 660,000—most of whom are classroom teachers, higher education faculty, and other school employees. The AFT is committed to helping its members bring excellence to America's classrooms and full professional status to their work.

The Educational Excellence Network—headquartered at Teachers College, Columbia University—is a coalition of several hundred educators and scholars devoted to the improvement of American education.

Freedom House is a national organization that monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world and that has spent 40 years educating the public about the nature and needs of democracy and the threats to it.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Introduction	9
I.	Education for Democracy: A Statement of Principles	13
II.	The Problem of What Must Be Taught	25
III.	Textbooks and the World History Course	33
IV.	Why Study History?	43
V.	The Legacy of the Greeks	47
VI.	The Fall and Legacy of Rome	53
VII.	The Basic Ideas of Judaism and Christianity	59
VIII.	The Middle Ages as a Source of Representative Government	65
IX.	The Triumph of Parliament in the 17th Century	69
X.	Ideas from the Enlightenment	75
XI.	The American and French Revolutions	83
XII.	The Major Ideologies of the 19th Century	91
XIII.	Nation-States, Nationalism, and Imperialism	99
XIV.	World War I—Before and After	105
XV.	Totalitarianism, Left and Right	113
XVI.	Appeasement and Democratic Foreign Policy	123
XVII.	Democracy in the World Since 1945	131
	Conclusion: Democracy's Untold Story	137

INTRODUCTION

This book is for my fellow teachers, and for future teachers, of history and social studies. In it I assume we agree on three things. First, that teaching about democracy and its adventures is one of our most important tasks. Second, that teaching it well is difficult to do. Third, that one of our greatest obstacles to doing so is the weakness of our textbooks.

Most of this teacher-to-teacher conversation, then, is a critical review of five much-adopted textbooks in world history, comprising the first half of a larger study. The second half, to be published later, will review textbooks in United States history and American government. I do not offer here a comprehensive review of style or scholarship, but a response to a single question: How helpful is each text in teaching the essential ideas and institutions of democracy, its development over time, and its present condition at home and elsewhere in the world?

I hope these pages will help you evaluate, and take an active part in choosing, books for your own schools. I hope you will gain useful suggestions for making up syllabi and lessons, as well as for adapting texts and materials to your own teaching goals in your own ways. This is not a text or a manual, but a set of reflections in which I hope you will find interesting and effective ways to develop in your students the historical perspective and political sophistication upon which any self-governing society must depend.

This book is also for others who play a part in educating citizens: publishers, text authors, state and local school board members, principals and supervisors, college faculty members who prepare future teachers, parents, and students. All of us

have a stake in the outcome of debates now raging over the quality, and equality, of American education in general and of education for citizenship in particular.

What are these debates? How might they affect our work? We can hardly start in mid-air, leaping to the matter of textbooks, without facing up to a number of larger, prior questions:

Why be concerned about the quality of education for democracy?

What is wrong that has to be remedied?

What do citizens need to know?

What sort of curriculum would help them learn it?

How might teaching conditions need to change to promote such learning?

Nowhere are these issues better addressed than in *Education for Democracy: A Statement of Principles.* Issued in spring 1987, it serves as the guiding charter for the many-faceted Education for Democracy project, sponsored by the American Federation of Teachers, the Educational Excellence Network, and Freedom House. This study of textbooks is one of the project's first efforts, and Chapter I comprises the statement in its entirety.

Chapters II and III open up other, more controversial, questions and argue for a number of answers sharply contrary to prevailing orthodoxies in American education, especially in the social studies. These questions include the following:

Is there a common core of knowledge worthy to be required of all?

What is the use and place of history in it?

Does studying history make better citizens?

What kind of history should be stressed in the schools?

Is "global education" the answer?

Can we make time for world history?

What about the study of Western Civilization?

Readers may, if they choose, skip over the arguments of the first three chapters. I hope they do not, for no critique of textbooks can make much sense on its own, without some prior responses to all of these questions. I do not ask that readers agree with me on each point, but I do ask that they recognize each question as unavoidable and then go on to wrestle with each, as they reflect on the pages that follow.

For the chance to voice these views about the teaching of history, I am indebted to the Education for Democracy project,

and to the U.S. Department of Education, the California Department of Public Instruction, and various private foundations for their financial support. I am especially grateful to Liz McPike and Ruth Wattenberg of the American Federation of Teachers for bravely inviting me to undertake this work.

I could not possibly acknowledge all those colleagues and students from whose ideas and criticisms I have profited over the years. But over the recent past I could not have done without the insights and encouragement of Diane Ravitch, who chaired an advisory committee of readers for this manuscript. Neither she nor they should bear responsibility for the lapses I may persist in. And these have been further reduced by my good fortune in having Ruth Wattenberg and Diane Aiken as critically attentive editors, deserving very special thanks.

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

I.

As the bicentennial for our Constitution approaches, we call for a special effort to raise the level of education for democratic citizenship. Given the complexities of our own society, of the rest of the world, and of the choices we confront, the need is self-evident and improvement is long past due.

As the years pass, we become an increasingly diverse people, drawn from many racial, national, linguistic, and religious origins. Our cultural heritage as Americans is as diverse as we are, with multiple sources of vitality and pride. But our political heritage is one—the vision of a common life in liberty, justice, and equality as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution two centuries ago.

To protect that vision, Thomas Jefferson prescribed a general education not just for the few but for all citizens, "to enable every man to judge for himself what will secure or endanger his freedom." A generation later, Alexis de Tocqueville reminded us that our first duty was to "educate democracy." He believed that all politics were but the playing out of the "notions and sentiments dominant in a people." These, he said, are the "real causes of all the rest." Ideas—good and bad—have their consequences in every sphere of a nation's life.

We cite de Tocqueville's appeal with a sense of urgency, for we fear that many young Americans are growing up without the education needed to develop a solid commitment to those "notions and sentiments" essential to a democratic form of government. Although all the institutions that shape our private and public lives—family, church, school, government, media—share the responsibility for encouraging democratic values in our chil-

dren, our focus here is on the nation's schools, and their teaching of the social studies and humanities.

In singling out the schools, we do not suggest that there was ever a golden age of education for citizenship, somehow lost in recent years. It is reported that in 1943—that patriotic era—fewer than half of surveyed college freshman could name four points in the Bill of Rights. Our purpose here is not to argue over the past, but only to ask that everyone with a role in schooling now join to work for decisive improvement.

We believe] that democracy is the worthiest form of human governance ever conceived.

Our call for schools to purposely impart to their students the learning necessary for an informed, reasoned allegiance to the ideals of a free society rests on three convictions:

First, that democracy is the worthiest form of human governance ever conceived.

Second, that we cannot take its survival or its spread—or its perfection in practice—for granted. Indeed, we believe that the great central drama of modern history has been and continues to be the struggle to establish, preserve, and extend democracy—at home and abroad. We know that very much still needs doing to achieve justice and civility in our own society. Abroad, we note that, according to the Freedom House survey of political rights and civil liberties, only one-third of the world's people live under conditions that can be described as free.

Third, we are convinced that democracy's survival depends upon our transmitting to each new generation the political vision of liberty and equality that unites us as Americans—and a deep loyalty to the political institutions our founders put together to fulfill that vision. As Jack Beatty reminded us in a *New Republic* article one Fourth of July, ours is a patriotism "not of blood and soil but of values, and those values are liberal and humane."[1]

Such values . . . cannot be taken for granted, or regarded as merely one set of options, against which any other may be accepted as equally worthy.

Such values are neither revealed truths nor natural habits. There is no evidence that we are born with them. Devotion to human dignity and freedom, to equal rights, to social and economic justice, to the rule of law, to civility and truth, to tolerance of diversity, to mutual assistance, to personal and civic responsibility, to self-restraint and self-respect—all these must be taught and learned and practiced. They cannot be taken for granted, or regarded as merely one set of options, against which any other may be accepted as equally worthy.

WHY WE ARE CONCERNED

Are the ideas and institutions—and above all the worth—of democracy adequately conveyed in American schools? Do our graduates come out of school possessing the mature political

judgment Jefferson hoped for, an ability to decide for themselves "what will secure or endanger" their freedom? Do they know of democracy's short and troubled tenure in human history? Do they comprehend its vulnerabilities? Do they recognize and accept their responsibility for preserving and extending their political inheritance?

No systematic study exists to answer these questions. We lack adequate information on students' knowledge, beliefs and enthusiasms. There has been little examination of school textbooks and supplementary materials, of state and district requirements in history and social studies, or of what takes place in everyday school practice. A study of how high school history and government textbooks convey the principles of democracy is under way, and we hope that several other studies will be launched soon.

Meanwhile, the evidence we do have—although fragmentary and often anecdotal—is not encouraging. We know, for instance, of the significant decline over several decades in the amount of time devoted to historical studies in American schools, even in the college preparatory track; today, fewer than 20 states require students to take more than a year of history in order to graduate. We know that, as a result, many students are unaware of prominent people and seminal ideas and events that have shaped our past and created our present. A recent study shows that a majority of high school seniors do not know what the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision was about.[2] Nor could majorities identify Winston Churchill or Joseph Stalin. Without knowledge of our own struggle for civil rights, how much can students understand of democracy's needs at home—what it has taken and will still take to extend it? And what can they know of democracy's capacity to respond to problems and to reform? In ignorance of the Second World War and its aftermath, how much can they grasp of the cost and necessity of defending democracy in the world? Having never debated and discussed how the world came to be as it is, the democratic citizen will not know what is worth defending, what should be changed, and which imposed orthodoxies must be resisted.

. . . a majority of high school seniors do not know what the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision was about.

We are concerned also that among some educators (as among some in the country at large), there appears a certain lack of confidence in our own liberal, democratic values, an unwillingness to draw normative distinctions between them and the ideas of non-democratic regimes. Any number of popular curriculum materials deprecate the open preference for liberal democratic values as "ethnocentric." One widely distributed teaching guide on human rights accords equal significance to freedom of speech, the right to vote, and the guarantee of due

process on the one hand, with the "right" to take vacations on the other.[3]

In the rush to present all cultures in a positive light, the unpleasant realities of some regimes are ignored, as when this guide talks of the high value accorded the right to strike by governments in Eastern Europe (a notion that would surely be disputed by the supporters of Solidarnosc). Or as another guide—financed by the U.S. Department of Education—lauds the Cuban government's commitment to women's rights, noting with approval that men who refuse to share equally in household responsibilities can be penalized with "re-education or assignment to farm work."[4]

This insistence upon maintaining neutrality among competing values, this tendency to present political systems as not better or worse but only different, is illustrated by this test question designed by the National Assessment of Educational Progress and administered in the 1981-82 school year to students aged 9, 13, and 17:

But we need not accept that Orwellian self-definition as if words had no meaning.

> Maria and Ming are friends. Ming's parents were born in China and have lived in the United States for 20 years.
>
> "People have no freedom in China," Maria insists. "There is only one party in the election and the newspapers are run by the government."
>
> "People in China do have freedom," Ming insists. "No one goes hungry. Everyone has an opportunity to work and medical care is free. Can there be greater freedom than that?"
>
> *What is the best conclusion to draw from this debate?*
>
> A. Ming does not understand the meaning of freedom.
>
> B. Maria and Ming differ in their opinions of the meaning of freedom.
>
> C. There is freedom in the U.S. but not in China.
>
> D. People have greater freedom in China than in the U.S.

According to NAEP, choice B—"Maria and Ming differ in their opinions of the meaning of freedom"—is correct. The test's framers explained in a 1983 report summarizing the survey's findings that students choosing answer B "correctly indicated that the concept of freedom can mean different things to different people in different circumstances." And, of course, in the most narrow, literal sense, B is correct.

Around the world, people and governments do apply different meanings to the word "freedom." Some states that deny freedom of religion, speech, and conscience nonetheless define themselves as free. But we need not accept their Orwellian self-definitions as if words had no meaning. Were we to use Ming's

definition of freedom—a job, medical care, and ample food—many of history's slaves and today's prisoners would have to be called "free"! To offer such a definition, and to leave it at that, without elaboration—as NAEP has done—is grossly to mislead students about history, about politics, and above all, about human rights. In fact, the "rights" to food and work and medical care, when separated from the rights to free speech, a free press, and free elections, are not rights at all. They are rewards from the government that are easily bestowed and just as easily betrayed.

We are rightly accustomed to honest scrutiny of our own faults, and so it is all the more inexplicable when educational materials sidestep or whitewash violations of human rights and pervasive injustice in other lands. Students need an honest, rigorous education that allows them to penetrate Orwellian rhetoric and accurately compare the claims and realities of our own society and those of others. Such a goal is compromised when the drawing of normative distinctions and values is frowned upon as a failure of objectivity, on the premise that all values are arbitrary, arising from personal taste or conditioning, without cognitive or rational bases. They are not to be ranked or ordered, the argument runs, only "clarified"; so the teacher must strive to be "value-free." But such a formulation confuses objectivity with neutrality. It is hardly necessary to be neutral in regard to freedom over bondage, or the rule of law over the rule of the mob, or fair wages over exploitation, in order to describe objectively the differences among them, or among their human consequences.

What of Nazi values and their consequences? To grasp the human condition in the 20th century objectively, we need to understand the problems of German society that pushed so many to join the Nazis and to acquiesce in their crimes. But to "understand" is not to forgive, or to trivialize, those crimes. Or to teach, in Richard Hunt's phrase, "no-fault, guilt-free history," where nobody is to blame for anything and fixing responsibility is disallowed.

Finally, no discussion of the discomfort that some feel in teaching children to cherish democracy can fail to mention that some may be indifferent to, or even alienated from, American democracy, out of disillusion over its failings in practice. The postwar confidence in the American way of life was undermined by the political upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s. First, America had its long-overdue reckoning with the historic national shame of racial discrimination. Then the country found itself mired in the Vietnam War, and was further shocked and disheartened by assassinations and the events of Watergate. As

we struggled to confront our failings and correct our flaws, legitimate self-criticism turned at times into an industry of blame. The United States and its democratic allies were often presented as though we alone had failed, and as though our faults invalidated the very ideals that taught us how to recognize failure when we met it.

While the realities of our own society are daily evident, many students remain ignorant of other, quite different, worlds. How can they be expected to value or defend freedom unless they have a clear grasp of the alternatives against which to measure it? The systematic presentation of reality abroad must be an integral part of the curriculum. What are the political systems in competition with our own, and what is life like for the people who live under them? If students know only half the world, they will not know nearly enough. We cannot afford what one young writer recalled as a "gaping hole" in his prestigious, private high school's curriculum.[5] He and his classmates, he says, were "wonderfully instructed in America's problems..."

How can [students] be expected to value or defend freedom unless they have a clear grasp of the alternatives against which to measure it?

> but we were at the same time being educated in splendid isolation from the notion that democratic societies had committed enemies; we learned next to nothing of the sorts of alternatives to bourgeois liberalism that the 20th Century had to offer...[We] learned nothing of what it meant to be a small farmer in Stalin's Russia or Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam. That it had been part of Communist policy to "liquidate as a class" the "kulaks" was something we had never heard spoken of. It was perfectly possible to graduate from the Academy with high honors and be altogether incapable of writing three factual paragraphs on the history of any Communist regime (or for that matter of any totalitarian regime whether of the Right or Left)."

WHAT THE CITIZEN NEEDS TO KNOW

What was, and is, lacking is a fullness of knowledge, an objective and balanced picture of world realities, historical and contemporary. We do not ask for propaganda, for crash courses in the right attitudes, or for knee-jerk patriotic drill. We do not want to capsulize democracy's argument into slogans, or pious texts, or bright debaters' points. The history and nature and needs of democracy are much too serious and subtle for that.

Education for democracy is not indoctrination, which is the deliberate exclusion or distortion of studies in order to induce

belief by irrational means. We do not propose to exclude the honest study of the doctrines and systems of others. Or to censor history—our own or others'—as closed societies do, or to hide our flaws or explain them away. We do not need a bodyguard of lies. We can afford to present ourselves in the totality of our acts. And we can afford to tell the truth about others, even when it favors them, and complicates that which indoctrination would keep simple and comforting.

And then we leave it to our students to apply their knowledge, values, and experiences to the world they must create. We do not propose a "right" position on, say, American involvement in the Vietnam War; or on the type of nuclear weapons, if any, we should have; or on what our policy in Central America should be; or on whether the E.R.A. should be passed or hiring quotas supported. Good democrats can and do differ on these matters. On these and a host of other policy issues, there is no one "truth." Our task is more limited, and yet in its way much greater: to teach our children to cherish freedom and to accept responsibility for preserving and extending it, confident that they will find their own best ways of doing so, on the basis of free, uncoerced thoughts.

The kind of critical thinking we wish to encourage must rest on a solid base of factual knowledge. In this regard, we reject educational theory that considers any kind of curricular content to be as good as any other, claiming that all students need to know is "how to learn"; that no particular body of knowledge is more worth noting than any other; that in an age of rapid change, all knowledge necessarily becomes "obsolete." We insist, on the contrary, that the central ideas, events, people, and works that have shaped our world, for good and ill, are not at all obsolete. Instead, the quicker the pace of change, the more critical it will be for us to remember them and understand them well. We insist that without this knowledge, citizens remain helpless to make the wise judgments hoped for by Jefferson.

The kind of critical thinking we wish to encourage must rest on a solid basis of factual knowledge.

First, citizens must know the fundamental ideas central to the political vision of the 18th-century founders—the vision that holds us together as one people of many diverse origins and cultures. Not only the words—never only the words—but the sources, the meanings, and the implications of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, the Bill of Rights.

To go deeper than the words, and truly to understand the ideas, students must know where and how they arose, in whose minds, stirred by what other ideas. What historical circumstances were hospitable, and encouraged people to think such things? What circumstances were hostile? What were the pre-

vailing assumptions about human nature? About the relationship between God and themselves? About the origins of human society and the meaning and direction of human history? To understand our ideas requires a knowledge of the whole sweep of Western civilization, from the ancient Jews and Christians—whose ethical beliefs gave rise to democratic thought—to the Greeks and Romans, through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the English Revolution—so important to America—the 18th century Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, a violent cousin to our own. Such a curriculum is indispensable. Without it, our principles of government—and the debates over them ever since—are not fully comprehensible. They are mere words, floating in air without source, life, drama, or meaning.

Second, citizens must know how democratic ideas have been turned into institutions and practices—the history of the origins and growth and adventures of democratic societies on earth, past and present. How have these societies fared? Who has defended them and why? Who has sought their undoing and why? What conditions—economic, social, cultural, religious, military—have helped to shape democratic practice? What conditions have made it difficult—sometimes even impossible—for such societies to take root? Again, it is indispensable to know the facts of modern history, dating back at least to the English Revolution, and forward to our own century's total wars; to the failure of the nascent liberal regimes of Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan; to the totalitarianism, oppressions, and mass exterminations of our time. How has it all happened?

Third, citizens in our society need to understand the current condition of the world, and how it got that way, and to be prepared to act upon the challenges to democracy in our own day. What are the roots of our present dangers, and of the choices before us? For intelligent citizenship we need a thorough grasp of the daily workings of our own society, as well as the societies of our friends, of our adversaries, and of the Third World, where so many live amid poverty and violence, with little freedom and little hope.

■
How can we avoid making all of this into nothing more than just another... parade of facts?
■

This is no small order. It requires systematic study of American government and society; of comparative ideologies and political, economic, and social systems; of the religious beliefs that have shaped our values and our cultures and those that have shaped others; and of physical and human geography. How can we avoid making all of this into nothing more than just another, and perhaps longer, parade of facts, smothering the desire to learn? Apart from needed changes in materials and methods, in the structure of curricula and of the school day

■
20

itself, we believe that one answer is to focus upon the fateful drama of the historical struggle for democracy. The fate of real men and women, here and abroad, who have worked to bring to life the ideas we began with deserves our whole attention and that of our students. It is a suspenseful, often tragic, drama that continues today, often amid poverty and social turmoil; advocates of democracy remain, as before, prey to extremists of Left and Right, well-armed with force and simple answers. The ongoing, worldwide struggle for a free center of "broad, sunlit uplands," in Churchill's phrase, is the best hope of the earth and we would make it the heart of a reordered curriculum for history and social studies.

The ongoing, worldwide struggle for a free center of "broad, sunlit uplands," in Churchill's phrase, is the best hope of the earth, and we would make it the heart of a reordered curriculum for history and social studies.

HISTORY AND THE HUMANITIES AS THE CORE OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

We regard the study of history as the chief subject in education for democracy, much as Jefferson and the other founders of the United States did two centuries ago. In revamping the social studies curriculum, we should start with the obvious. History is not the enemy of the social sciences, but is instead their indispensable source of nourishment, order, and perspective. We aim at nothing less than helping the student to comprehend what is important, not merely to memorize fact and formula. But it is clearly impossible to reach genuine comprehension of economic, political, social, and cultural questions without examining them in their historic context. To pull "case studies" and "concepts" out of historical narrative, as so many social studies programs do, not only confuses students but is likely to distort the truth of the human condition.

Of all the subjects in the curriculum, history alone affords the perspective that students need to compare themselves realistically with others—in the past and elsewhere on earth—and to think critically, to look behind assertions and appearances, to ask for the "whole story," to judge meaning and value for themselves. History is also the integrative subject, upon which the coherence and usefulness of other subjects depend, especially the social sciences, but also much of literature and the arts. Taught in historical context, the formulations and insights of the social sciences take on life, blood, drama, and significance. And, in turn, their organizing concepts and questions can help rescue history from the dry recital of dates and facts so many students have rightly complained about.

We are pleased that several major reform proposals[6] agree on the centrality of history. Theodore Sizer, in *Horace's Compromise*, makes the joint study of history and ideas one of the four required areas of learning throughout the secondary years. *The Paideia Proposal* puts narrative history and geography at the center of the social studies curriculum, during every grade beyond the elementary. Ernest Boyer's Carnegie report, *High School*, asks for a year of the history of Western civilization, a year of American history, another of American government, and a term's study of a non-Western society. The Council for Basic Education sets an "irreducible minimum" of two years of American history, one year of European, and the study of at least one non-Western society in depth. The State of California now calls for at least two years of high school history.[7]

We also ask for wider reading and study in the humanities. For we are concerned, again, with values, with every citizen's capacity for judging the moral worth of things. In this, courses in "values clarification" do not get us very far. They either feign neutrality or descend to preachiness. Values and moral integrity are better discovered by students in their reading of history, of literature, of philosophy, and biography. Values are not "taught," they are encountered, in school and life.

The humanities in our schools must not be limited, as they so often are now, to a few brief samples of Good Things, but should embrace as much as possible of the whole range of the best that has been thought and said and created, from the ancient to the most recent. Otherwise, students have little chance to confront the many varied attempts to answer the great questions of life—or even to be aware that such questions exist. The quest for worth and meaning is indispensable to the democratic citizen. The essence of democracy, its reason for being, is constant choice. We choose what the good life is, and how our society—including its schools—may order its priorities so that the good life is possible, according to what we ourselves value most. That is what de Tocqueville meant by the "notions and sentiments" of a people.

Education for democracy, then, must extend to education in moral issues, which our 18th-century founders took very seriously indeed. This is hardly surprising. The basic ideas of liberty, equality, and justice, of civil, political, and economic rights and obligations are all assertions of right and wrong, of moral values. Such principles impel the citizen to make moral choices, repeatedly to decide between right and wrong or, just as often, between one right and another. The authors of the American testament had no trouble distinguishing moral education from

religious instruction, and neither should we. The democratic state can take no part in deciding which, if any, church forms its citizens' consciences. But it is absurd to argue that the state, or its schools, cannot be concerned with citizens' ability to tell right from wrong, and to prefer one over the other in all matters that bear upon the common public life. This would be utterly to misunderstand the democratic vision, and the moral seriousness of the choices it demands of us.

But it is absurd to argue that the state, or its schools, cannot be concerned with citizens' ability to tell right from wrong.

CONCLUSIONS

In calling for a decisive improvement of education for democracy, we are well aware that this will require a sea-change in the typical curriculum. Specifically, we call for the following:

1. A more substantial, engaging, and demanding social studies curriculum for all of our children—one that helps students to comprehend what is important, not merely to memorize names, dates, and places. The required curriculum should include the history of the United States and of democratic civilization, the study of American government and world geography, and of at least one non-Western society in depth.

2. A reordering of the curriculum around a core of history and geography—with history providing the perspective for considered judgment and geography confronting students with the hard realities that shape so many political, economic, and social decisions. Around this core of history and geography, students should be introduced to the added perspectives offered by economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science.

3. More history, chronologically taught, and taught in ways that capture the imagination of students. Historical biography, colorful historical narrative, and debate over the central ideas that have brought us here are all appealing to students. And we recommend that a central theme in the study of history be the dramatic struggles of people around the globe and across the centuries to win, preserve, and extend their freedom.

4. More attention to world studies, especially to the realistic and unsentimental study of other nations—both democratic and non-democratic. Comparative study of politics, ideology, economics, and culture, and especially the efforts of citizens to improve their lot through protest and reform, offer students a healthy perspective on our own problems and a needed window on problems elsewhere.

5. A broader, deeper learning in the humanities, particularly in literature, ideas, and biography, so that students may encounter and comprehend the values upon which democracy

depends. Through such study, moral education—not religious education and not neutral values clarification—can be restored to high standing in our schools.

We understand that such a major reform of the curriculum will require more effective textbooks and auxiliary materials, aimed less at "coverage" than at comprehension of what is most worth learning. It will require continuing collaboration between faculty members from the schools and universities, where both work together as equals to clarify what is most worth teaching in their subjects and to devise ways to convey the material to diverse clienteles. And it requires new approaches to teacher education, both pre-service and in-service, to help teachers present the revamped and strengthened curriculum.

Our proposal asks for great intensity of teaching effort. Students will not reach genuine understanding of ideas, events, and institutions through rote learning from texts, classroom lecture, and recitation followed by short-answer quizzes. We ask for active learning on the part of students—ample time for class discussions, for coaching, for frequent seminars to explore ideas, and for regular writing assignments.

We know that teachers would like nothing better than to work in this way. We also know that they cannot be expected to do so when they are responsible for 150 or more students, coming at them in a kaleidoscopic, five-times-fifty minute daily lockstep, frequently requiring three or four different preparations. We thus ally ourselves with recent calls to dramatically restructure education. Over time, we must sharply alter the management, the schedules, and the staffing patterns of our schools to afford teachers more authority, a wider latitude of methods and materials, more time to devote to the intellectual lives of fewer students and more time to devote to their own intellectual growth.

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We understand that the dramatic changes we call for—in curriculum and structure—will not come easily. We know also that these changes can be made, and must be.

As citizens of a democratic republic, we are part of the noblest political effort in history. Our children must learn, and we must teach them, the knowledge, values, and habits that will best protect and extend this precious inheritance. Today we ask our schools to make a greater contribution to that effort and we ask all Americans to help them do it.

THE PROBLEM OF WHAT MUST BE TAUGHT

II.

THE COMMON CORE

A particular body of knowledge that must be taught to all? Most modern educators will fire back three counter-questions: Is there any such thing? Can it be described? And even if it can, should it be taught to, required of, all students in all schools? The answers are yes, yes, and a hundred times yes, especially in a democracy and most especially in a multicultural democracy.

The fate of the entire educational reform movement, from kindergarten to college, depends upon the willingness of educators to take up the intellectual challenge of deciding upon a common core of what is most worth learning in late-20th-century American society, as well as where it most critically affects education for intelligent citizenship. Next, that core—extracted from the rising mounds of data amassed by the scholarly disciplines—must be arranged in helpful sequence. And finally, it must be conveyed in imaginatively varied ways to our many different kinds of students.

The last task promises to be the easiest. For generations, American educators have worked well and fruitfully on methodology, which they can now marry to subject matter. The second task must wait upon the first. The first will be immensely difficult, for it assaults the most popular prevailing orthodoxies of educators today. Again and again, many deny the possibility of prescribing a common core of learning. Of all the recommendations of the several reform reports issued since 1983, the call for

a common core—even of the most partial, modest sort—is the most violently attacked.

The argument made against the common core is threefold: First, that our culture is too "fragmented"; it would be oppressive and insulting to teach any particular historical past or any particular cultural, moral, or intellectual tradition to a multicultural student population. Second, that a common core of learning is "elitist," unsuited and unnecessary to "non-traditional" students of minority, immigrant, or working-class status. Third, that the explosion of knowledge and the rapid pace of change in modern life will surely render any particular knowledge "obsolete," so educators must focus on how to learn—on generic skills and modes of inquiry—rather than on any given subject matter.

Together these objections represent an intellectual failure of the first magnitude. They ignore the needs of citizens in modern democratic society, and their arguments actually point to contrary conclusions. In an increasingly multicultural society, it is imperative that adequate time be devoted to what we Americans have in common. For it is precisely our common political heritage—and its mainly Western intellectual, cultural, and moral sources—that allows us the freedom to be different from each other, that impels us to respect our differences, and that encourages us to live together in liberty and equality. In sum, understanding our common democratic ideals is the only guarantee that our multicultural society will survive.

As for the charge that a common core of academic learning is "elitist," this is not the place to track down the numberless confusions it embodies. The fact is exactly the reverse. No society seriously striving to be democratic would dare fail to offer to all of its students, of any class, race, sex, or nationality, as much as possible of whatever subject matter it deemed necessary for those who will be expected to govern. We must hope that, with time, the reform reports' demand for a common core will be recognized as the great, long-overdue step toward educational equality that it really is. For nothing has been more elitist than our tracking systems, largely along class, ethnic, and racial lines. These have offered equal access only to drastically unequal education, to an endless array of "life adjustment" courses that do nothing for students' development as critical, competent citizens or cultivated individuals. We have long violated their right to know.

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Finally, we turn to the "knowledge explosion" and the rush of change, supposedly making any particular knowledge obsolete and leading to the dictum that any sort of curriculum, regardless of content, that teaches skills and modes of learning

is as good as any other. In regard to studies that prepare democratic citizens, this is nonsense. The quicker the pace of change, the higher the flood of "knowledge," the more critical it will be for us to understand the ideas, institutions, and events that have shaped our society. The more complex our society becomes—the more anxious and troubled—the less obsolete and the more relevant will be the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, Lincoln's second inaugural address, the *Atlantic Charter*, the civil rights laws. Also the more needed will be the historical and literary knowledge required to grasp their vision and to recognize the conditions that have either nourished or threatened such visions throughout history. What can be obsolete about knowledge that tells us where we have come from and what we ought to be? And this is not to speak of the need to know the rest of the world and our relation to it.

The quicker the pace of change, the more critical it will be for us to understand the ideas, institutions, and events that have shaped our society.

Critics of the common core do not notice how much they take for granted. A recent *Boston Globe* editorial dismissed the idea of "a common body of knowledge" as no longer feasible; culture was too fragmented and knowledge too vast and specialized.[8] Yet the same issue of the *Globe*, in its general news pages, expected readers to know both the facts and the significance of the following items: the Constitution, John Hancock, the Founding Fathers, the rule of law, Parliament, radicalism, moderates, conservatism, nationalism, the Civil War, Reconstruction, Islam, Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism, the Depression, the New Deal, FDR, the Common Market, Nazism, the Politburo, and the Holocaust. Where but in a common, history-centered curriculum could students acquire such political and cultural literacy?

THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN THE CURRICULUM

Of what use is history? Teachers, and textbook authors, need to prepare their own answers. Chapter I presents history as "the chief subject in education for democracy" and goes on to explain why it should be at the heart of a revamped social studies curriculum through every grade, why it is not the enemy but the needed companion of the other social studies. And why—as Jefferson and Burke, de Tocqueville, and so many others have argued—a historical education is nothing less than the precondition for political intelligence.

To the arguments of Chapter I, many others may be added. More directly than any other subject, history tells young people who they are, why they and others think the way they do, how their country and the world arrived at the present situation, and what choices they may have before them. It responds to their

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need to find themselves in time and space, to see where their own lives intersect with the history of the human race. No other subject can so help students place themselves in the larger perspective of the human condition.

Of what special use is history to the citizen? To begin with, it repeatedly teaches a dual lesson: the everlasting difficulty of most human endeavor and the ever-emerging margin of chance to make things better, just enough to impose on citizens the duty to persevere. The story of the past denies us the comforts of both optimism and pessimism. Americans have often rushed from liberal crusades to the most self-centered hopelessness, prey to the disillusion that always follows the unrealistic life expectations of a people unschooled in history.

History sensibly defines heritage as both the good and the bad imposed on us by the past—as what we have to work with, no more and no less. Not treasure alone, it is a mixed legacy of resources and limitations citizens must recognize if their choices are to be realistic. Ignoring the origins, the costs and complexities, and the fragility of our heritage may tempt citizens to assume that everything good from the past is somehow permanent and free for their instant gratification, requiring from them nothing in return.

For policy making, history offers no blueprint, no specific solution to problems. One of its lessons is the folly of expecting such, for the essence of history is change. Still, history reveals much about human behavior; its possibilities and its limits, what may be expected under certain conditions, the danger signs to be considered, the aspirations to be taken into account, the scourges of pride and dogma, and the fruits of endurance and attention to detail. It suggests the insights sometimes gained out of failure and the dangerous temptations that accompany success. Again, its lessons do not say what is certain, but what may sensibly be expected.

In sum, historical study offers the citizen the perspective, the sense of reality and proportion, that is the first mark of political wisdom. As Thomas Mendenhall and James Howard explain in *Making History Come Alive,* the student comes to see that not every difficulty is a problem and not every problem is a crisis.[9] Restraint and good judgment are gained from perspective. Whether difficulty, problem, or crisis, all have their dimensions in time. So often we debate political choices as though nothing had ever happened before, as though the past had left behind no guideposts for our choices. The saddest proof that we have failed to take seriously de Tocqueville's plea to educate democracy is our casual, chaotic, and minimal schooling in history.

WHAT KIND OF HISTORY?

Given the very limited time allowed to history in our schools, what kind of history should be taught? It is both true and too simple to say "all kinds." True, because our students' historical perspective and political sophistication would surely profit from knowing all varieties of historical approach: social, economic, cultural, and political—or local, national, Western, and global. But it is too simple, because there will never be enough time to cover all modes and areas of the discipline—and because the historical synthesis necessary for coherent school texts and courses has not been done. This synthesis is especially lacking in the rapidly growing fields of social, local, and global history, all of which tend to be specialized and fragmented.

Professional historians have little interest, and usually no experience, in helping secondary school teachers to design courses. "Yet synthesis is exactly what we need," says Hazel Hertzberg, if high school courses are to be anything more than "an accumulation of unrelated events." She wisely observes that the attempt would no doubt uncover significant historical questions that specialization ignores: "If even a few institutions made the search for synthesis a basic part of their research and instructional program, we would begin to see results that would spill over into history teaching."[10]

Meanwhile, despite its well-known pitfalls, the most promising kind of history for secondary schools is chronological history, arranged according to major political eras, together with the forces and human decisions that shaped events and institutions. For the education of democratic citizens, there is no substitute for the framework and perspective that narrative political history affords. To drop it in favor of some other sort of history, or for concept-centered social studies, is to drop the story of democracy itself. The great, critical choices affecting all of our lives have been and are made in the political arena. The central human drama is there.

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Undeniably, other forces are at work from the outside, forces no history teacher can ignore—geography, climate, resources, technology, population, social and economic change, tides of passion, the intervening power of other nations. Each must be recognized, for each may shape the choices open to political leaders. Within these limits, the sense or folly of political leadership has again and again determined whether the lives of most ordinary people are bearable, unbearable, or extinguished. The more one is concerned with the fate of the common people, the more closely one must study the "elites" in power. To educate citizens, history must nurture wisdom about politics.

Unhappily, this takes time. The complexity and subtlety of the democratic experience on earth cannot be conveyed in a single course of history or civics. It takes more time than most public schools are as yet willing to allot. And the problem may be worsened by the recent burst of enthusiasm for social history, which is so much in favor among both academicians and social studies educators that it seems about to swamp all other approaches. As so often with fashions in American education, a rush to one side of the boat ignores the need for balance. To cite but one of several recent examples, social history, together with "world perspectives," dominates the latest College Board recommendations for social studies in the secondary curriculum. The authors dismiss political history as "distorted," defining it narrowly as "limited to the rise of nation states or successive occupants of the presidency." And they decry traditional cultural history as "limited to the most sublime intellectual and artistic 'contributions' of a civilization."[11]

The argument for social history invokes the most generous notions of democracy and equality:

> High school students will have the opportunity to investigate and understand people and activities less distant from themselves. This is particularly true of minority and female students. Until recently, members of these groups have seldom had the opportunity to become kings or congressmen, captains of armies or of industry. But social history comes closer to all students. The histories that students are living are set more in the family, the schools, and in the community than in the corridors of political power.

Social history dwells on experiences "common to most students," they continue, mentioning youth and aging; work and leisure; health and illness; race, ethnicity, and religion.

No doubt social history may broaden and enliven historical consciousness, so that students, in the authors' words, may "begin to know history as inquiry, as an active rethinking of the past." Social history is undeniably valuable, and good teachers were using it long before it became fashionable. In combination with political, economic, cultural, and intellectual history, it enriches all and helps illuminate their significance. Happily, the political framework is flexible enough to incorporate most of the other modes of history and, in turn, the others—together with concepts and questions taken from the social sciences—can rescue narrative history from the mere recital of dates and facts so many students have complained about and which speeded its decline as a required subject.

The social historians' argument is not wrong, but it is seri-

ously incomplete. It underplays the fundamental educational need of citizens to understand their common political heritage and its vicissitudes. The ultimate irony would see the vogue for social history reduce even further the chances for "ordinary" people to acquire the political sophistication they need to exercise their hard-won and still-fragile rights and for "non-traditional" students to contribute their own share to the vigor of our multicultural democracy. The question of which history to teach would, of course, be less pressing, less divisive, if American schools were to require a substantial history course as the core of the social studies every year beyond the primary grades, in the European style.

More time in more courses would also be needed to satisfy the current vogue for "global education." Again, it is undeniably important, but its advocates do not acknowledge the needed curricular space. The recent report of the The Study Commission on Global Education sets forth an enormously ambitious range of substance and concepts students ought to know,[12] but nowhere does it admit that the present American curriculum in history and social studies is wholly incapable of carrying such weight. The authors do not recommend additional required courses in history at any level. The College Board's *Academic Preparation in Social Studies* also stresses "worldwide perspectives" but seems to assume that, along with U.S. history, world history will be the second of only two required courses even for the college-bound. Indeed, it urges the dropping of Western civilization and of Ancient and European history, or relegating them to electives. Such courses, the authors say, ignore much of the rest of the world and "only some of the topics treated in them will bear the test of worldwide import and significance."[13] They do not list the "some" topics but dismiss Western-oriented courses out of hand: "the politics and economies discussed in them have less significance for the contemporary world than many other developments in the past."[14] So much for feudalism, capitalism old and new, industrialism, socialism, Communism and imperialism, monarchy, liberalism, democracy, fascism, and Nazism. They do not say what the more significant topics are.

By the nature of their field, global educators must spend a good deal of their time saying nothing very specific but searching for principles of selection. They often suggest rather general organizing themes: the movement from traditional to modern societies, the spread of religions and languages, and the worldwide shift to industrial economies. Again, these are worthy objects of study, as are most of the items in the Commission's catalog of recommendations. But in its enthusiasm the report fails to acknowledge the patent conflict between its high aspirations

and the absurd constrictions of the American secondary school curriculum. It does not wrestle with the plain facts: first, that there is no foundation in most American schooling upon which to build anything close to sophistication about the world's people and world affairs; second, such a foundation would require a drastic reordering of the curriculum, providing substantially more time for history—of the United States and the Western hemisphere, of Western civilization, and of the world. In so zealously pressing for concentration on social history or global education without discussing the changes in curricular structure needed for a balanced and effective program, their advocates lose the chance to illuminate the many-faceted educational needs of a democratic people.

TEXTBOOKS AND THE WORLD HISTORY COURSE

III.

TEXTBOOKS AND THEIR ROLE

Given the sharp debate over so many educational issues, why begin with a study of textbooks? As the foregoing has made clear, it would be senseless to suppose that even the perfect text, were it available, would be the cure for what ails citizenship education in our schools.

Still, textbooks are important. Within the confines imposed by the conditions of teaching, they are likely to determine what teachers will seek to accomplish in their courses, in what order, and what materials they must very often settle for. Textbooks tell the student what is important, what is not important, or, perhaps too often, that there is little difference and no time to look for it anyway. However much teachers and students may complain, the textbook—by virtue of its colorful, expensive, printed presence—is taken as the final authority on most matters, if only because teachers lack the time and resources to offer alternative materials and counterarguments. What is not printed is assumed to be not worth knowing.

Moreover, any sensible study of the trouble with textbooks cannot help but confront all the broader questions about American education. In turn, a look at particular texts, topics, and lessons brings each larger question down to the ordinary daily tasks of classroom teachers—and demonstrates in detail why so much must change in teachers' conditions of work. This review of textbooks should convince readers that nothing much will come from minor adjustments in present courses and programs. The entire American social studies curriculum, from kindergarten through general college courses in history and social

sciences, together with teacher training in history and social studies, all need to be wholly redesigned in structure, methods, and substance.

Meanwhile, my questions here are three: How helpful, or harmful, are these textbooks in educating the young to be knowledgeable citizens? How might texts be made more helpful? And what can teachers do, with or without texts, to encourage engagement and genuine understanding among their students? On the last, I hope that high school teachers will find here concrete ideas and questions immediately useful to their lesson plans. More important, I hope they will be heartened to try out their own ideas and questions, not hesitating to make the time to develop them in their classes by leaving out a good deal that is less compelling.

I hope that high school teachers will find here concrete ideas and questions immediately useful to their lesson plans.

There is no need, either in textbooks or in courses, to cover or "mention" everything. In world history and U.S. history, it is plainly impossible and invariably destructive to try. Even doubling the length of the school year would not suffice. Teachers know that even under the most favorable conditions, an entire class hour is hardly enough to explore a single point of substance in history or politics: whether Machiavelli was a rascal or a reformer; why Aristotle thought that small property was indispensable to a self-governing polity; what Eisenhower meant by the "military-industrial complex." And this says nothing of major themes: the developing notion of individual free will and responsibility in Judaism and Christianity; the simultaneous, contrasting triumphs of absolutism in France and parliamentarism in England; the institution of slavery and the American Civil War; the total wars and total oppressions of the 20th century.

As it is, textbooks give us too much and too little. In their unrelenting encyclopedic coverage, they lose the student in thickets of detail whose significance is often left unexplained. And they give too little space to the big questions and turning points. The ideal text, historian J. H. Hexter says, should be the product of "a resolute determination on the part of its authors to omit any topic about which they have nothing memorable to say, and to omit any fact that cannot be woven into the memorable treatment of a topic." Instead, students find a "collection of vapid generalities and lists of unassimilable facts."[15]

If better texts are to be produced in the future, high school teachers must take part in writing them; good books will not be handed top-down by subject-matter experts or social studies educators on university faculties. That was the mistake of the Sputnik era, when *Academe* and educational think tanks proffered their "teacher-proof" course packages. Most were expensive pedagogical failures, ignoring schoolroom realities and the needs of teachers and students alike.

Better textbooks and teaching materials will emerge only from durable partnerships between high school and university teachers in the same discipline, working as equals who very much need each other to answer two vital questions: What subject matter, from all the learning amassed in their discipline, is most worth teaching? And how can it best be taught, at different levels of schooling, to widely differing kinds of students? In those unhappy circumstances in which other materials are lacking, or teachers are indifferently prepared (or overwhelmed by distractions and too many students), the text ought to be wholly worthy to serve as the student's only companion in learning. In happier circumstances, it ought to facilitate the use of added materials and to serve the expert teacher's imagination.

In better texts to come, authors will openly argue what they believe is most important in history, what they believe students ought to know from the nearly infinite choices available, and why. They will "mention" many fewer items and instead explain more fully the main drama, debate, idea, or institution. They will devote more space to excerpts from original documents, from relevant literary and biographical works. They will linger over critical and controversial issues, offering clear organizing themes to reinforce chronological narrative. They will trust students to wrestle with basic concepts, such as the different views of human nature that underpin every religion and ideology, every political and economic (and educational) theory. In sum, they will be explicit about *why* to study the assigned material and how it relates to larger ideas and developments. They will respond to their student-readers' most persistent and most reasonable questions: So what? What of it? Good teachers do this all the time; so should good texts.

THE PROBLEM OF TIME

No critique of world history textbooks would be fair or intelligible without a prior look at the plight of narrative history in our social studies curriculum. It is mainly absent. The only required course in most states is United States history, usually taught in 11th grade. The next most-offered course, required by only a dozen states and far below U.S. history in enrollment, is some version of world history. It is usually found at the 9th or 10th grade level. In most localities, no other history is required, even on the college-bound track.

Although many K-8 social studies programs include some American history in the fifth and eighth grades, almost none prescribe any other particular historical content, Western or non-Western, ancient or modern, for any other grade. The pre-high school course in "world cultures" or "world peoples"

sometimes offered in the sixth or seventh grade rarely includes a historical framework and is often (sensibly) confined to one or two "cultures" chosen by the teacher, the school, or the district. One term may be devoted to Russia, the next to Japan; in a neighboring school, the choices may be Mexico and India; yet another may select a globe-trotting survey of dozens of societies on every continent.

The general incoherence of the K-12 social studies curriculum in so many American school districts puts the authors of world history texts in an impossible situation. Apart from certain elementary notions of U.S. history, they can assume no common knowledge whatever—no common cultural, political, or historical literacy in the minds of their 9th- and 10th-grade students, aged 14 through 16! Moreover, they know that most of them will never again be exposed to courses in any other sort of non-U.S. history or even current world problems courses.

Years of trying the impossible have aroused distaste for "history" among students.

What are authors to do? As conscientious educators, necessarily attuned to the demands of the market, they tend to include everything that anybody has ever said is important to "cover," all supposedly to be gotten through in a single year, without the aid of any prior background. It is not possible to compose a good text in this way, much less to teach an effective course. Years of trying the impossible have aroused distaste for "history" among students, as has the usually overloaded and underanalyzed U.S. history course of the 11th grade. Not surprisingly, many social studies educators have wanted to abandon narrative history in favor of "concept" courses. But these cannot take history's place in educating citizens. Only narrative history provides the perspective, the changing context, and the complexities to ground the social studies in reality.

To draw the sharpest possible contrast to our problem of time, we may look at the place of history in the French public schools, which now graduate as high a proportion of young people from high school as we do. In grades five and six, they survey the major periods in French history. In middle school, grades 7 through 10, they do a four-year cycle of world history, coordinated with geography, demography, and economics, taught by the same teacher in the same course. The entire first year is devoted to prehistory, early world civilizations, Greece, Rome, Judaism, and Christianity (the other world religions follow in the 8th grade) and the onset of the Middle Ages. The middle years proceed in chronological order. In grade 10, the final year of common schooling obligatory for all students—regardless of track—the history course begins at the end of the 19th century and concludes with current world problems. The three years of required history for those students (the majority) who continue on through the *lycee* (*grades 11, 12, and terminale*)

return to a detailed study of France since 1789 and her relations with Europe, with other industrialized nations, and with the Third World. Some emphasis is on politics: revolution, imperialism, war, ideologies, decolonization, and comparative government. But history and geography also embrace scientific, technological, economic and social change, and accompanying courses in the humanities deal with major currents in the arts and thought. This common program for all students, regardless of track, nonetheless leaves the choice of emphases, texts, materials, and pedagogy to the schools. Building grade to grade, the curriculum offers ample time for French history, its broader Western setting, and every major non-Western society, as well as the study of relevant methods and concepts of the social sciences. It should be added that France, like the United States, has experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization in a society that is increasingly multicultural.

If we, too, enjoyed seven years of postelementary history-centered social studies, we would not have to make unpleasant choices between Western and non-Western history. But we have no such luxury, and there our problems are rooted. Our society's educational tradition precludes, of course, any nationally mandated curricula. But we surely may hold school districts, perhaps even states, responsible for imposing some higher measure of sense on instructional programs than now prevails. True, major reform proposals ask that history be given more time. But not much has changed so far and, in effect, 9th- or 10th-grade world history is usually the only course that even a minority of our students take in addition to the required U.S. history course. Although extolled by some as the centerpiece for global consciousness, it is by itself probably counterproductive in bringing students to face and to understand global realities, the lives of other people, and our choices in regard to them. No single course can make up for years of wasted time, and it certainly cannot enable students to understand other cultures before they have confronted the historical complexities of their own.

THE QUESTION OF CONTENT

If students have done no systematic study of the history of Western civilization before the 9th or 10th grade, it must become the heart of whatever course is then offered. Why emphasize Western civilization? Simply because American history and ideas, and the vision and fate of democracy on earth, are not intelligible without a prior grasp of the life and ideas of Greece and Rome, Judaism and Christianity, Islam and Christendom in the Middle Ages, feudalism, the Renaissance and the Reformation, absolutism, the English Revolution, the Enlightenment,

the French Revolution, and the comparative experiences of Europe and the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries.

What of non-Western history and cultures? Does a focus on Western civilization not leave out much of the past for native Americans, Afro-Americans, and Asian-Americans? The first response is that a well-ordered, junk-free, 12-year curriculum would have plenty of room for the study of non-Western cultures. The second, more immediate, response arises from the nature and needs of any society. Whether by past force or recent choice, the people of non-Western origins living in this country are now part of a community whose ideas and institutions, for good and ill, grow out of the Western experience. Whether they seek to enjoy and enrich the society or to exploit or overthrow it, all citizens need to know much more about it than most do now. And there is little hope that mainstream Americans can come to sympathetic understanding of strangers in their midst, or of foreign lands and cultures, without first facing up to the historical record of the best and worst in themselves. It simply makes no sense for our schools to start anywhere but with the Western experience. They must start from the beginning. As Rousseau would say, we all now owe each other a close knowledge of our origins as partners in a social contract.

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. . . a well-ordered, junk-free, 12-year curriculum would have plenty of room for the study of non-Western cultures.
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Nobody can quarrel with those who insist that the study of Western civilization is by itself seriously insufficient, given the diversity of our own people and the precarious interdependence of the world community. But, once again, it is time that is seriously insufficient. It is senseless for historians, whose first lesson is that time limits all possibility, to be fighting for space in a single year of the social studies curriculum, when other years yawn empty before us. It is senseless, too, to have that single year so fragmented by demands for multicultural education that our students fail to comprehend the roots and needs of the democratic political vision that best promises to nourish peace and justice in a multicultural society.

What, then, are the essential elements of a Western-based 9th- or 10th-grade course? Any historian, whether high school teacher or university professor, could make a list of topics that ought not only to be "covered" but understood. The topics selected for this review reflect the assumption, of course, that one major theme should be the evolution of democracy on earth—its origins, advances, and failures—and those economic, social, military, religious, cultural, and moral forces that have worked for and against it. The list has no claim to completeness, even for the study of democracy. As any teacher will see, it is not a complete syllabus for world history. It leaves out a good number of vital subjects, even for the study of Western history.

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38

It assumes the teacher will wish to pursue one or more additional organizing themes suitable to the course.

Although the topics center upon the history of Western civilization, they do not plead for Western ways. Nor are they a parade of "treasured heritages"—that was the error of certain courses in the past. The focus is on the West not because it is inherently better than other civilizations but because it has produced liberal democracy and many of the moral values that sustain it. This is not to say that no other civilization was capable of doing so, but it was in fact the West that did it, and we need to know how.

Although the topics center upon the history of Western civilization, they do not plead for Western ways.

It was also the West and not another civilization that produced from within itself the deadliest enemies of democracy, Bolshevism and Nazism, and we need to know why. We focus on the West because it has sought and created unprecedented prosperity, social decency, moral codes, and cultural riches we must sustain, and also because it has generated violence, social oppression and exploitation, and cultural and moral degradation we must confront. In short, the object is to place us in our own reality, the only ground from which we can hope to make sense of ourselves, of others, and of the world.

The textbooks will be examined according to the following topics:

1) Why study history?
2) The legacy of the Greeks.
3) The fall and legacy of Rome.
4) Basic ideas of Judaism and Christianity.
5) The Middle Ages as a source of representative government.
6) The triumph of the British Parliament in the 17th century.
7) Ideas from the Enlightenment.
8) The American and French Revolutions.
9) The major ideologies of the 19th century.
10) Nation-states, nationalism, and imperialism.
11) World War I—before and after.
12) Totalitarianism, left and right.
13) Appeasement and democratic foreign policy.
14) Democracy in the world since 1945.

LOOKING AT THE TEXTS

As we examine the textbooks along the lines of these topics, certain questions concern us. Within the limits and purpose of

the world history course, what do the texts contribute to the students' knowledge of political democracy? As basic materials in the social studies curriculum for civic education, do they make clear the essential ideas and elements of a free society? Are the contrasts between free and unfree governments set forth? Are democracy's origins, development, and present situation in the world made clear? Will students find the facts and explanations they need to comprehend those forces that have nourished democracy—and those that have opposed and frustrated it?

On the other hand, are the sources, ideas, and institutions of authoritarian and totalitarian societies, past and present, equally clear? Is the coverage honest and balanced? Are all societies, past and present, put into reasonable perspective and all, including our own, judged by coherent and consistent standards? Finally, are major themes and questions set forth and the relevant facts, ideas, and explanations offered in ways likely to engage the student and facilitate the teacher's work?

It may be objected that to judge world history texts by a list of mainly Western topics is unreasonable. By their nature, they will not have the space for the kind of explanation, or enough of the vital documents, to suffice by themselves as bases for genuine comprehension. But the purpose of world history is precisely to capture the essence of each major world civilization. How well a text succeeds in capturing our own is a fair question. If it does well, providing a good framework—however lean—the teacher may add the materials and time for an effective course. If it fails, and becomes an obstacle, it will have failed in its purpose as a world history text. This is doubly serious, for in the absence of European history and Western civilization courses, world history is the only course in which students can learn of their own heritage.

In fact, the worst problems do not often arise from insufficient space given to things Western. Except in particular cases cited below, they are failures to select, and to explain in the space available, the most important facts and ideas about the subject being treated. In turn, these failures arise from the authors' neglect of major themes or "great questions" around which to organize their materials. The results are curious, but frustrating to both teachers and students. The authors, perfectly adept at finding themes and questions, find all too many. Reluctant to leave any out, they bunch them all into end-of-chapter reviews instead of choosing a few beforehand as guides by which to order their text material. Teachers and students repeatedly confront questions of significance at the end of chapters that contain little of the information needed to answer them, as though "mentioning" questions is enough. "What did

you want us to get out of this?!" may annoy teachers mightily, but it is a question better put to textbook authors, who should begin their work with the best answers they can contrive, and only then proceed to Chapter One.

The texts to be reviewed here were chosen from the approved list of adoption states and large school districts. Publishers do not reveal actual sales figures, but the following five texts seem to have been the most widely approved for adoption in 1985:

Wallbank, T. Walter, *et al.: History and Life: The World and Its People, Second Edition,* Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982. 720 pp.

Kownslar, Allan O., and Terry L. Smart: *People and Our World: A Study of World History,* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981. 693 pp.

Beers, Burton F.: *World History: Patterns of World Civilization,* Prentice-Hall, 1983, 752 pp.

Mazour, Anatole G., John Peoples, and Theodore K. Rabb: *People and Nations: A World History,* Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1983. 801 pp.

Roselle, Daniel, *Our Common Heritage: A World History* Ginn and Company, 1984, 633 pp.

WHY STUDY HISTORY?

IV.

None of the texts defines what history is, how it is written, what its strengths and weaknesses may be, how it relates to the student's life and other studies, or what connection it could have with preparing thoughtful and informed citizens. Four of the five say nothing at all to students about what they should get out of the book—the first thing everybody ought to be thinking about. Only Mazour offers a page and a half, entitled "History and You," and even then apologizes to the student that it "may seem a strange way to start a book about the history of the world"! The section is bland and short, too full of sweeping questions too briefly put.

How has geography affected the course of history? How have people organized their economies? How have people been governed? How have people gained knowledge? How have different religions arisen and influenced people's lives? How have nations settled their conflicts? Why have they risen or declined? Each is followed by a few sub-questions, all left equally general. Class discussion would be better stirred by a longer section, posing fewer questions but pulling the students and their beliefs, the United States, and the Western world sharply into the middle of debatable issues. It could preview controversies to come and suggest to students what they would have to know before taking a stand they could defend.

None of the texts introduces its major concerns or organizing themes.

None of the texts introduces its major concerns or organizing themes. Again, authors could enliven their works by telling students outright what they think most vital and why, what they plan to leave out, and how their choice of themes affects the structure of the book and its content. Why not let the students

in on the problems the historians face right from the start? Then, throughout the book, why not make explicit to students how their themes and choices are working out—and what they should be getting out of it? Seasoned teachers may well begin their courses with a discussion of their own on the uses of history and major themes, but it is much easier to do so if the text provides some argument to start with, to illustrate, to counter, or to add to. And it would be much easier thereafter to draw the students into examining the text's own success in living up to its promises.

For example, Mazour promises in "History and You" that students will learn the "power of ideas, such as the belief that every human being has worth and dignity that must be respected," and the growth and decline of such ideas. But the promise is never carried out in practice. Like all the others, Mazour is weak on the history of ideas. Whether out of choice or inadvertence, it is a pedagogical mistake. Contrary to certain educational notions, students of high school age can be sensibly engaged in the relations, and contradictions, between beliefs and facts and in debates among beliefs.

The charge that "intellectual history" is beyond high school freshmen and sophomores need not deter the teacher. Ideas are simply other kinds of facts.

The charge that "intellectual history" is beyond high school freshmen and sophomores need not deter the teacher. Ideas are simply other kinds of facts. That some people are optimistic about human nature and see no need for prisons, and that others think the opposite, are facts. They are forces in history and everyday life, not nearly so abstract as many other concepts offered in social studies, not nearly so difficult to remember as hundreds of other facts in history texts. Students' lives from playground to dinner table to endless television drama are full of arguments over human nature, over the reasons for good and bad behavior, and for choosing some "values" over others.

To draw them into the general question over how people have been governed, for example, requires a running accompaniment of arguments over how people can, or should, or must be governed. The aim is not to arrive at a quick, right answer, but to demonstrate the significance of ideas and human choice—and the play of both facts and beliefs upon such choice. It is probably not possible to meet that perennial challenge, "So what? What of it?" without opening up the great questions of human nature, human needs, and human possibilities—and following them throughout the study of history.

Why not pose the big questions right away, letting the discussion start at any level? Are people born with good, altruistic natures? If so, why not let them grow up without rules and thereafter let them run free? Are they born mainly perverse, needing to be whipped into shape, watched over, and kept in

fear of punishment ever after? Are they born blank, ready to go either way according to environment and education? Are they born with active tendencies toward both good and bad behavior? If so, do they have the will to choose for themselves? What circumstances seem to bring out better behavior—or worse? Do people change significantly as their lives go on? What makes it happen? Are human beings equal? Are human beings alike? Are these the same? Does the answer to either question suggest how they should be treated?

Are human beings equal? Are human beings alike? Are these the same?

It does not matter what level of erudition the students bring to bear at first. What matters is that they see—and are constantly reminded—that most of the great historical struggles pushing the world into its present situation have been fought over the different answers proclaimed by religious, political, economic, and social activists. What matters is that they see the need to wrestle with the same questions for themselves if they are to develop their own ideas about everything in life from religion to politics to bringing up children. What are people like? What do they need? How much can they do? And then to pose the assignment at hand: what answers do the experiences of history suggest?

This is only one step from asking what history can do for citizenship. Apart from the many possible variations of the arguments offered in Chapter II, teachers may begin anywhere. For example, how does the citizen achieve the dignity of free choice? Free choice is achieved only by grasping the alternatives possible in public and private life. By spreading before the student the great range of ideologies, of ways to think about society and their own lives (and afterlives) that people have tried over the centuries, history makes free choice possible. At the same time, it demands the kind of critical thinking indispensable to choice. History demands that fact be confronted, complicating our own wishes and others' slogans. The enemy of abstraction, it forces us ever back to reality, making us wait for evidence upon which to judge events, people, and their talk.

History vastly extends our experience. What students cannot know in person of the lives and fate of others, they can know indirectly. Together with literature, drama, film, and the other arts, history reveals realities beyond our senses—the work of coal miners and other heroes, the Holocaust and other evils—without which we are prisoners of our milieu. Students already know that direct and second hand experience clarify each other. The more they know of life, the better they will understand history—and the other way around. We owe it to them to make the point as often and as imaginatively as possible that their lives and their schooling are not two separate realms.

To take but one example, they already know—from life on the playground or on the street—history's great law of consequence: whatever is done, or not done, will probably have its price, to be paid by somebody (often innocent) sooner or later. It will not surprise them to find this law at work in the origins of the First World War, in the history of American slavery and the Civil War, or in the French subjugation of Indochina. What looks to one generation like a quick, clever, cheap solution to one problem may turn to cataclysm and anguish for the next, or the next after. Seeing this is already not so far from political wisdom.

Seeing this is already not so far from political wisdom.

The discussion over the uses of history should run throughout the course. It is not a pep talk for September. As "lessons" and "laws" and "answers" and "warnings" seem to pop up, they need to be scrutinized for their worth and limits. As the course nears the present, students should be well aware of the use and abuse of history by advocates of one action or another. But the tough, connected narrative must come first. From the start, the difficulty of studying history must be admitted to students. The complicated facts are not easy to remember or to apply; they may not be popular with all students or stay in their minds. But taught honestly, concentrating on truth and on the questions that grip many young people, history will earn their lifelong respect—no small thing to confer on future citizens.

THE LEGACY OF THE GREEKS

V.

In reviewing their appropriateness for citizenship education, we will not often fault these textbooks for errors of commission. Each text has real strengths, many passages of well-wrought detail, and explanations of important points that testify to the authors' expertise, good judgment, and devotion to the task at hand.

Rather, their weakness lies in lost opportunities to deal with key points in the history of political democracy. It lies in the omission of points or explanations that could have strengthened and clarified central themes vital to political sophistication (and which, for the most part, the authors themselves consider to be important, judging by their own review questions and exercises).

Their treatment of the political legacy of ancient Greece is the first case in point. How have people been governed, and how should they be? Each text has something to say about Athenian democracy as a great contribution to Western civilization, about the contrast between direct and representative democracy, and about the severe restrictions on who could be a citizen. Their narratives of reform and development from Solon through Pericles are generally clear. But Greek ideas about how people ought to be governed—ideas that have been more influential in the world than the example of Athenian democracy in practice—are not to be found. "Mentioned," they are neither described nor explained—and not for lack of space.

Kownslar may serve as a first example. Plato is described only as a "famous pupil of Socrates who wrote about the philosophical problems that people have faced for centuries," including "what kind of government would produce the most

good." But all we read of *The Republic* is that scholars "had the most knowledge and intelligence" and so they would rule. But why? Is there nothing to question here? Missing is Plato's view of human nature, his notion that virtuous behavior depends upon the rarest qualities of intellect. Students are left with a fact to memorize, but nothing to discuss—or to compare with Aristotle, who appears next. The passage on Aristotle and politics is worth quoting as an example of description without explanation:

Students are left with a fact to memorize, but nothing to discuss—or to compare with Aristotle, who appears next.

> He classified governments, for example, according to whether they were headed by one man, by a few men, or by many men, and showed how there were good and bad governments.

Here the authors lose the chance to prepare the students' political vocabulary. They leave out Aristotle's famous six forms of government: kingship, aristocracy, and polity—"good" forms because they are exercised in the common interest of all the people; tyranny, oligarchy, and "democracy" (rule by the mob)—"bad" forms that occur when rulers govern in their own selfish interests. Without these basic terms, there is nothing even to memorize.

So Kownslar cannot thereafter name Aristotle's favored type of government, a self-governing polity—what we call "democracy"—but only confuse the student by commenting that governance ought to be in the hands of "a large middle class." What are 20th-century American students to make of that? Aristotle's view of human nature—that virtuous behavior most likely arises from secure but modest economic circumstances, small property, farms, businesses, and crafts—is left out. It was not the presence of what we would call today "a large middle class" that would make the polity work, but the absence of extreme wealth on the one hand and large numbers of the very poor on the other, since neither condition bred patient, moderate, unselfish behavior in public affairs.

Do you behave nicely because you are wise or because you feel secure?

Students of 9th- or 10th-grade standing can perfectly well grasp the contrasting notions of Plato and Aristotle at this level. They can argue them long beyond the class time available, especially if they have read well-chosen excerpts from *The Republic* and *Politics*. Do you behave nicely because you are wise or because you feel secure? Are there other possibilities and combinations? Whence decent public conduct and what does that mean for forms of government under different circumstances? It is a continuing theme of central importance, and none of the texts seizes the chance to launch it here (including Mazour, which raises the questions in its own introduction). On Aristotle's political ideas, Mazour says only that he "studied the political organization of 150 city-states and put down his conclu-

sions in a book called *Politics*." "What of it?" we can hear the students ask.

The remaining three texts take the same fragmented approach. Wallbank tells us that Plato's best-known work is *The Republic*, which "describes an imaginary land in which each person does the work that suits that individual best" and philosophers rule "in the interests of all." On Aristotle, the following is said:

> In his *Politics*, Aristotle wrote about the good and bad features of different kinds of government: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Unlike Plato, he did not describe an imaginary state, nor did he find a single ideal system. *Politics* serves to point out an important difference between Plato and Aristotle. Plato often appears to deal only with abstract ideas. Aristotle seems more down-to-earth.

Beers notes only that Plato explained his concept of the ideal state in *The Republic*, where he said "the ruler of such a state should be a philosopher-king." On Aristotle, Beers brushes against the idea of virtue and moral behavior as a "balance between extremes," adding that he praised "the virtue of self-control and self-reliance." What kind of society or government might nurture these qualities is left unsaid. The passage closes in the most general terms:

> His writings include works on logic, politics, philosophy, biology, botany, and the arts. In each of these fields, Aristotle's ideas have remained influential.

Roselle, finally, has Plato say that only "the wisest men and women should rule the people." Aristotle is described as "interested" in many fields, politics among them. Of what he said, we get only a hint: "People should learn to live with each other" and anyone "who is unable to live in society or who has no need to do so must be either a beast or a god."

Apart from failing to introduce here or, for the most part, anywhere else, the fundamental debates among political ideas and their roots in ideas about human nature, the text authors also lose the chance to dramatize the common humanity of figures like Plato and Aristotle. Nothing is said of what their city of Athens was undergoing at the moment of their struggles to clarify their own ideas of governance, nothing of why they should distrust democracy as practiced by their fellow citizens.

As noted above, the texts do somewhat better at narrative history. Each recites the evolution from monarchy to democracy in Athens, noting the social and economic forces at work. Each draws the contrast to Sparta. Each is clear on the nature of direct democracy and on its severe limitations. Although

women, slaves, and foreigners were excluded, the authors resist the temptation to judge Athens by present standards and praise Greek willingness to consult even a substantial minority of the people as an extraordinary step.

Mazour applauds the Greeks as "the first people to experiment successfully with the idea that citizens might govern themselves," and Roselle calls them the first to "discard the idea that one person or a few persons had the right to rule over all the people." Wallbank adds that citizens, though a minority, were equal before the law—another reason for calling Athens a model for democracy.

Beers prefaces the first of two chapters on Greece, and overall the best account, with excerpts from Pericles' funeral oration, noting that it was recreated by Thucydides:

> Our system of government is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law. When it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership in a particular class but the actual ability which the man possesses. . . . Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well. . . . We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.

Wallbank also provides an excerpt, calling it propaganda in a nonpejorative sense—that of Pericles seeking "to spread ideas and beliefs." Both texts stress the notion that public service was an expected, honorable duty for worthy Greeks to perform and that this, too, was a legacy to the Western world.

[The texts] do not make explicit the terrible failure of Athenian democracy to survive the temptations that accompany victory, power, and wealth.

Although all the texts suggest in one way or another that the quality of public life did not in actuality live up to Greek statements of ideals, they do not make explicit the terrible failure of Athenian democracy to survive the temptations that accompany victory, power, and wealth.

That Athens was a democracy at home and imperialist abroad is noted but not made graphic. Each book recites the fall of Athens from her peak of power and prestige at the end of the Persian Wars (c. 479 B.C., the battle of Plataea) to her total, humiliating defeat at the hands of Sparta in 404 B.C. Most of the texts say that the Athenians took advantage of their former allies, and Kownslar remarks that Pericles was a democrat at home yet "very aggressive" abroad.

But the degree of arrogance and cruelty toward weaker states is not presented, nor is the rising hubris that was to

destroy Athens. No authors describe how demagogues sought public favor—and undermined the democratic system—by their reckless attacks on other Greek cities, culminating in the expedition to Syracuse that opened the way to Sparta's victory.

Mazour says only, as Thucydides remarked, that both Athens and Sparta were "full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms." But Thucydides' great lesson on the ravages of pride is not invoked (as George C. Marshall invoked it as his warning to us shortly after the great American victories of 1945).

In vain had Pericles cautioned before his death against rushing into action before consequences could be carefully considered. He himself had had to bend before a prideful public opinion. The drama of democracy's birth and some of her vulnerabilities could not be more compelling. It is not too much to say that Athenian democracy's failure to resist the lure of empire led to her own destruction. But, although the texts miss the chance to suggest it, the raw facts are there and teachers can elaborate upon them.

Finally, the texts offer a basis upon which to build a lesson on the relations among education, character, and citizenship. Scattered remarks on Greek education, Greek drama, philosophy, and the classical tradition appear in all of the texts. Beers is the most complete, beginning with a paragraph on "Training for Athenian Citizenship" and citing grammar, public speaking, memorization of passages from the epics and histories, and encouragement to debate art, politics, and philosophy. For a "sound mind in a sound body," there were sports, gymnastics, and military training.

Beers includes a page on Sophocles' *Antigone* as a tragic clash between individual and government. "More than most ancient peoples," he observes, "the Greeks were concerned with defining the rights and responsibilities of the citizen." Their answers were not simple. The clash between right and right was to be expected in life and politics. Beers reinforces the point, though not explicitly, with Socrates' choice of death over exile.

The recognition and acceptance of tragedy was fundamental to Greek thought, or at least to the sort of Greek thought posterity has chosen to regard as central to the Greek legacy. (Here teachers could usefully suggest how selective, and perhaps quite untypical, a people's "legacy" may turn out to be!) At the same time, Greek thinkers expressed great faith in the power of human reason to sweep away mystery and to discover natural laws explaining the universe. Beers describes this faith, as well as the approach of Herodotus and Thucydides to history, as the rational study of human behavior and its laws.

Although Beers describes Greek art and architecture as

striving for harmony and proportion, the broader meaning of classicism is omitted. Mazour, Kownslar, and Roselle also name the characteristics of classical art—harmony, balance, order, restraint—without using the term. None of the texts makes the connection between the Greeks' ideal of style in the arts with their repeated exhortations for the same harmony, balance, order, and restraint in human behavior. Nor does any suggest that exhortation to moderate behavior becomes most insistent among people who tend to behave otherwise and most need reminding. Beneath the classical Golden Age was nearly unbroken restlessness, violence, and aggression.

In any case, from the bits and pieces to be found in these books, teachers may well suggest that for many Greeks it was axiomatic that good moral character and good citizenship arose from a healthy well-roundedness. Men who had developed all of their human possibilities to the limit—physical, aesthetic, civic, intellectual—would win dignity. They would be at peace with themselves and thereby with others. They would be proud but not arrogant, unafraid, unenvious, and self-disciplined, ruled by a code of personal honor and civic duty. This, at least, was the ideal and, as such, was much admired and sought after by educators ever since. It was the civic side of classicism that was so respected by 18th-century thinkers and politicians, including the American founders.

At quite another level, the texts' failure to consider the broader meaning of classicism is a chance lost to introduce students to the great debate with Romanticism. Are music, painting, literature, dress, and public behavior better served by reason or by emotion? By restraint or by exuberance? By form and balance and convention or by spontaneity, fantasy, and free subjective innovation?

What student would have no opinion on these choices?

What student would have no opinion on these choices—or could not be brought to appreciate various choices according to various aspects of life? Whatever is said may be usefully related to matters of historical substance, from the Greeks onward, for in both politics and war the rival modes of Classical and Romantic heroism have had striking consequences.

In sum, however, the main failing of these texts is to leave out any coherent account of Greek political ideas: Plato's faith in intellect, reason, and education; Aristotle's vision of a democratic polity that depends on public moderation and a healthy economic and social balance; and the two philosophers' differing views of human nature and of what brings out the best in people. A good text would also explain how Plato's and Aristotle's own experiences of public life could have affected their political ideas, most particularly the failure of Athenian democracy to survive its demagogues and the temptations of empire.

52

THE FALL AND LEGACY OF ROME

VI.

Until the French Revolution, the fall of the Roman empire occupied historians as the greatest upheaval in human history. The 18th-century revolutionary leaders in Europe and America looked to the decline of Rome for dangers to guard against as they struggled to order their own societies for the future. Several, including Jefferson and Robespierre, thought Aristotle had foreseen the root cause in the rising extremes of wealth and penury, the destruction of family farms, and the modest middle classes. "Lessons" from Rome abounded, as each generation read different meanings into the mass demoralization of a once-invincible people.

Curiously, the first thing missing from these and other textbooks is the human drama itself—the violence, terror, anguish, fury, and despair of a society in disintegration. In their concern to cover so much, the authors fail to pause on episodes most likely to reach students' feelings. History is first of all an awesome story; emotion is not out of place. Indeed, many events are obscured or distorted when blood, tears, and suspense are drained away. Admittedly, not every such event can be paused over and brought back to life with needed detail, original documents, and literary and pictorial images. But some must be, especially those we look to for perspective, special insight, and example.

The decay of Rome is an obvious choice on an epic scale, as is the French Revolution, the Western Front of 1914-18, or the Holocaust. Historians and teachers make their own choices of other moments deserving full dramatic portrayal: the destruction of the Spanish Armada and the siege of Stalingrad; Gettysburg and the Battle of Britain; Galileo and the Curies; Magellan

and the landing on the moon. To leave all such episodes recessed in gray, undifferentiated narrative is to hide from students the heights and depths of human possibility.

Aside from the drama, what of the great historical puzzle of decline and fall? These texts offer varying degrees of analysis. Kownslar offers but 1 page in a chapter of 21, without looking for causes beyond the Roman Empire's sheer size and the inability of the emperors to control the army, the pressure of Germanic tribes, and "internal strife and repeated warfare." Yet in the section review, students are asked to discuss the reasons for Rome's decline, to explain in general why important countries decline, and to pronounce on the strengths and weaknesses of Roman culture. Rome's economic and social problems are unconnected to the collapse, appearing 10 pages earlier, under "Building the Empire."

Two of the other texts do only somewhat better in wrestling with cause. Wallbank divides its relevant material between the end of its chapter on Rome and the start of a chapter on Christendom, with major emphasis on the pressure of Germanic invasions. Roselle, which does have a strong section on Roman life, law, and architecture, devotes two pages to the decline and fall. Like Wallbank, it is brief on internal problems, long on barbarian invasions. Neither tells students about the historical debates that have raged ever since.

It is a lost opportunity, for the multifarious reasons offered by historians present the best chance, until the French Revolution, to acquaint students with sharply contending schools of thought. Since these often quarrel over the relative importance of politics, economics, social forces, and cultural and moral factors, this is also the best early occasion to introduce students to the helpful device of grouping their facts under political, economic, social, cultural, and moral headings. It helps them to define and clarify each of these categories of life and history, and then to exercise their "critical thinking" by looking for connections and influences among them. The object, of course, is not to find the single right answer (there usually is none) but to open their minds to the complexities of cause and to the danger of oversimplifying out of dogma or abstraction.

Very few subjects promise a richer array of possible reasons for a society's decline, with so many overtones that students will recognize from current debates over the health of their own society. Although there is always the danger of falling into "presentism," it is worth reviewing with them all of the great range of conditions historians have found to blame. In the political and military spheres, factors include the failure of civilian control of the soldiers; the absence of regular, peaceful means to ensure the imperial succession; military politics at the

capital; the sheer size of a static empire; bureaucratic overcomplexity and corruption; the death of local government and local responsibility; the mercenary rather than citizen army; the chaos and inequities of the tax system; the vagaries of the personalities in power; the barbarian pressures at the frontiers; and the many short-term reasons for repeated military defeats. And this is only a start.

On the economic side, explanations have ranged from soil exhaustion, a shrinking tax base, and flight from the land to monopolies, inequities of wealth, loss of incentives and managerial competence, inflation, welfare costs, tax burdens, fraud and profiteering, the absence of technological advances, and a general inability to cope with the end of profits from imperial expansion.

In social matters, some have pointed to the decimation of the middle class and of small- and middle-scale farmers, to the pauperized urban masses—violent and sullen, ready to be swayed, bought, or manipulated. Others have stressed the shrinking population, the influx of new peoples, the decline of family and parental authority, and generalized class polarization and class hatred, exacerbated by every new difficulty and crisis.

Gibbon is not the only historian to blame Christianity for undermining the unity and morale of the Romans. Others have seen Christianity as dividing the most serious and well-meaning people against each other; of spurring hostility to authority and necessary hierarchies; of inciting antimilitarism, antiimperialism, and the ridicule of Roman tradition and patriotism; of encouraging intolerance, moral arrogance, puritanism, and perfectionism; and of pressing the young to "drop out" of earthly strivings for success and recognition.

Finally, in the realm of culture and morals, historians have indicted the private character of Stoicism on the one hand and what they see as growing self-indulgence and hedonism on the other. They see apathy, alienation, and loss of civic pride in a centralized empire so vast it seemed beyond the reach of any individual or group to direct. They thus see the Romans as resigning themselves to political helplessness and fatalism about forces beyond human control. Other observers lay before the reader the public grossness of the prosperous and the brutishness of illiterate, hopeless masses. They describe escapism everywhere—in astrology, alcoholism, drugs, obscenity, sexual obsessions, mystery cults, and spectacles of death and mutilation in the arena and theatre. In sum, they point to moral decadence, loss of higher purpose, and failure of nerve, with the dizzying multiplicity of problems overwhelming even the best, brightest, and noblest of Romans.

It does not require much textbook space to list these many-

faceted assertions and the major arguments or examples used to support them. Not a few of these emerged from historians quite obviously concerned with flagellating their own societies, from Rome itself to modern America. Once more, the point is not to arrive at a single, settled answer, although several historians have produced impressive lists of documented causes in one reasonable order or other. It is to awaken students' ability to place themselves in other times, to sense through the Roman drama the very many aspects of any society they must explore before proffering easy answers.

Of the five texts under review, two do rather well in this exercise of historical analysis. Beers offers a four-page section, "Collapse of the Empire," on political, economic, and social forces, following its treatment of the division of the Empire, the attempts of Diocletian and Constantine to stem the tide, and an account of the barbarian invasions. It also includes a boxed exercise asking students to examine one Roman author's views on the indulgence of the wealthy and the brutal amusements of the poor.

Mazour provides comparable space and detail but carries analysis one step further by explaining how various factors—political, economic, social, cultural, military, and personal—acted upon each other in a complicated downward spiral of Roman power. By adding well-chosen original materials or summaries of historians' arguments, teachers could build a satisfactory lesson in historical cause on either of the two latter texts. But without a sharper sense of what was at stake and the scale of human tragedy that attended Rome's fall, students might find the analysis of cause less compelling than teachers would wish.

. . . no saga offers clearer proof that the quality of political leadership can make a difference.

Several of the texts speak of "good" emperors and "bad" emperors without clarifying the traits and policies that differentiate each sort. The drama of Roman politics could be enhanced for students if the texts pointed out that many of the conditions blamed for the fall had been present even from the Augustan age, four centuries earlier. Both good and bad emperors had struggled with them, and no saga offers clearer proof that the quality of political leadership can make a difference.

Some of the good emperors followed immediately upon periods of chaos and insecurity. They profited from the general desire for order and predictability. It was easier for them to gain support, even sacrifice, for sound policies. They were more able to prepare their successors, to control the military at home and in the provinces, and to sustain employment through public works. They collected taxes which, though often heavy, were fairly distributed and predictable. They kept careers open to talent and rooted out corruption in the higher civil service. They

strove to restore agriculture and resettled people on the land. Personal character played its part; better men won admiration and loyalty. Here a biographical vignette or two would bring political history to a human level.

It would also illuminate the Roman legacy in law and government. Trajan (98-117 A.D.), for example, urged fairness to accused Christians:

> Information without the accuser's name subscribed must not be admitted in evidence against anyone, as it is introducing a very dangerous precedent and by no means agreeable to the spirit of the age.

In the matter of Roman law, the texts are uneven in their coverage. Kownslar and Wallbank are extremely brief. The latter cites none of Roman law's principles and Kownslar is content to remark that it combined flexibility with universality. Beers, Mazour, and Roselle are explicit on the importance of Roman law to Western Europe ever since. They explain the notion of a common standard of justice applicable to all citizens equally, at the same time interpreted by judges according to local customs and circumstances. Among the common principles were the presumption of innocence until the accused was proved guilty and consistent rules for the admission of evidence.

Finally, on the subject of the Roman republic and its legacy to Western political forms, Wallbank is the only text too brief to be helpful. Beers, Mazour, and Roselle all provide a full narrative on the republic, with ample detail on its complicated sets of counterbalancing authorities, but none is explicit on the separation of powers that Romans sought—and later theorists saw—in their system of government.

Kownslar is the clearest in this instance, calling the veto what it was—a safeguard to ensure no branch or officer of government seized dominance over the others. Kownslar is also alone among the texts to point out that the structure was both federal and democratic but usually in the actual control of only a few, privileged factions. Overall, there is material in most of these textbooks for solid lessons on Roman politics and institutions, and hence the Roman legacy. What is left out is the debate among historians over the reasons for the decline and fall, a debate that helped shape several schools of political thought down to modern times.

THE BASIC IDEAS OF JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY

VII.

Here we arrive at one of the most serious failures of all the texts. The moral and ethical principles of Judaism and Christianity make up the core of the Western intellectual and literary tradition. They lie at the heart of most subsequent world ideologies, even those determinedly anti-religious. The great debates over right and wrong, over justice and injustice, and over the place of the individual in society and history are rooted in what Greeks, Jews, and Christians believed to be true of human nature and human needs. Yet the basic ideas of Judaism and Christianity are all but ignored in some of these texts and only feebly suggested in the rest.

How is this lapse to be explained in books whose purpose is to acquaint students with the essence of each world culture? One possibility is that the authors take for granted that students have already absorbed from family, church, or prior schooling the bases of Western religious tradition. This might explain their tendency to devote substantially more space and explanation to Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism. It might also explain the broad, demanding review questions they pose, asking students, in one example, to "compare the basic teachings of Christianity and Islam" from a text (Wallbank) that devotes one sentence to Christian teachings ("Like other Jews, Jesus condemned violence and selfishness and taught doctrines based on brotherhood") and nearly two pages to those of Mohammed.

Or are the authors overwary of possible accusations of religious indoctrination? But then again, why should they be? This is not a matter of presenting the main tenets of Judeo-Christian faith and dogma as true or untrue. That is not the business of

historians. Their concern is with the history of ideas at work, their power to move people to action—and to other ideas. Students much younger than those of the 9th and 10th grade are well aware that the truth is very often less important than what people think is true. It is, after all, the very engine of TV soap opera. We examine ideologies such as Marxism and fascism with great care, not because we believe them or wish to convert our students, but because they are forces in history and they, in turn, have been shaped by historical events. There is no less reason to examine Judaism and Christianity. Textbooks should hardly eviscerate themselves just to avoid displeasing readers who cannot tell the difference between religious instruction and the history of ideas.

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For whatever reasons, these texts do fail. In Wallbank, referred to above, the Jews do not get so much as a boldface heading (as the Hittites do). We find four paragraphs summarizing their history from Canaan to the Diaspora and only one dealing with religious ideas. There is mention of monotheism and the Ten Commandments, from which "prophets developed some of the noblest rules of human behavior." But the Ten Commandments are not listed, and we are given only one sentence of noble rules from Micah: "Only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." Accompanying the single sentence on Christian teachings cited above are two pages of narrative on the lives of Jesus and Paul, the fate of Christians in Rome, and the organization of the early Church. Mentioned are the Nicene Creed, the New Testament, the letters of Paul, and Augustine's *City of God*, which "provided much of the foundation of Christian theology." In all this, there is not a word of substance on ideas.

Kownslar is much the same. The Ten Commandments are not listed, only described as governing "the actions of the Hebrews in their religious, family, and community life." Ethical monotheism stirred "good behavior in individuals—both in their personal lives and toward others." The single passage on Christian belief follows:

> He taught that the Ten Commandments of the Hebrews were a guide to proper living. Jesus also taught that all people are equal in the eyes of God, that everyone should love God above all else, and that they should treat others the same way they would wish to be treated. The teachings of Jesus, together with those of the Hebrew religion, which formed the foundation of much of his preaching, make up what is called the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Beers and Roselle, somewhat stronger on ideas throughout than are Kownslar and Wallbank, begin by listing the Ten Com-

mandments (though not by number, a lost chance for a bit of cultural literacy). They also present more remarks on Hebrew respect for the individual and on concern for the poor and weak. Both also devote substantially greater space to Christian teachings, citing the message of the Sermon on the Mount and suggesting the emphasis of the "New Law" on love of all human beings and on the equality and dignity of all. Mazour, having promised readers they would "learn about the power of ideas, such as the belief that every human being has worth and dignity that must be respected," fails to say that the belief is at the heart of Judaism and Christianity! Although the text includes a box noting that reading Scripture is helpful to understanding faith, not even the Ten Commandments are listed, only mentioned. Ethical monotheism is described in two sentences, then proclaimed as "the most important contribution of the Jews to Western civilization." Christian teachings are presented in 12 lines, all on love and forgiveness.

Absent from all of these accounts is the fundamental Judeo-Christian notion of human nature as a complicated mixture of worthy and unworthy elements, active impulses toward both good and evil. Also missing is the notion that God holds the individual responsible for the exercise of free will in moral choice. Jews and Christians both deny the fatalism common in the ancient world. Man the individual is responsible. He can act otherwise. His choice is not determined—or excused—by fate, mystery, environment, or collectivity. Absent from these texts, too, is the idea of individual creation of each soul in the spiritual image of God, which to believers is the compelling reason to accept the equality and dignity of every person on earth. Some of the texts touch upon the principle of equality—but without reference to the religious source of its power.

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In Judaism and Christianity, the fatalism of the ancient world is also defied by the doctrine of amelioration. The world is not to be accepted as it is. God imposes on Jew and Christian the duty to make it better, regardless of obstacles or excuses. Whatever the actual religious beliefs—and nonbeliefs, even antibeliefs—of Western peoples, they have ever since been marked by these ideas: the equality and dignity of all, the need for societies in which moral choice is freely possible, and the duty to struggle for just and decent communities. That religious leaders and believers in positions of power have, throughout history, often betrayed and suppressed such ideas may be regrettable (though, given the basic view of human nature, not surprising) but is beside the point. The egalitarian, individualistic, humanitarian, reformist, and striving ethic rooted in the Jewish and Christian faiths lives on. Coupled with the codes of personal

behavior that the Judeo-Christian tradition shared with the pagan Greek and Roman philosophers—fortitude, self-restraint, self-examination, self-respect, and devotion to truth and reason—this ethic has sustained, and been sustained by, the best moments of liberal democracy in nations East and West.

If such commonplaces are absent from elementary texts, it is not surprising to find other important ideas missing as well. Among them is the peculiarly tense, restless nature of Western religion, which imposes countless, frequently competing charges on its followers. Jews and Christians, and those who have absorbed its moral imperatives without wholly retaining the faith, are enjoined to transform themselves but also to transform society; to obey God's law always but also to render to Caesar all that is his; to suffer injustice but to defy unjust laws; to be humble but to show the light of righteousness; to seek truth through faith but also through reason; to aspire to the spiritual but also to use well the things of the earth and the flesh. The main stream of Western religion has not been otherworldly but, as Frost said, ever "risking spirit in substantiation." The results have not always been holy or edifying to look at. Religious warfare and persecution have been as cruel in the West as anywhere, in crusades, pogroms, inquisitions, massacres, and civil wars.

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For textbooks to dwell a bit longer on Judaism and Christianity need not imply claims of superiority over other world religions or claims that others have not inspired admirable ideals of human conduct. Indeed, not a few Westerners have found spiritual comfort in other faiths less bound up with things of the earth. Moreover, the West has never been dominated by any single version of morality and values, except for a short time in the Middle Ages. Out of the legacy of ideas of Greece, Rome, Judaism, and Christianity, Westerners have grappled with multiple questions and quests—sometimes in turn, sometimes several at once. What is beautiful? What is true? What is just, orderly, or merely useful? What is holy? What will save me? What is the full human life? What is success, honor, love? Many historians, trying to account for the West's incessant change and dynamism—for better or worse—have fastened upon the restless, contradictory impulses rooted in its activist, eclectic religious heritage. In this sense, Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (a good book for high school) is a parable about the end of Western civilization: nobody is to ask any more questions or to seek anything but fun and comfort.

Admittedly, the force of ideas cannot be quantified, but then neither can many other forces. We do not know what percentage of cause for Rome's decline to assign to Germanic invasions, but we take the invasions seriously because we know they

were there. In a world daily proving to us that ideas have power, textbook writers for high school students could well pay more attention to them—not only because they are important, but because they are more likely to engage students than any other sort of history. Not to explain the religious sources or moral ideas so critical to human rights and free societies is a major pedagogical and intellectual failure in these texts.

THE MIDDLE AGES AS A SOURCE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

VIII.

In returning to political history, we find our authors more comfortable but still preoccupied with coverage, slow to pause and bring forth central points of importance. In the history of liberal democracy, the Western Middle Ages is pivotal. In 1215, for example, King John was forced to sign *Magna Carta*. In 1295, Edward I summoned the Model Parliament: "What touches all should be approved by all." From these 13th-century events evolved the British constitution, the revolution of the 17th century, and the attainment of parliamentary democracy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Transplanted to America in the same 17th century, English political habits stirred our War of Independence, were embodied in our Constitution, and, as in England, gradually broadened to political democracy.

Representative government was to be justified and supported by political ideas from Greece, Rome, medieval and Renaissance scholars, Protestant divines, and theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries. But it did not spring from ideas. It was rooted in an earthly pattern of armed power, in what most moderns regard as the political chaos of feudalism. *Magna Carta* was a feudal document; the Model Parliament, a feudal gathering. The essence of feudal society was that nobody held all the power. Kings, bishops, abbots, and many other ranks of nobility each had a share, most tangibly in the bands of fighting men at their command. This physical balance of power—an unplanned development out of the Dark Ages following Rome's collapse in the West—underlay all else. Because of it, feudal contracts were true contracts; that is, each party had obligations as well as

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rights. Although he sat at the apex of the feudal pyramid, the king was not sovereign; he was not above the contractual system but enmeshed in it, subject to man-made law and limits. If he ignored his obligations to his vassals, nobles, or clergy, he could be forced, by their armed power, to mend his ways. Arbitrary royal government was not possible. Each group holding a share of power held a share of freedom to resist and to bargain.

This—that representative government depends on a physical balance of power—is the first, the most vital, of all political lessons students should take in from their study of this period. It is not only the historical base of liberal democracy, but the first question to be put to any society claiming to be free. Is there a balance of power within it? Are there separate groups, each with separately rooted bases of power—arms; land; wealth; prestige; tradition; special skills or functions; geographical location; sheer numbers; ethnic, class, or religious cohesion—so that, in turn, there may be separate contending parties, each free to offer real choice against others each secure enough to compromise with others or even to lose elections? Without such balance, do constitutions, assemblies, votes, and elections mean anything? From Napoleon through the Soviet Union, model constitutions have proliferated. What realities lay behind them? When is a constitution only an artful piece of paper? What kinds of economic, social, geographic, religious, cultural, and military conditions seem to nourish, or tolerate, the survival of political balances of power? These are questions to ask when studying the England and Europe of the Middle Ages—and when pursuing liberal democracy today.

From Napoleon through the Soviet Union, model constitutions have proliferated. What realities lay behind them?

Another question: who controls the purse, the power to tax and to appropriate—the assembled representatives of the several groups or the executive alone? With such power, the assembly can act, as the English parliament progressively did; without it, the assembly only talks, as did the Duma of Czar Nicholas II. *Magna Carta* was a typical feudal contract, sharing out rights and obligations among all parties. At its heart lay the king's agreement not to levy any but the customary taxes "without the common consent of the realm"; without new taxes, he could not increase his army and overturn the balance of power.

Historians who play down the importance of *Magna Carta* are partly right. In itself, it guaranteed nothing. Nor did the Model Parliament of 1295 guarantee any sure evolution to a settled system of limited, constitutional, representative—and ultimately democratic—central government. If it had been easy to sustain, representative government would have sprung out of every corner of feudal Europe. Everywhere power was dispersed, "magna cartas" were signed, royal power was limited, and

numberless parliaments met. But in most other localities, kings worked themselves free of feudal restrictions (sometimes brandishing the theory of "divine right" to ignore man-made contracts, as they would later use it to rise above religious factions). In some cases, as in Poland, central government dissolved in the face of uncompromising local feudal magnates. The English experience proved to be unique in combining orderly central government with the freedom of representative institutions.

How do these textbooks deal with democracy's medieval origins? As on other topics, Kownslar remains on a lower level of sophistication in most respects: in language, in context, and in concepts. The terms of *Magna Carta* are given less than a paragraph; worse, the text is content to describe, without explaining the relationship of each item to broader themes or questions:

> The document was a list of things the king was forbidden to do. It was a statement of the rights claimed by the nobles and common people. For example, it stated that no unusual taxes might be collected without the consent of the Great Council. It also declared that the king's subjects were entitled to the protection of the laws and a trial when accused of wrongdoing.

According to Kownslar, *Magna Carta's* significance is that it "has always been respected by the English people" and that it "limited royal powers." But Kownslar makes no connection between *Magna Carta* and the feudal system, which is mentioned 15 pages earlier. Consequently, there is no discussion of the balance of power. Edward I's Model Parliament called in 1295 ("What touches all should be approved by all," his writs said), is described several pages before *Magna Carta* (1215). Kownslar is unclear on Parliament's social composition and passes, without comment, over the crucial fact that it approved new taxes.

Like Kownslar and all the others, Wallbank makes no connection between the feudal system itself (treated 10 pages earlier) and the constraints *Magna Carta* placed on the king. All the texts are silent on the fundamental notion that the guarantor of any constitution is a balance of power among competing interest groups. Wallbank's passages on *Magna Carta* and the Model Parliament improve on Kownslar by citing the later evolution of the charter's clause on taxation and linking it to the American colonists' denunciation of taxation without representation. In most other respects, Wallbank, Beers, Mazour, and Roselle offer similar treatments. They describe the social groups represented in the Model Parliament: the upper nobility and clergy, knights from the shires, and burgesses from the chartered towns. They explain how Parliament gradually turned its power of the purse into the power to legislate, how it eventually

divided into the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Beers has the added merit of printing critical excerpts from the Great Charter in a prominent box.

No account is inaccurate, or misleading, except insofar as they all fade into the relentless march of detail. In being set forth so briefly, crowded about with so many other topics, what was remarkable is rendered commonplace. No doubt this is one price for compressing world history into a single text; still, better choices could have been made. Most texts devote twice as much space to the quarrels between popes and German emperors, but they fail to suggest the significance of these quarrels. Although every text follows its account of English developments with an account of the contrary developments in France—increase of royal power, failure of Estates-General to establish itself—none makes much of the contrast, and none asks why England alone should have followed parliamentary lines. Perhaps it is a question better saved for the even sharper divergence of the 17th century, when Parliament's triumph is assured.

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Meanwhile, to leave out, as these texts do, the medieval and feudal origins of constitutional government, to ignore the central place of the balance of power as the guarantor of constitutions, and to fail to dwell on the elected representatives' need for power of the purse is to make all subsequent struggles for free government very much harder to understand.

THE TRIUMPH OF PARLIAMENT IN THE 17TH CENTURY

IX.

The 17th century is another great turning point in the history of free, representative government. At the start of the century, Parliament was, of course, already three centuries old, a traditional institution with broad support in the country. Its power to approve new taxes was honored even by the willful Tudors, Henry VIII and Elizabeth. Still, there was no certainty about its future. The power of the throne was formidable, and with the death of Elizabeth in 1603 there arose a line of Stuart kings determined to rule by divine right in the style of continental monarchs. Though not openly seeking to destroy Parliament, these kings sought to rule in all matters, with or without parliamentary consent. But before the century ended, it was Parliament that ruled; its chosen monarchs were forced to ask its consent on every major matter of government.

Again, how did this happen, and why in England? The answers lie in a great and complex drama that must be studied at two levels. First, it was a particular political event, unfolding along its own unique lines, as history does not repeat itself. But, at the second level, since certain general forces and conditions do reappear, the English Revolution must be examined for those factors that favor the emergence of representative government. The English parliamentarians did not create their system—as was later said of the British empire—in a fit of absent-mindedness. They knew they had to defend themselves against a resurgence of royal power. What they forged in the way of laws and safeguards also offered lessons that people elsewhere were to follow, around the world and to the present day.

Even as world history texts, these five books underplay the drama of the English Revolution and its significance to the evo-

lution of democracy. Both fact and analysis fall short. Again, the extraordinary is made ordinary, and students may be forgiven for failing to grasp its import to themselves.

Still, there are differences among the texts worth noting. Kownslar and Wallbank devote so little space to the Revolution that it is lost in the mass of surrounding detail. The latter gives it but 3 pages in a 16-page chapter, misnamed "The Age of Democratic Revolution" and crammed with the English Revolution, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the revolts of the Latin American nations! The greatest dramas in the history of political democracy are reduced to little more than mentioning.

. . . the extraordinary is made ordinary.

Kownslar gives the Revolution 4½ pages of print in a 14-page chapter that also rushes through the religious wars of the 16th century, the Armada, the Thirty Years War, and the age of Louis XIV.

Mazour devotes 7½ pages to the English Revolution, but those pages are confusingly squeezed into a chapter headed "Central Governments in Europe Increased Their Power, 1480-1800." Subjects range from Charles V and Philip II through Louis XIV, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresa.

Nowhere is it more obvious that the single-year course in world history—as ladled out in these texts—is wholly inadequate in educating democratic citizens. All five books offer substantially more space to ancient Egypt than to the English Revolution.

The somewhat longer accounts in Mazour, Beers, and Roselle do manage sufficient narrative and contain enough reference to critical documents to provide a basis for effective study. All three list the major points of the *Petition of Right of 1628*, the *Habeas Corpus Act of 1679*, and *the Bill of Rights of 1689*—and emphasize their importance. They make clear the great value of the long parliamentary tradition in resisting James I's claims to divine right, which he saw as setting the monarchy "free" from the restraints of man-made law (such as *Magna Carta* and all other feudal contracts). They cite the emergence of political parties—Whig and Tory—under the Restoration though, unfortunately, without clarifying their different sources of support in the social and religious balance of power in English society. And all close by explaining the later development of ministerial responsibility and the cabinet system.

All five texts, even the briefest, do quite well in summing up the safeguards erected by the victorious Parliament in its *Bill of Rights of 1689* and their later importance to the United States: the protection of free speech and debate in Parliament; regular meetings of Parliament (Charles I had ruled without one for 11 years); free elections and the right to petition; the king's being

forbidden to proclaim or suspend any law without consent of Parliament, to impose taxes without its approval, or to maintain a standing army in time of peace; prohibition of excessive bail or fines; prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment; the citizen's right to a fair trial and (if Protestant) to bear arms. That these 1689 safeguards laid the foundation for the United States' Constitution is made clear in all the texts. Also, all do well in reminding us that, although much had been won, England was still very far from democratic in 1689. Until the early 19th century, politics was the province of the landed aristocracy and its upper-middle-class allies; the vast majority of Englishmen were shut out of voting and holding office by property qualifications. The age of popular democracy lay far ahead. But the principle of representative government was already secure, as was the rule of law, which promised to protect all citizens from arbitrary authority of any kind.

Also secure, by 1689, was the principle of representative government, as tested against the two criteria for valid constitutions proposed in the previous chapter. As to the first criterion, there was a genuine balance of power in English society, expressing itself in the Whig and Tory parties. As narrowly confined to the privileged classes as these were, they nonetheless represented different factions and tendencies. Elections meant real choice among separate, contending parties and personalities. By the 19th century, party rivalry would bring an extension of suffrage to other classes and, by the 1920s, suffrage and eligibility for office to women.

Tested against the second criterion, the elected representatives in Parliament did possess the all-important power of the purse; they had the power of taxation and appropriation. What the executive could, or could not, do was constrained by Parliament's power to give, or to withhold, money. The failure of the Stuart kings, was, in effect, a failure to collect enough money on their own, without Parliament's approval, to use as they wished. Students should see that several of the great documents of the time concerned money. The Petition of Right in 1628, with its fulsome language about "divers rights and liberties of the subjects," shut off taxation without consent of Parliament; prohibited arbitrary arrest (which shut off the possibility of ransom); forbade the billeting of soldiers on civilians (by which the king could save money on his army); and prohibited arbitrary imposition of martial law (by which forced "gifts" or "loans" might be obtained). In practice, the Petition would mean a permanently limited monarch, reduced to trading power and policies with Parliament for his bread, butter, and soldiers. Charles I, who tried to evade it by refusing to call Parliament for 11 years, was finally forced to do so by an empty treasury. ■

Historians have suggested many explanations as to why Parliament triumphed over royal authority in England, while across the Channel the French monarchs rose to absolute power, utterly free of the Estates-General, which ceased to meet after 1614. What forces and conditions favored the emergence of limited, constitutional, and representative government? As in any exercise over historical causation, no neat final answer is possible—or ought to be expected. The advantages on Parliament's side are obvious, but they hardly lend themselves to measurement, and historians still debate their relative importance.

Once again, the basic assumption underpinning everything is a particular conception of human nature.

First, and unlike the French Estates-General, Parliament had a long tradition of regular consultation and an accepted role in money matters, going back to the 13th century. Thanks to geography and the Norman Conquest, there was but one parliament in England. A needy king had no choice. In France, a larger country (much larger, as transportation went in the medieval and early modern eras), major provinces could resist royal authority one by one, sometimes by action of their local Estates, usually dominated by the local nobility. Weak French kings were helpless to overcome such resistance. Strong kings could, and did, play one locality against another, to their own advantage.

Paradoxically, William the Conqueror's quick, complete centralization of power in the hands of English kings resulted in their earlier limitation. No province remained remote; no local magnates could long imagine they could defy royal power by themselves. Whoever desired to restrain that power had only one choice—to join with others at the center. In England, it was easier to join with others whether from different regions or from different classes. Regional interests were less sharply diverse than in France. Cooperation in Parliament between landed aristocrats and middle-class townsmen dated back to the 13th century. The subjugation of the aristocracy by English kings had made it less feared by, and readier to live with, other elements in the society.

In France, the opposite was true. The bourgeoisie was often forced to turn to royal protection against an aggressive nobility with power to disrupt the peace. Class divisions were also more prominent there. The estates remained three in number: clergy, nobles, commoners. There was little or no mixing of the lower gentry with representatives of the towns, as in the English House of Commons. In France, the lesser nobility clung fiercely to their separate status, separating themselves from the bourgeois commoners. Class strife and religious conflict were endemic in France in the 16th century. A longing for order was widespread. The Estates-General stood for disorder and noble

privilege, threatening the king's ability to keep the peace.

Moreover, the Estates-General had rarely been useful to French monarchs as a source of tax money, because localities refused to give their representatives at remote Paris the power to commit themselves to taxation. Therefore, the Estates-General was not called from 1614 until 1789, when it was to open the way to the French Revolution. In England, Parliament's ability to appropriate funds ultimately won it the power to withhold those funds.

As the only hope for stability, and as the ally of a rising bourgeoisie, the French king had gathered money and power on his own throughout the 17th century. His army had kept order at home and had secured the French frontiers. In contrast, England was a relatively secure place. An island, it had little reason to fear invasion. Under the Tudors, it had enjoyed a century of internal peace, helped by Elizabeth's compromise in religion. Its only major threat, from the Spanish Armada, had been countered by its sailors. There was little excuse for a royal standing army and much less reason than in France and elsewhere on the continent to fear a diminution of royal authority. When it came to actual civil war, Charles I found his hurriedly assembled forces inadequate to meet the parliamentary challenge. Parliament enjoyed the support of a broad range of Englishmen, nobles and commons alike, with ample wealth to gather their own army.

The English Revolution, then, was carried out by a prosperous, confident, aggressive alliance of a people with a wide range of grievances against the Stuart kings—political, diplomatic, economic, and religious. In contrast, James I and Charles I had many disabilities. Their claim to divine right directly defied English Parliamentary tradition; they were "foreigners" come to fill the place of the legendary Elizabeth; they were trapped by inflation into increasing dependence on Parliament; and they lacked the army to collect money by force (and without money they could not enlarge the army).

The advantages Parliament had were formidable, enjoyed by few other such institutions in Europe at the time (and, unhappily, by few democratic institutions in many of the fledgling democracies of our own day): experience, tradition, public respect, wealth, confidence, and the relative prosperity of a united society, largely free of class and religious strife, secure from outside attack. Yet, all this said, the triumph of representative government in England was a violent, long-drawn affair of more than 80 years. It took civil war, the execution of a king, a decade of military dictatorship, and the forced exile of another king—James II—before the final settlement of 1688-89. Attaining representative government was neither easy nor inevitable.

Yet, all this said, the triumph of representative government in England was a violent, long-drawn affair of more than 80 years.

Students need to be reminded that, for all the analysis of causes and forces, advantages and disadvantages, the path of political history remains full of contingency and the unpredictable. One can set up the rough odds, but never foretell the result. In England, the result had long-range implications elsewhere. Parliament's example stirred the admiration of many Americans and Frenchmen. It also inspired some of the political ideas popularized in the 18th century Enlightenment, ideas which in turn influenced the course of revolution in America and in France. But the texts' failure to illuminate the special circumstances propelling Parliament to its triumph in England—and those contrary circumstances pressing for royal absolutism in France—leaves students ill prepared to comprehend those later revolutions and their dissimilar outcomes.

IDEAS FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT

X.

What are the most important ideas American students should get from any text's account of the Enlightenment? The conventional answer is still the best: optimism—a faith in science, reason, natural law, education, social harmony, and progress. The American republic was shaped in a time of confidence. So was the French democratic tradition. Leaders of both believed that once they overthrew the old orders—British rule over the American colonies and the Bourbon regime of the (supposedly) autocratic Louis XVI—the way would be open to peace and progress, with the gradual but inevitable betterment of human life under governments in the hands of the sovereign people.

The students should already know that many of the practices and safeguards of free representative government evolved from the feudal and English past. Now they should grasp how the prevailing ideas of the scientific and intellectual revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries—known as the Enlightenment—reinforced the notion of self-government and pushed it toward universal democracy. The main assumptions and expectations of the 18th century Philosophes—a group including many American leaders of the time—have been vitally important to liberal democracy ever since. Once again, and whenever ideas are the subject, students should be engaged in examining and debating them. The first questions for students are obvious: How much do they, and others, still believe such things today? What doubts or reservations do they have? How do their beliefs or their doubts affect their attitudes toward democracy as a form of government? If students cannot be challenged to take a direct, personal plunge into exploring ideas, then it may be best

not to tackle the Enlightenment at all. At least one of our texts has apparently decided the matter this way.

But there is no need to give up. The basic ideas of human nature are always engaging. The presentation should begin with the Newtonian view of the universe and nature as orderly, peaceful, harmonious, and predictable because they are governed by great natural laws that human minds can discover. The next topic should be the leap made by the Philosophes: if nature is orderly, peaceful, and predictable, then so, too, can human society be—if it, too, is governed by its own "natural" laws. If scientists can discover by observation and reason the laws that govern nature, then other thinkers can observe and reason about past and present human society, discovering what laws can render human life as harmonious as nature. Next step: educated, reasonable men can, by discussion in assembly, come to agree on which laws governing human society are "natural" and beneficial. And once society has been reformed and reconstructed according to these laws (and old, unnatural, irrational institutions are swept away), progress will be certain—because there is nothing necessarily evil or regressive born into human nature. Once erected, the good society need not be spoiled by human weakness or misanthropy. The good society, with its rational and just environment, will form the good citizen.

Once again, the basic assumption underpinning everything is a particular conception of human nature. The Philosophes put their faith in the capacity of the human mind. Educated, rational men could, they thought, control their passions and govern themselves by exercise of intelligence and will. They recalled and admired the Greek faith in critical reason's ability to sweep away all mystery and in the Classical human powers of self-discipline, restraint, moderation, patience, order and dignity. Rousseau, of course, saw it otherwise. To him, the root of virtue lay in the heart's natural impulses and sentiments, not in the mind. Complicated and contradictory as his writings were, Rousseau's basic message was clear: man is naturally good at heart and is corrupted only by corrupt society, by the wrong kind of environment, and education. Man is capable of looking honestly into his heart and recognizing what is good for all human kind—that is, the "general will." He can shape his actions accordingly, provided he is not distracted by factions and special interests.

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But whether virtue proceeded from mind or heart, from reflection or sentiment, it was regarded as natural to human beings. On this particular view of human nature rested the 18th century's faith in the possibility of peace and progress. Moreover, the 18th century thinkers also derived from their admired

Greeks and Romans the ideal of civic duty. This was the need for men to serve their community with honor—with sacrifice, if need be—to respect posterity, and to take on responsibility for preparing a better future so that the future would honor them.

Although a good number of the Philosophes—including some American leaders—rejected much of traditional religion, ritual, church structure, and the idea of a personal God, they were deeply educated in the Judaic-Christian tradition and steeped in its moral and ethical values. In effect, the Philosophes' ideas reinforced Jewish and Christian principles of human equality and dignity, of individual responsibility, of conscience, of social amelioration, and of humanitarianism. But—and a large "but" that students of high school age can readily understand—the popular 18th-century view of human nature was markedly more optimistic than that of traditional religion. Where the latter cautioned that weakness born into human nature would always render it liable to imperfection, the 18th century believed that in a good environment, with good schooling, people could wholly mend their ways once error was pointed out to them.

Students can also see how dangerous such optimism can be. It can lead both to the highest aspirations for human life and—often at the same time—to merciless oppression and cruelty to those who do not conform. Jews and Christians, expecting less of human beings tainted by impulse to sin, can be more forgiving of lapses and antisocial behavior. But if one rejects all inborn weakness and is sure of everyone's ability to be good, then failure to be good is not forgivable. It must spring from a deliberate exercise of will to be bad—a crime against nature, a defiance of the "general will" of virtuous humankind, a sort of inexplicable perversion that deserves extirpation. So the dominant ideas of the 18th century may lead and, as we shall see, have led either to free and liberal doctrines and societies or, also quite logically, to the most manipulative and oppressive regimes imaginable.

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How do our texts deal with the ideas of the Enlightenment? One, Kownslar, does not deal with them at all; "Enlightenment" is not even in the index. Nor are Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or Voltaire. Newton gets one line (he "developed our concept of gravity") at the end of a single paragraph headed "Science during the Renaissance." There is nothing else on the scientific revolution of the 17th century or on the intellectual revolution of the 18th century. On the American side, such figures as the Adamses and Madison are not mentioned. Nothing on Franklin or Jefferson would suggest they had ideas at all. Both the American and French revolutions and their results are presented as springing entirely out of particular circumstances, interests, and resentments, unrelated to the intellectual climate

of their time.

Wallbank devotes a 10-page chapter, "Science and Reason," to the subject. It begins well, with the observation that the scientific revolution entered every area of thought and action: religious, political, literary, social, and economic. It describes the leap from the laws of nature to the laws of society:

> Scientists' discoveries showed that the physical universe was a well-ordered machine, working according to the laws of nature. Many thinkers reasoned that people also must be governed by some natural laws. They only needed to discover these laws...Then they could improve the ways that people live together.

Wallbank then briefly describes the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Locke is called, rightly, the most influential of all, asserting that "progress is certain if people would use their minds and follow reason." But his view of human nature is left out. Why was progress certain? Wallbank does not give Locke's answer: because man was not born bad, but as a blank page (*tabula rasa*) to be shaped by environment and education. Locke's view of natural rights to life, liberty, property, and replacement of unjust government are cited, as well as their influence on American leaders.

Montesquieu is described as another thinker using observation and reason to discover political principles. His idea of the separation of powers in government, and its influence on us, is set forth. But his even more basic idea of the need for a balance of power within society is absent: the freedom of the individual requires many bodies intervening between himself and the central authority—local governments, guilds, associations, courts, authorities, and groups of all kinds. These not only afford the citizen protection, places to hide, and greater freedom of choice, but they also provide invaluable experience in working with others to civic ends. De Tocqueville, of course, was to make much of these ideas in *Democracy in America*.

Rousseau's jumbled notions tend to defeat most authors' attempts at clarity. Wallbank is no exception. Rousseau's "Tarzan" view of human nature is briefly put: "before people were civilized, they had been pure and good"; they could find purity and goodness again by going "back to nature." But Rousseau's idea of the general will as a kind of collective conscience is not clear, being explained only as "shared common values and common attitudes." That Rousseau's ideal—an affective, communal society—was quite opposite from Montesquieu's, with no intervening bodies or factions between the mass of individuals and their central authority, is not mentioned. Nor is his ominous phrase in the *Social Contract* about forcing men to be "free,"

that is, forcing them to obey the general will rather than their own particular interests. That Rousseau's ideas can lead to totalitarianism as well as to liberal democracy is not noted.

Wallbank, like the other texts, is clear on the reformist and humanitarian zeal of the Age of Reason. Voltaire and others stood for religious liberty, improvement of public health, schooling, hospitals for the sick and insane, law and prison reform, and abolition of slavery. The text's recital of 18th-century tastes in art, architecture, literature, and music is briefly linked to that period's neoclassical enthusiasm for the Greeks and Romans. But a further connection with order, reason, balance, and discipline as the public, political virtues is missing. In sum, a good many relevant points are mentioned, but no major political thinker is described fully enough to engage the student's interest or to allow for those comparisons and contrasts needed for critical political thinking.

That Rousseau's ideas can lead to totalitarianism as well as to liberal democracy is not noted.

Roselle does not provide a separate chapter on the Enlightenment, divided as it is between a brief passage in Chapter 18 on Maria Theresa and Joseph II as enlightened despots and a few pages in Chapter 21, "The French Revolution and Napoleon Shake Europe." In the first segment, the Enlightenment is explained only as "the idea that people should gain as much knowledge as possible and solve their problems by reason and intelligence." The second segment is more helpful, but it is extremely brief on science and natural law. Newton is mentioned a hundred pages earlier, only in regard to the law of gravity. The vision of an orderly universe is not brought out. Locke's political ideas appear two chapters earlier in relation (properly) to the English Revolution. But his view of human nature, underlying his confidence in self-government, and his dominant influence on the Enlightenment are not mentioned.

Of the Philosophes, Voltaire is cited on freedom of thought, speech, and religion. Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers and its impact on the American Constitution is well explained, but again there is nothing on his call for a balance and exercise of power among many separate authorities in the society at large. On Rousseau, three short paragraphs are so jumbled and general as to puzzle students completely, perhaps even to mislead, since not one of Rousseau's ideas is explained, connected to politics, or contrasted with the ideas of others. No connection is made between the Enlightenment and American developments, either in the pages on the American Revolution or in those later on the Enlightenment, yet a review question *between* the two segments asks students to explain why the establishment of the United States "convinced many liberals in Europe that the ideas of the 'Enlightenment' were practical."

Liberalism has not been referred to at all at this point, and the following pages on the Enlightenment do not refer to it either.

Mazour sandwiches in a single page on the Enlightenment at the end of a chapter called "The Renaissance and Reformation Brought Great Changes to Europe (1350-1700's)." The connection between the Newtonian universe and the aspiration to create orderly and just societies by discovering and applying natural law is fairly clear. For individual thinkers, one must explore later chapters. Locke appears along with the Glorious Revolution, which he helped justify. His assertion of people's natural rights to life, liberty, property, and free choice of rulers is set forth, but there is nothing on why he thought people capable of self-government. Mazour tries to draw the contrast to Hobbes but without exploring each man's view of human nature and history; as a result, their differences remain obscure.

Another single page, "The Enlightenment in France," follows in Chapter 15, "Central Governments Throughout Europe Increased Their Power (1480-1800)." There Mazour cites Locke's popularity in France and also Montesquieu's admiration for the English system, his idea of separation of powers, and its application in the American Constitution. Rousseau receives 12 lines, but his view of human nature and its relation to the general will is not explained.

The most effective presentation of the Enlightenment and its ideas is in Beers' Chapter 19, "The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment." Following upon an account of Newton's "well-regulated" universe and the idea of natural law, Beers presents Locke's view of human nature and popular sovereignty, contrasting it sharply with the pessimism of Thomas Hobbes. Locke's influence on the French thinkers is made clear, as are their concerns for freedom of religion, speech, and press; for education, economic, and social reform; and the end of slavery. Beers then presents the main ideas of Montesquieu (though not his insistence on the balance of power among intermediate bodies); of Voltaire, including his popularization of Newton and Locke; and of Rousseau, including his optimistic view of human nature as "noble savage." Although Beers confuses the general will with decisions of the majority, his account of Rousseau's egalitarian, communitarian society is the best of the texts surveyed.

Beers also surpasses the others in a special section called "Impact of the Enlightenment," which cites the effect in France of the *Encyclopedia* assembled by Diderot and the rising importance of newspapers, journals, pamphlets, public lectures, coffee houses, and, of course, the *salons* held by noble and bourgeois women.

In sum, only one text adequately explains the Enlighten-

ment's impact or the concepts of human nature that lay behind its political doctrines. But even Beers fails to connect the 18th century's enthusiasm for the classical style in the arts to its wider admiration for the classical virtues in personal and civic life. Further, none of the texts compares and contrasts Enlightenment ideas with the Judaic-Christian tradition. Nor do any point out that many Europeans and Americans were inspired by both Enlightenment and religious ideas, seeing no necessary conflict between them. On the contrary, they believed, as Alexis de Tocqueville was later to insist, that elements of both were indispensable to the health of liberal democracy. This sensible view, widespread among people capable of holding two ideas in their heads at once, is wholly absent from these texts.

THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS

XI.

What should one expect of world history textbooks as they relate the American and French revolutions? A very great deal, for the two decades between 1775 and 1795 mark the dawn of contemporary history not only for the West but for the whole world. These decades launched a triple revolution of expectations that is still working itself out, and its unflagging forces are at the source of most current world unrest.

It is not too much to say that the Americans and the French taught the peoples of the world that three great transformations were not only possible, but right and inevitable. The first was national revolution: the fulfillment of each people's right to their own national independence and to their place of equality and dignity among nations. The second was political revolution: the attainment of free democratic self-government and equality of civic rights. The third was economic and social revolution: the right of all people in every class to economic justice and social decency. Nothing since has been able to shut off the drive of most peoples on earth to attain these ends. The complicated story of how different peoples have pursued them—of which of these three ends the different factions and nations have put first and at the expense of which others—is the stuff of world history since 1800.

The first thing to expect from history books, then, is a clear view of the significance of the events in America and France in the last quarter of the 18th century. A second is a sensibly complicated picture of the causes for each revolution, the ideas and conditions that prepared a "revolutionary situation." A third requirement is that the texts present and explain, or at least of-

fer the facts necessary to explain, the great differences between the two revolutions. Finally, some analysis of what role each revolution played in the long-term shaping of democratic societies and institutions is in order.

To take the last first, it is obvious that neither the Americans nor the French achieved a finally settled constitutional system until much later. While we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Constitution, we cannot forget that it was not until 1865, after a civil war bloodier than all the French upheavals put together, that Americans were brought to agree on the meaning of their federal system. From 1775, that adds up to 90 years. In France, a stable constitutional regime was achieved only in 1875, 86 years after the French Revolution. The English Revolution had run from 1603 to 1689, another period of 86 years. When we remember that all these revolutions occurred in relatively prosperous, largely secure societies of substantial political and administrative experience and sophistication—with large, confident middle and lower-middle classes and widespread ownership of property—the present plight of newly formed nations in underdeveloped areas of the world is put in better perspective.

To help students see the more particular contributions of the American and French revolutions to liberal democracy, texts should present the main features of the basic documents: the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and, in France, the *Declaration of the Rights of Man.* And, beyond the words and principles, texts must give a candid treatment of the central institutions set up to give them meaning, both those that did not work—like the American confederation or the constitutional monarchies of the French—and those that did.

In the short run, the United States appeared to have achieved a settled constitutional system not long after defeating the armies of George III; in the short run, the French Revolution plunged into the Reign of Terror and mass purges, followed by political chaos that was ended only by Napoleon's dictatorship. Only in 1815 was a moderate compromise achieved between royal and popular power, reflecting the first such compromise in 1791. Three more revolutions were to come before the final republican compromise of 1875. What made the difference? The answers go far to illustrate some of the conditions favorable to the evolution of liberal democracy and some hostile to it.

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The advantages of the United States were several, and the textbooks ought to make them clear. Ours was a revolution against outside authority, not against compatriots (although the Tories, or American loyalists, suffered more than is generally

admitted in our history books). Ours was relatively free of class hatred; we had suffered no privileged aristocracy or clergy; relations between rich and poor, in town and country, were less strained. We enjoyed the advantages of great distance from Britain and of massive, probably decisive, aid from the French. Their Revolution was attacked by several foreign powers across land borders. Our political leaders and legislators had, for the most part, long experience in the daily workings of representative government. Theirs had very little. Religious issues were minor in America. In France the question of the Church tore the nation, including the political moderates of the Center, in half.

Economic conditions, too, were worse in France. Depression, unemployment, inflation, food shortages, and fear of famine all made the task of peaceful political settlement very much harder. Regional and provincial rivalries were more divisive in France than the American colonies' well-known suspicions and hesitations. All of these factors are still active in much of the world where democracy struggles to be born and survive. Our textbooks should make them clear, just as they should make clear the various causes for each revolution.

All of these factors are still active in much of the world where democracy struggles to be born and survive.

What do we find? First of all, that some accounts are very brief, hardly worthy of the two greatest dramas in the history of liberal democracy. Kownslar's Chapter 19, "The American Revolution," is four pages long. After three pages of the usually mentioned causes, the entire revolutionary war, the Declaration of Independence (one sentence; no text), and the victory at Yorktown are disposed of in three paragraphs. There is nothing on the Constitution, on the Bill of Rights, or on the Revolution's significance beyond an introductory sentence: "The idea of independence spread throughout the Americas and into Europe and influenced people of other countries to revolt against unjust rulers and to develop their own governments." The advantageous conditions of the American Revolution, including French aid, are not mentioned.

Kownslar's Chapter 20, "The French Revolution and Napoleon," is 15 pages long and has greater detail, but it is limited to a chronological recital fit only for memorization. Since Kownslar never deals with the Enlightenment, the ideas of the Enlightenment and their role in the two revolutions go without mention. The causes of the French Revolution are presented at the most elementary level. The role, ideas, and interest of the middle classes are ignored, as is the cost to France of her aid to the American colonies. The account could have been written by a Jacobin pamphleteer. "The king controlled everything," it says, although it is more accurate to say that revolution erupted because the king controlled nothing. Louis XVI's poor judgment and Marie Antoinette's extravagance are made to appear respon-

sible for the magnitude of the French debt. The complexities of the revolutionary situation—which alone could be interesting to students—are not to be found.

The forces and conditions making it impossible for the moderates to maintain control are not explained.

The forces and conditions making it impossible for the moderates to maintain control are not explained, nor is the central problem of all revolutions: the struggle among factions to command the armed forces in the capital—from Paris to Petrograd to Havana to Manila. The fact that Robespierre and the Terrorists justified their acts by the ideas of Rousseau goes unmentioned. Kownslar does say, rightly, that the Reign of Terror was doomed once the French felt safe from invasion. But since the growing role of the army is not illuminated, the rise of Napoleon seems to be an accident of genius.

The textbook is silent on the mechanisms of Napoleon's dictatorship.

The textbook is silent on the mechanisms of Napoleon's dictatorship: secret police; night arrests; political murder; censorship of mail, press, theater, and literature; control of school texts and church sermons; and the denial of equal trial to workers. Instead, the *Code Napoleon* is said to have guaranteed "that all citizens were equal before the law."

In this connection Kownslar touches upon an important point, though obliquely, by saying that Napoleon "kept the major reforms won by the French Revolution, but he found new ways to use them in establishing his personal dictatorship." The point is that Napoleon was the very first of the modern dictators, precisely because he used the vocabulary and preserved the facade of liberal democracy—elections, referenda, assemblies, and constitutions—as a screen for authoritarianism.

The greater point is that, with such rhetoric, the American and French revolutions transformed the world's political vocabulary. Henceforth most authorities would feel the need to pretend they respected liberty, equality, and self-government, to use the words of enlightened liberals while pursuing opposite goals. Their hypocrisy has ever since been the homage that political vice pays to democratic virtue. Napoleon was the first in a long line, still thriving.

On the American and French revolutions, Wallbank is even briefer than Kownslar, devoting less than two pages of print to the American and five to the French (less than is given to a single Chinese dynasty or to the arts and social sciences of the 19th century). Wallbank's text has all the weaknesses cited in Kownslar and provides less detail. Discussion of the Enlightenment is absent from these chapters: not a word of substance is given on the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights; the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man* is not even mentioned (in Kownslar, it is briefly excerpted). Both texts are apparently composed on the assumption that any substantive American history belongs in another course. But what

sort of perspective on world history can students achieve when America's first and greatest moment of influence on the world is brushed aside? How much understanding of liberal democracy is possible when its central ideas, documents, and institutions are barely touched upon and when nothing is said about the character, education, ideas, and works of its leaders?

On the French Revolution, Wallbank improves on Kownslar's account of cause by better explaining sources of the government's debt (though leaving out the cost of aid to America). Unfortunately, the other causes are too briefly put to be intelligible and the crucial role of the middle classes throughout the Revolution is omitted, as is any analysis of the many conditions hostile to moderation. Wallbank's account of Napoleon, although too cursory to interest students, is more balanced and less misleading than that of Kownslar. Bonaparte emerges as a partly enlightened despot. In sum, these two texts fail both in putting the two upheavals in perspective and in drawing out major lessons critical to understanding democracy's early needs.

Each of the three other texts gives a sharper perspective on the American and French revolutions, with Roselle offering somewhat less than Mazour and Beers. Roselle devotes only three pages to the American Revolution but more clearly defines the issues between the colonists and the British, the advantages of each side in the war, and the importance of French aid. But no critical document is included and the impact of the American Revolution is reduced to two points: "It weakened the prestige of monarchical governments" and "It influenced France, a country moving toward revolution."

Roselle has the advantage of placing the story of the Enlightenment directly before the French Revolution in Chapter 21, "The French Revolution and Napoleon Shake Europe," covering 16 or so printed pages. The causes of the Revolution are markedly more focused and complete, the impact of the Enlightenment and of the American Revolution is included, and the central role of the middle class is explained. Roselle sets out the main reforms of the National Assembly, an excerpt (much too short) of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man,* and the divisive results of the *Civil Constitution of the Clergy.* The role of war, patriotism, and fear in bringing the collapse of the moderate constitutional monarch and the rise of the Reign of Terror is more vidid. But, again, there is nothing on the importance of Rousseau's ideas to the Terrorists.

The rise, character, and reforms of Napoleon are more adequately treated, but there is very little on his dictatorship. Roselle does provide, finally, a somewhat better summary of how the Revolution and Napoleon stirred demands for democ-

racy and national sovereignty in France and the rest of the world. The fuller narrative also affords the teacher more material on which to base discussion.

Mazour's Chapter 17, "Revolution Changed the Course of Western Civilization," covers 21 pages and comes close to fulfilling the promise of its title. The introductory paragraph begins well:

> The impact of the American and French revolutions was so great that they continued to inspire people in later generations, even to our own time. The American and French revolutions were the beginning of a revolutionary tradition... The ideas of the revolution—that all people have rights that no one can take from them and that the powers of government belong to the people—swept the Western world...[T]he fact that totally new ideas about change became prominent in the West in the late 1700's marks this as one of the decisive, transforming periods in modern history.

Mazour's account of the American Revolution includes the major substantive points of the Declaration of Independence and its relation to Locke and Rousseau, the *Articles of Confederation* and its weakness, and a summary of the Constitution (though not of the Bill of Rights).

On the causes of the French Revolution, Mazour is stronger than Roselle in coverage; in clarifying the grievances, interests, and aspirations of each class; and in explaining how the ideas from the Enlightenment meant different things to different people—setting the stage for trouble once the Old Regime disappeared. The sources of the French debt and Louis XVI's failed attempts to reform the tax system are clarified. There is a good account of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* and its English and American sources (a special boxed section suggests that students compare it with our own Bill of Rights, but the necessary texts are not provided).

Mazour describes the three main contending groups—conservatives, moderates, and radicals—and explains the origin of the terms "Right" and "Left" from the seating arrangements of the Legislative Assembly of 1791. But the social composition, interests, and programs of each group are not defined, making it difficult to grasp the reasons for the failure of the moderates and the resort to the Reign of Terror. This text does not cite the Reign of Terror's radical ideology or explain that the Terror was overthrown once national security seemed assured.

Like the other texts, Mazour is better on Napoleon as reformer than as modern dictator; dictatorship is mentioned, not explicated. Like Roselle, Mazour ends by describing the ef-

fects of the French Revolution and Napoleon at home and abroad; how the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity spread across the continent and how Napoleon's conquests stirred up nationalist fervor all over Europe.

Beers' account of the American Revolution is slightly briefer and much less explicit on its larger-world significance than Mazour's, although it has the slight benefit of including a short paragraph on the Bill of Rights. His account of the French Revolution and Napoleon is very close to Mazour's, with similar advantages over the other three texts in that it describes the roles of the various social classes, their economic problems, and Louis' attempts at tax reform. The *Declaration of the Rights of Man* is more fully excerpted, in a separate box. Beers also explains "Right" and "Left" but, like Mazour, fails to probe for the classes, interests, and programs behind the labels. His section on the Reign of Terror describes Robespierre's ruthlessness but not his ideology. The treatment of Napoleon and of the overall impact of the Revolution and imperial conquest are much like Mazour's. On balance, Mazour's presentation of the two revolutions and their consequences is superior to the rest, being more insistent on the lasting change they wrought in people's expectations down to the present

No text does what one would wish in comparing and contrasting the two revolutions, a useful preparation for later comparisons with revolutions in Russia and elsewhere. It follows that none concentrates sufficiently on the plight of the moderates, caught between extremes of Left and Right in France, or on the dynamics that moved the French Revolution from stage to stage, at first leftward toward radicalism and then back to military dictatorship. In sum, these books do not clarify those conditions that were helpful, and those that were hostile, to the emergence of stable representative institutions at the end of the 18th century. Essential to this understanding would be a much sharper picture than any text provides of the economic and social classes—with their fears, hopes, and ideologies—throughout the Western world at that time.

No text ... concentrates sufficiently on the plight of the moderates, caught between extremes of Left and Right.

THE MAJOR IDEOLOGIES OF THE 19TH CENTURY

XII.

To understand the evolution and problems of liberal democracy after the American and French revolutions, as well as the threats to free government posed by the forces let loose by the Industrial Revolution, students need a clear idea of the several ideologies that developed in the 19th century. They need to know what groups and classes supported 19th-century conservatives and liberals, socialists, and radical democrats or republicans. They need to put a battery of questions to each "ideology": What were its main political ideas and its economic and social programs? What were its views of human nature and human needs? How did it see history and education and religion? What vision did it have of the future?

In actuality, the relations among ideologies and social groups were extremely complicated and did not consistently follow any single pattern, but certain base lines must be laid down. Only then will the students be able to deal with the particular conditions and tendencies of various factions, country by country—and with the evolution of the major "isms" under shifting party labels, down to the present time: conservatism, liberalism, radical republicanism or democracy, and the many sorts of socialism.

To begin with, students must have a ready understanding of the several social classes and subclasses of Europe. Very few texts (including the better college history books) do well enough in this matter. The rudiments of social history are missing. Social "facts" abound—but without meaningful pattern and without relation to political and economic life. Students are constantly asked to call city workers "peasants," mixing up the

aristocratic and bourgeois wealthy, or missing the differences of level in the middle classes. Since they do not know who people are, where they live, how they support themselves, and whom they distrust, students cannot understand what their interests and fears can be or what impels them toward this or that party or ideology. Students need guidelines for sorting things out.

Conservatism was the common ideology of the various ranks of the landed aristocracy; of the upper ranks of the armies, navies, and diplomatic corps (all usually staffed by aristocrats); of the established clergy; and of a good number of ordinary country people with neither wealth nor title. Except in England (always a special case) conservatives opposed representative self-government in most forms, preferring rule by king, church, and aristocracy—those "born to rule" since the Middle Ages. They pictured themselves as having no vested interests; already privileged, they had no need to profit from politics and were thus able, they thought, to rule paternally in the interests of all classes, exercising *noblesse oblige*. Rejecting the ideas of the Enlightenment and abhorring the French Revolution, they believed tradition to be a better guide than reason. They thought it folly to think that any single generation could be wise enough to build a new society from scratch.

In economic and social matters, they considered agriculture the most basic and honorable of pursuits, together with artisanship and shopkeeping in the village. The Industrial Revolution seemed to many of them an abomination. They feared and distrusted the new wealth and power of the industrial and business classes; they thought government should control their activities, intervening in and guarding the overall national interest. They dismissed *laissez faire* as the profiteers' excuse for exploiting labor. Thus, a combination of class interest and their ideal of *noblesse oblige* encouraged many of them to propose government regulation of factory working conditions, hours, and wages. The Conservative, or Tory, party in England sponsored Factory Acts, as did aristocratic social Catholics in France. They held traditional Christian views of human nature. Men were flawed beings. The future could not be a great deal different from the past. History moved in cycles. The better times were sustained by faith and order; when these broke down, worse times followed.

Liberalism (sometimes with a capital "L" to distinguish it from 20th-century meanings of the word) expressed the outlook of the upper middle classes, whose incomes flowed from the business and industrial world. In politics, they called for representative government, but with the right to vote and hold office restricted to men of property and education, to men who were serious, reasonable, and in control of themselves. They ac-

cepted the trappings of monarchy and the Old Regime but only if primary power lay in the hands of parliamentary majorities controlling the executive. They generally advocated civil rights and freedom of the press, speech, and religion. Many sought the expansion of public education (though not for women), as a precondition for widening the suffrage.

Their economic ideas and visions of future society rested on a confidence in industrial progress and in the great wealth to be created out of science and invention—and out of their own enterprise, if government would only leave them alone. Although not nearly so pessimistic as Malthus and Ricardo, Liberals were willing to use Malthusian arguments to gain support for *laissez faire*. There should be no government intervention in business matters, except to deal with problems fomented by strikers and labor organizers or foreign competition. Progress was to be expected out of increased production, gradually making it possible for everyone to enjoy a better life. Meanwhile, education, hard work, sobriety, and public order would speed the day. A good many Liberals, especially on the continent, ceased the practice of religion while insisting on its necessity for women, children, and the lower classes.

Republicanism (or radicalism, as its enemies called it) was, of course, popular among the lower middle classes and among city working people, until socialist parties drew them away later in the century. It was the political faith of the young—students, artists, writers, fledgling professionals—whose income was still modest, clerks, small shopkeepers, civil servants. Their political ideal was democracy, universal suffrage, and all power in the hands of an assembly directly, and frequently, elected by the people. Anticlerical and antimonarchical, they demanded a republican form with the widest possible civil rights and freedoms. They were not afraid of what Liberals called "mob rule," for they believed, like Rousseau, that the people's hearts were good and, if anything, purer than the hearts of those spoiled by wealth.

In economic and social matters, they agreed with Liberals on the sanctity of private property, but they were ready to distinguish between big property and small. Citing Aristotle (or Robespierre, or Jefferson), they believed that free self-government prospered best in societies of widespread, modest property. They rejected *laissez faire* notions and stood for government action to limit the power of big property and capital; they were ready—until the workers turned to socialism—to sponsor social legislation on wages, hours, and factory conditions. Their vision of the future was extremely optimistic. Progress was inevitable, through universal suffrage, universal education, and

the application of science and reason as regulated by governments in the hands of the people.

As the century drew onward, the industrial working classes gradually turned from the democratic republicans (who, in any case, almost always failed in their bids for power) to various forms of socialism. In political matters, most held to republican ideas. On questions of economic life, they progressively abandoned their faith in any but the smallest amount of private property. They saw capitalism, the profit motive, and private wealth as producing only cruelty and injustice. At least the important means of production should be under government or collective ownership, as should banks, railroads, and utilities. Their views of human nature and the future were decidedly optimistic: once society was transformed and economic exploitation erased, progress would be certain. Their faith in science and invention matched that of their liberal opponents. There would be more than enough to go around.

Of the many variants of socialism, Marxism should be explained with particular care. Its principles, strengths, and weaknesses ought to be as familiar to students as those of liberal democracy itself. For Marxism is, in one form or other, democracy's only serious competitor in the realm of ideas these days. That is, two visions of the future now compete for people's minds, whatever sort of regime they may live under. One is some form of Marxist collectivism; the other is a range of systems generally defined as reform democracies with mixed economies. (Military authoritarianism and fascism, while common enough—even in societies claiming to be Marxist—are based on ideas now discredited by the horrors of Nazism and its friends in the 1930s and 1940s.)

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To begin with, students should be able to distinguish between socialism as a general term and Marxian communism as a particular. Next, they should know something of Karl Marx himself, as intellectual and author shaped by several traditions from the Old Testament to 19th-century scientism, as a historian-Philosophe finding "natural laws" in economics and history, and as a revolutionary bent on changing the world. Next, the *Communist Manifesto* should be examined both as a historical argument and as a program for action. Then the student should be introduced to the two major developments after Marx: the revisionist, evolutionary school of Marxism generally dominant until the First World War and the Leninist, Bolshevik, revolutionary Marxism dominant since 1917.

In helping students understand all of these "isms," how well do the world history texts perform? Kownslar, in keeping with its apparent (and probably mistaken) design for use with weaker students, is as usual the least satisfactory on ideas.

Neither Conservatism nor radical republicanism is in its index, and Liberalism is mentioned only as an opposition movement in Czarist Russia. Liberalism's class base, political ideas, and parties in the rest of the world are ignored, and Kownslar's brief remarks on the *laissez faire* approach are left unrelated to actual business or governmental policies. Parliamentary reforms are listed—Factory Act, 1833; Mines Act, 1842; Ten-Hour Law, 1847—but without reference to ideas, parties, or interests. There is no way for students to compare ideologies or to see the relationship between economic and social change on the one hand and politics on the other. Further, there is no way to grasp the problems and judge the works of representative governments as they responded to the challenge of the Industrial Revolution.

This time, however, Kownslar is not very different from the rest. None of the texts manages a clear presentation of the ideologies. None would help students see how these ideologies arose from the French Revolution or how they were reshaped by the effects of the Industrial Revolution and by the class interests of those espousing these ideologies. To one extent or another, all the authors are defeated by the problem of organizing history from 1800 to 1914. Wallbank, for example, brings in the Industrial Revolution and its consequences, including the doctrine of *laissez faire*, only after dealing with liberalism, 1848, and political changes to 1914. The Lloyd George Budget of 1909, Britain's unemployment insurance and minimum wage, and Bismarck's social reforms in his duel with the German socialists all precede any mention of industrialization or the contending ideas and parties. References to "isms" are scattered, unconnected to classes, to events, to legislation. So the political history of Europe is left a jumble of facts, without pattern or direction.

Roselle, Mazour, and Beers all suffer from the same or worse weaknesses of organization and from an absence of connective tissue. None describes Conservatism at all, which was an essential part of the beginnings of social legislation and whose echoes would be evident to students through several strains of modern thought. Worse, none presents a clear picture of democratic radicalism, or republicanism, which is closest to our modern view of reformist democracy. Great chances to engage the students' current political interest are missed. Since early 19th century Liberalism is *not* fully presented either, it is difficult for students to understand why some of it is now called "conservative" and why "liberal" now suggests a range of other attitudes. Yet even an elementary review of classes, parties, and intervening legislation would make the transition easy to grasp.

The texts are not entirely barren, of course. Wallbank is extremely instructive about the rivalry between industrial Whigs and landed Tories in the English parliament, a rivalry which produced much political and social reform. No other text makes this point. Instead, reform seems to spring from nowhere, the result of Dickens' muckraking or "some people" wanting it, rather than from the give-and-take of representative government. Beers offer a good explanation of *laissez faire* economics and its roots in the Enlightenment notion of natural law.

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Each text has helpful passages, but on the whole they fail to clarify a difficult era for governments everywhere. They faced the sharp challenge of adapting the political principles of earlier, simpler times to the problems of an industrializing world, with its great concentrations of economic power.

The factory system; urbanization; the new proletariat; the new scale of industry, banking, and commerce; and the new and more visible extremes of poverty and wealth all threatened the 18th-century vision of peaceful progress in rural, small-town societies whose wealth and property would be broadly distributed. Wherever governments succeeded reasonably well in responding to the new economic and social forces, extremism and revolution were rare. Wherever they did not—wherever labor unions were weak or outlawed, for example—trouble was certain, and we still live with its consequences. Every day the headlines remind us that we have not yet coped with the Industrial Revolution; for students of political democracy, the critical era from 1789 to 1914 must be presented better than it is by these texts.

In explaining Marxism, they are somewhat more effective than they are with other 19th-century ideas. Each begins its treatment of socialism with the Utopians, then moves on to Karl Marx. Each provides an intelligible summary of the Marxist theory, usually drawn from the *Communist Manifesto of 1848*. All furnish fairly clear explanations of Marx's claim to scientific truth, of history as class struggle, of the rise of capitalism and the proletariat, of the coming revolution and the workers' triumph and consequently the end of class struggle, and the need for coercive government. Kownslar, usually the least satisfactory on ideas, includes all of these points. Missing, though, is the notion, added by Wallbank, that all of politics and society is determined by economic forces, most especially changes in the means of production. Wallbank also presents Marx's labor theory of value, which he then debunks. Mazour also explains the critical role of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Beers follows suit and closes with a refutation of Marx's claims that revolution is inevitable, that reform is meaningless, and that the

workers have no country.

Still, some basic points are missing. None of the texts notes the highly optimistic view of human nature and human possibilities that underlay Marxism. As such, it was very much a species of Enlightenment doctrine, with Marx a latter-day Philosophe or Physiocrat finding scientific laws to make his chosen future appear to be inevitable. Marx is the workers' Adam Smith or Ricardo. None of the authors cites the critical Marxist reservation that the ultimate communist society—where the state has withered away and all share equally in everything—cannot arrive until all opposition within and without has been eliminated. Thus, some of the authors cite the failure of the Soviet state to wither away and assert that this in itself proves Marxism false. As far as theory goes, it does not. It would be more effective and accurate to point out to students that Marxists are asking the world to buy before seeing the goods. Wielding dictatorial power, they demand that everyone else disarm and wholly accept a system based on dubious theories of human motivation and human history, without preserving the means of change or retreat.

Of all the texts, Roselle takes the greatest pains to refute Marx. He sets out Marx's assertions under six headings, to each of which he responds with "Objections." But it is a mixed performance. Some of Roselle's objections are honest and effective, others are tendentious and likely to arouse students' suspicions. If it is infeasible to offer a long and detailed analysis of Marxist doctrine, perhaps it is best just to observe—as all of our text authors do—that Marx's prediction of increasing misery and revolution was not borne out in the advanced industrial countries. Rather, in poorer countries, where dictatorships have taken over in the name of Marxism, they have proved to be among the most repressive in history. To engage in easy refutation of the economic interpretation of history or of the labor theory of value may be satisfying but is historically beside the point: the attraction of ideology, and its ability to exert force in the world, has little to do with its truth or internal consistency.

Marxism's strength or weakness has always varied depending on the particular place, time, and prevailing conditions. It is to such factors that students must look if they are to understand the attraction revolutionary Marxist slogans hold in many parts of the world. People in misery, who see no hope for better lives in other systems, find that hope in Marxism's promises. Others, offered hope from other quarters, have no need for its promises. Nothing better illustrates this primitive point than the history of Europe up to 1914, when revolutionary Marxism clung to life in only a few peripheral corners of the industrializing world. Then came the catastrophe of the Great War of 1914-18, rendering

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the world much less safe for democracy, loosing upon it the forces of 20th century totalitarianism.

Before students can be expected to comprehend these later events, however, they first need a solid grounding in all of the major ideologies of the 19th century—Conservatism, Liberalism, radical republicanism, and socialism—together with the interests, anxieties, and expectations of the various social groups espousing them. Second, students need a way to connect the economic changes of the Industrial Revolution to social changes and then to political events and ideologies. Neither the organization nor the substance of these textbooks serves such needs adequately.

NATION-STATES, NATIONALISM, AND IMPERIALISM

XIII.

These ideologies—Conservatism, Liberalism, radical democratic republicanism, and socialism—were concerned primarily with forms of government and the role of government in economic life. On the national, political, and economic/social issues—raised by the triple revolution of expectations launched by the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions—these ideologies offered varying mixes of political democracy and social and economic legislation. Once the texts have explained the ideas and the students grasp the sociological bases of these ideologies, together with the groups and classes proclaiming them, the textbooks may proceed with whatever narrative of 19th-century history they consider essential. Even the many and varied revolutions of 1848 can then be made intelligible, though they are probably worth rather little time at the secondary level.

In keeping with the theme of political democracy and its adventures, a useful lesson could be the contrast between 19th-century Britain and France. In the former, a stable parliamentary system evolved peacefully into nearly universal manhood suffrage by 1914, and a two-party rivalry produced relatively advanced social legislation. In contrast, France suffered several bloody revolutions, ending in an unstable multiparty system and, up to 1914, had the least progressive economic and social policies of the major industrialized countries.

Why the difference? Given sufficient materials, students may be cast in the role of investigative reporters, "visiting" each country to uncover contrasts in every sphere of 19th-century life—political, economic, social, and ideological. (The present-day application of this approach should be readily evident.) The great political contrast between the two countries

should leap to the eye: in Britain, there was a large, confident Center, unafraid to accept change, unafraid even to lose elections, because the extremists of Right and Left were too weak to be dangerous to the parliamentary system; in France, there was a small, embattled Center, its moderate approach repeatedly overcome by powerful extremes, both radical and reactionary, each rejecting the parliamentary system itself.

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What conditions, then and now, appear to help or hinder constitutional forms? Some of the social differences between the British and French go back to the Middle Ages. In Britain, a larger, more assured middle class rested upon a larger, more rapidly advancing manufacturing and trading economy. The middle class and the landed aristocracy had many interests in common and often found it profitable to cooperate in both national and local politics. In France, hostility between bourgeoisie and aristocracy persisted, with the former less numerous, less prosperous, and less confident of the security of their interests than were their British counterparts.

In turn, this partly explains the earlier legalization, growth, and effectiveness of trade unions in England and the emergence of a single, moderate parliamentary labor party by the turn of the century. French labor, repeatedly denied legal standing and repeatedly repressed by armed force (as in the massacres of 1848 and 1871), remained outside the system—fragmented, bitter, and increasingly radicalized.

In France, fearful regimes frequently stifled the public debate of controversial issues in parliament and the press. Until 1848, suffrage remained severely restricted, with portions of the middle class entirely shut out. A string of experiences—in 1789, 1792, 1794, 1799, 1830, 1848, 1870, and the Commune of 1871—taught the French that change only produced violence and that, equally, only violence could produce change. Across the Channel, the 17th-century revolution was deep in the past. Political reforms, factory and labor legislation, and extension of the vote were openly debated and carried through Parliament by the interplay of the Liberal and Conservative parties, succeeding each other in the leadership of the House of Commons. Too briefly or simply put, such contrasts can be misleading or unhistorical. Students should be encouraged to recognize them as only a beginning to the exploration of political complexity, as only an exercise in raising elementary questions about politics in any society.

Another possible theme to choose in studying 19th-century Europe is nationalism—its progress and impact. Apart from the pursuit of political democracy and social justice, the third aim of the worldwide triple revolution has been the pursuit of indepen-

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dent nationhood. Often rabid in its determination to include or exclude certain peoples, nationalism has often trampled both political democracy and social reform in its rush to power. The unifications of Italy and Germany may be used as cases in point, provided there is time to present the instructive complications in each case, as well as the several facets of the nationalist impulse in general.

Is national, patriotic ardor a progressive or retrograde force? Is it conducive to free self-government and to social justice, or is it their enemy? Our texts do not pose the question. Yet world history of the 19th and 20th centuries can be imaginatively mined for examples that cut in several different directions. A summary of how these textbooks organize the period from 1800 to 1914 appears early in the next chapter. It is enough to say here that none succeeds in arranging its narrative along clear themes helpful to students. Several themes would be possible: industrialization and the consequent rise of the middle and working classes, trade unionism and social legislation, urbanization and demographic change, coherent national or comparative history, contrasts between Western and Eastern Europe, or contrasts between the industrializing societies and the rest of the world. Here, as at other periods, facts abound but patterns and organizing questions are absent.

A partial exception is the treatment of Western imperialism. No candid presentation of the development and actions of democratic societies on earth can ignore the fact that all of the major self-governing states conquered and colonized weaker societies by brute military force in the several decades prior to 1914. As Athens did in her Golden Age, so did the wealthy, prideful industrialized nations do in theirs. A modern Thucydides could as easily point to the contradiction between ideals expressed, and often adhered to, at home and the aggression and exploitations practiced abroad; to the corruption of public life and political debate at home by the forces of imperialism; and finally, to the seeds of decline, even of self-destruction, sown by the imperialist urge.

The lesson seems eternal. Rarely have either individuals or nations been able to withstand the temptations that come with power and success. Democracies have been no exception. Again and again, democratic ideals and their advocates at home have failed to contain the forces of pride or greed or the ordinary desire for comfort and convenience at the expense of others.

The textbooks do not suggest lessons so broad (or interesting to students). The considerable space they devote to the new imperialism is mostly taken up with narrative, except for brief lists of causes at the start of their chapters. Beers devotes over 50 pages to a three-chapter unit on imperialism, which provides

the best factual base for classroom discussion. But only a half page is given to general causes. Like the others, Beers cites new economic motives developing out of the Industrial Revolution: the desire for sure sources of raw materials, for new markets, and for places to invest. But none of the texts explores whether these economic expectations were on balance fulfilled, a question likely to occur to practical-minded students. To the economic reasons, all the authors add the driving forces of nationalism, national rivalries, the search for power and prestige, and the desire for military bases, as well as the mission to Christianize and the humanitarian impulse to carry the benefits of modern medicine, education, law, and justice to the rest of the world. Kipling's word on the "white man's burden" is cited in Beers, Mazour, and Wallbank.

Beers alone suggests the supportive role of Social Darwinist ideology. Mazour and Roselle add the European search for places to emigrate. Roselle further points out that certain "ambitious statesmen" were convinced that they could win popularity at home by advocating imperialism abroad. But the point is left there. The periodic susceptibility of democracy to tough-talking demagogues is not suggested.

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The texts, then, offer a largely common set of motives at the start and thereafter relate them only very rarely to the narrative of each nation's imperialist activity. Only Roselle, whose narrative on imperialism is otherwise quite brief, refers to any internal debate over whether imperialism was compatible with democracy at home. In opposing the American seizure of the Philippines, Senator Hoar remarked that for the United States to acquire an overseas empire would be to "strut about in the cast-off clothing of pinchback emperors and pewter kings." William Jennings Bryan feared that it would promote militarism. But Senator Beveridge's side won the day and Roselle quotes him on America's destiny:

> We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient.
> We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the world.

Roselle goes on to describe how the Americans crushed the Philippines independence movement, as do Mazour and Wallbank, though all three are sketchy. The latter two texts are the most candid on American dollar diplomacy and intervention in Hawaii and Latin America. Kownslar, in contrast, offers no motives at all for American actions in the Philippines, Hawaii, or Latin America; the imperialist activities of the various world powers are scattered through several unconnected chapters, giving the teacher little chance for building a coherent lesson on imperialism.

The other four books bring the subject of imperialism into a single chapter or section, but they vary widely in the detail they include and in the areas of the world they stress. Beers is fullest and best balanced, with a chapter each on Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In describing the effect of Western education on preparing colonials for future leadership, Beers notes particularly the impact of Locke and Jefferson. Mazour and Wallbank, the next fullest accounts, also mention the spread of Western notions of law, self-government, and nationalism. Each of these texts uses India as the main example. Each also notes the Japanese adoption of the more authoritarian constitution of Bismarckian Germany, though without suggesting why the choice was made! Next to Kownslar, Roselle is briefest on imperialism, and neither author mentions the spread of Western constitutional ideas.

On the other consequences of imperialism, whether upon the conquered or the conquerors, these texts are markedly uneven and all are ultimately inadequate. Kownslar fails to sum up the effects at all; even the connection between imperialist rivalries and the origins of the First World War is given but a single, general sentence. Roselle is content with a brief numbered list outlining three "serious problems": international tensions, "one of the causes of future wars"; the loss of cultural identity among the conquered; and mistrust and hatred of Westerners. Five results are called "important": European and American control of the world; economic development, though Westerners and their corporations reaped most of the benefits; better health and education for colonial peoples; cultural changes on both sides; and the stimulation of nationalist feelings among the conquered.

Wallbank sums up the general benefits as the end of slavery, the relief of famine, better health and education, and an improved level of law and order. The oppression, exploitation, and degradation of Asian and African peoples are to be found in the ensuing narrative, as are the corruption and class conflict worsened by foreign investment (mainly American) and intervention in Central and South America. Mazour and Beers follow a similar pattern. Apart from the general mention of international conflict, hatred, and militarism, the effects of imperialism on the subjugated peoples are narrated colony by colony, area by area, as Mazour and Beers describe the mainly negative effects of modernization designed to serve Western profit. Traditional economies and cultures were displaced, distorted. On this point, the texts miss the chance to remind students that the Industrial Revolution had forced many similar

changes on the traditional societies of Europe, raising problems unforeseen by the 18th-century optimists.

Imperialism was not, of course, the 19th century's only countercurrent to that generalized faith in liberalism and human progress inherited from the Enlightenment and the Atlantic revolutions. By 1900, several other forces were at work to challenge liberal optimists: an increasingly shrill nationalism expressed itself in outbursts of racism and militarism, which were in turn, justified by a vulgar Social Darwinism claiming that conflict, not harmony, was nature's way and the engine of progress. To the progressives' faith in reason, education, self-mastery, individualism, peaceful reform, universal law, free will, and free choice, these challengers countered with theories of human irrationalism, social conditioning, moral relativism, evolutionary determinism, materialism and cults of the self, "dynamism," and "salutary violence" as the only thinkable mode of change.

For the most part, however, these ominous currents of thought were not to loom important until after the devastation of the Great War of 1914-18. The live faiths of 1914 were still optimistic and progressive: political democracy, social amelioration through legislation and unionism, universal education, progress toward peace. In the popular imagination of pre-1914 Western societies, even nationalism could be construed as progressive, even imperialism as only a step along the way to ultimate world harmony, lighted by reason, science, and technology. To follow the history of political democracy on earth, these high expectations of 1900 must be explained, together with the terrible disillusions brought by world war.

WORLD WAR I—BEFORE AND AFTER

XIV.

As in the case of the American and French revolutions, the first thing we ask of textbooks dealing with the world war is to paint it in compelling colors, to make dramatic its enormous effect in shaping the entire 20th century. To begin with, they must reveal how terribly it cut across and interrupted the progress being made in most spheres of Western life. Second, there should be a sensibly complicated explanation of the origins of the war, from which any citizen should draw certain political warnings. Finally, textbooks in world history ought to be particularly concerned with the problems of peacemaking that confronted democratic leaders at Paris in 1919.

That the war of 1914 wrenched Europeans (and many Americans) from an era of optimism to a generalized pessimism—characterized by a sharply reduced confidence in the inevitability of human progress—is one of history's great cliches. Like most such, it is fundamentally true. To the generation of young adults in 1910 or so, looking back at how life had been for their parents and grandparents, there seemed innumerable reasons to be optimistic about the future for their own children. Faith in science, reason, and progress seemed wholly justified by facts. Progress of the triple revolution launched by the Americans and the French had been striking. Nationalism had triumphed in Italy, Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and throughout Latin America; the American Union had survived civil war; Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had won independence. Vigorous nationalist movements were active in other "subject areas" of Europe. Those who believed that universal nationhood (excepting their own colonies) was one of the conditions for peace were expecting much of the future.

Political democracy, too, seemed to be making steady progress. Americans had abolished slavery and Russians, serfdom. The vote was being extended in most nations of the Western world, even in the Russian and Austrian empires. Elections, parties, assemblies, public debate, and freedom of speech, press, and religion had emerged across the European map—or so it was claimed. The rise of effective labor unions and the passage of social legislation—led by Great Britain and Germany—promised better economic security and social justice for the working classes. Most Marxist parties had turned revisionist, ready to rely on the peaceful workings of the parliamentary system.

Science, for the most part, appeared benign. It was cleaning up the world. In the half-century before 1900, anesthetics, antiseptic surgery, vaccination, and pasteurization had been developed; tuberculosis, diptheria, typhoid fever, yellow fever, the bubonic plague, and cholera had all been effectively controlled. The death rate had fallen, life expectancy had lengthened, and the terrible scourge of infant mortality had been markedly reduced. The railroad and steamship had made foreseeable the end of famine.

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When the Great War exploded in August of 1914, it tore across all this and blackened the body and mind of Europe.
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In the advanced industrial countries, every class enjoyed more and better food, clothing, shelter, and recreation. The spread of public education promised new chances at mobility. Cities had electric lights, cleaner water, and greater security, as well as streetcars, automobiles, bicycles, public parks and sports grounds, libraries, museums and theaters, music halls and ballrooms. Useful inventions proliferated: the telephone, phonograph, radio, moving pictures, the still-innocent aeroplane, the wondrous ocean liner. Unparalleled economic growth had left Europe owning the world, and there had not been a general war for a century. People could have confidence in their leaders, in the value of their money, and in the future of their children. Textbooks should put all these practical reasons for optimism in sharp relief.

When the Great War exploded in August of 1914, it tore across all this and blackened the body and mind of Europe. It should not be beyond text writers to convey to students the great sense of loss Europeans felt as 1914 darkened their century with totalitarianism, wars, and cold wars. But the significance of this turning point is lost unless the text contrasts it with the high promise of prewar days. Our texts do not do so. The problem is partly one of their organization. Although many of the above points are mentioned, they are too dispersed or flatly put. Their human significance is drained away, and the war does not stand out as the stupendous tragedy it was for all.

Kownslar scatters a few brief points on the growth of

unions and on economic and social amelioration over three pages, but they come four chapters before the war itself is dealt with. The facts about national unifications and independence are divided among three chapters. There is no treatment of the progress of political democracy in any European country, even in England and France (or in the United States). The triumphs of science, medicine, and invention are given two lines; education also gets two lines (aside from an unclear paragraph on higher education), and no mention is made of its importance to democracy.

In Chapter 25, "The Growth of Liberalism, Nationalism and Democracy, 1815-1914," Wallbank does somewhat better with the progress of political democracy in Britain and France, as well as with Bismarck's social reforms, but again we are four chapters away from 1914. Science, medicine, and invention are surveyed in the following chapter, three away from 1914. A discussion of trade unions, social legislation, and the increasingly evolutionary nature of Marxism follow in the next chapter. Education is also briefly mentioned; but only its economic usefulness is discussed, not its importance to preparing citizens for self-government.

In Chapter 20, "Governments Sought Order While New Political Ideas Gained Influence, 1770-1914," Mazour presents the democratization of the British parliamentary system; British social legislation; the granting of self-government to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; and a brief, mainly negative, view of the French Third Republic before 1914 (one could never guess that it would later be called "La Belle Epoque"). In Chapter 21, progress in science and medicine is very well surveyed, as are public education and its effects. National unifications and German social legislation follow in Chapter 22, but unions and social reform elsewhere are not dealt with. Inventions are covered back in Chapter 19 and are well summarized: "People thought that science and technology were capable of solving any of the problems that might be created by the Industrial Revolution." Mazour also includes improvements in city life and suburbs, including the wide availability of sports, amusements, and cultural events.

Roselle, like the others, scatters pre-1914 developments very widely. Two paragraphs on the French Third Republic, too brief to convey its significance, close Chapter 23. There follows the chapter on the Industrial Revolution, with a half page on modern inventions to 1914. In the next chapter, there is but one general sentence on social legislation after the Ten Hours Act of 1847, three sentences on modern labor unions, and three short paragraphs on medical advances. Roselle is fuller on German social reform and on the gradual political democratization of

Britain; he offers good detail from Chartism to the Parliament Act of 1911 and on the granting of self-government to the dominions. World War I follows, three chapters later.

Beers brings the variegated story of prewar progress into four chapters of a unit called "Dawn of the Industrial Age," separated from the war by a three-chapter unit on "The Age of Imperialism." Modern invention is well covered in the Industrial Revolution chapter, as are the rise of labor unions, the doubling of real wages, and a short paragraph on social legislation and free public schooling (so workers "could also look forward to a better future for their children"). Paragraphs on the betterment of city life close the chapter, and medical advances are, briefly, and too drily, summarized in the next chapter. Beers' Chapter 25, "The Growth of Democracy (185-1914)," is altogether the most satisfactory treatment of the subject. Separate sections on Great Britain, the dominions, the Third Republic, and the United States each offer combined accounts of political and social reform in helpful detail.

In the chapters dealing with the war itself, only Beers and Mazour open by commenting on how severely it dashed popular expectations. Beers offers only a few general words. Mazour is worth quoting:

> In the early 1900's many people believed that the world was on the verge of a long era of prosperity and peace. They thought that scientific and industrial progress would create a better life than anyone had ever known. They believed that widespread education would prepare people to govern themselves with wisdom and moderation.

Elsewhere in Mazour, there is enough material—although it is scattered and would have to be drawn together—that a teacher could give meaning to these words.

Of the five accounts of the origins of the First World War, Kownslar's, as usual, is the briefest. It does cite the effects of imperialist rivalries, the alliance system, the Anglo-German naval race, militarism and the armaments race, nationalism, Austro-Russian hostility, and the Balkan crises, which culminated in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. But the role of imperialist conflict is unexplained. Why and how the alliances were formed and the scale and character of the arms race and military planning also go unexplained. Similarly, Kownslar is incomplete on the main diplomatic steps, and failures, taken during the critical month of July. There is simply not enough upon which to base a proper lesson. Kownslar's attempt at piquing student interest by retelling the story of the chauffeur's wrong turn at Sarajevo does not make up for the absence of solid information.

On the causes of war, there are few differences from among the Beers, Mazour, Roselle, and Wallbank texts. All cite the general causes Kownslar does, but with better explanation. The chain of events from the Franco-Prussian War to the alliance system is clear, as are the particular effects of imperialism. Wallbank is weaker than the others on the arms race and military plans, but clearer on the military's influence in Germany and Russia during the July crisis as well as on the motives of leaders on all sides. Roselle's information on the general causes is adequate, but the flat, unexplained recital of events in July detracts from its usefulness. Mazour is strongest on the long-term causes and on the aims and fears of each major state, but the diplomatic crisis of July is less clear than in Wallbank.

The Beers book strikes a medium level. Not quite so strong as Mazour on general causes or as Wallbank on July, Beers' account is competent and well balanced, with the advantage of explaining the importance of the Schleiffen Plan in the last moments of the crisis. It also offers students an exercise on analysis of cause from two interpretations, Emil Ludwig's and Raymond Aron's, but it is hard to imagine that students would get much out of it without a great deal more information than the text offers.

Although one could always ask for more information on the long-term build-up of general causes setting the stage for war, teachers might better concentrate on the drama of July itself, both to interest their students and to suggest lessons for self-governing citizens. The steps from murder to war are breath-taking, and reproducing a day-by-day narrative for the class is well worth it. Even the most competent or well-meaning leaders are caught in a web of forces resulting from past action (or inaction), their hands all but tied, unable to take new action they know they ought to—or unable to take it in time. The inexorable law of historical consequence is nowhere more obvious.

Even the most competent or well-meaning leaders are caught in a web of forces resulting from past action.

Political leaders were also caught by forces of aroused public opinion tired of past "surrenders," an excited press, quarrels within their own governments, undependable information from other capitals (they also, as always, ignored good information that crossed their preferences), and, perhaps most fatal of all, the fear of being blamed for delaying the terrible military timetables imposed by the technology and military plans of those days. Perhaps the ultimate irony, though it should not surprise good liberal democrats, is that the potentates who in theory held autocratic power—Kaiser William, Emperor Franz Joseph, Czar Nicholas—were never in charge of events, but were bullied, evaded, or manipulated by their putative underlings. The democratic leaders in London and Paris kept better control but were pulled over the cliff by their alliance

with Russia. They did not forget it.

On the carnage of the war itself, the textbooks fall short. It must be seen in all of its long, drawn-out horror for students to understand why Europe emerged as such a ruin, why Russians and Germans (and Italians) were left unable to survive the onslaught of totalitarians in their midst, and why the British and French were so shaken—and estranged—that they could no longer mount effective foreign policies. The scale of slaughter on the Eastern and Western fronts must be made imaginable, as must the murderous incompetence of military leaders on all sides. Textbook authors seem reluctant to dramatize, but they only falsify by failing to, leaving students unable to comprehend what followed in the interwar years. Although war losses are given in general terms, perspective is lacking. One example may suffice: The French had 1,350,000 killed. Were the United States to suffer losses in the same proportion to its present population, it would mean the killing of 8,100,000 Americans. Somehow, such trauma must be set forth. Otherwise, the problems of peace making at Paris are beyond understanding.

On the carnage of the war itself, the textbooks fall short.

It is probably unfair to expect realistic accounts of the Paris peace conference and the ensuing Versailles treaty in high school texts, when no university-level text is competent on the subject, either. Lacking the perspective of those who fought the whole war, unable to imagine themselves on the spot after the war, American texts invariably fail to grasp the essential problems of the Paris conference. In what may be called a lapse in "global consciousness," the event is interpreted exclusively from an American point of view when, like a good novel, it should focus on those most agonized by the situation: the French and the Germans.

There is little use in reciting the detailed differences among our five texts on peace making. Yet the subject is important, for it is the first attempt by democratically elected statesmen to make peace after a major war. As such, the Versailles settlement is often compared unfavorably with the Vienna settlements in 1815. In Vienna, representatives of autocratic or aristocratic governments were able to ignore the public hatreds whipped up against Napoleon and France. The emissaries of the Bourbon king, Louis XVIII, were not excluded and then dictated to, as were the officials of the new German republic after World War I. In dealing with the defeated French as equals in 1815, the victors made France (and, they hoped, all of Europe) safe for monarchy.

It is said that at Paris the Big Three–Georges Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson–were prisoners of public opinion. The lesson suggested by this is that it might be better to leave foreign policy to the experts. But the matter is not so

simple, and students ought not to be tempted to think it is. Of the three, it is true that Lloyd George seemed wholly concerned with his image, if in fact he had serious concerns at all. But Wilson and Clemenceau took great risks with their electorates and political allies at home, the latter by giving up French claims to a Rhine frontier, the former by insisting that the United States allow some of its decisions to be made by a League of Nations and by signing a military alliance with the French. However, no great public outrage ensued.

To encourage critical thinking by students of democratic politics, it is useful to push further into the contrast with Vienna and to point out how much more complex and threatening were the forces confronting the men at Paris. Europe was in shock. The losses of life, the numbers maimed or driven mad, were incomparably higher; a much more complicated economy lay in ruins; famine raged again; Bolshevism seemed poised to spread over central Europe; and revolution and counterrevolution daily added to the death toll. All the while, public anger was magnified by the press, and public expectations of a wondrous new age earned by their soldiers were nourished by ambitious politicians. There is, of course, no answer to what might have been accomplished if autocratic experts had been left quietly in charge or if the Big Three had done things differently.

One lesson is simply that any reasonable action is difficult amid the consequences of war. Another is the folly of expecting leaders to escape the web of forces spun by the past or without having to ask their people for added sacrifice. In addition, students need reminding that all this had never happened before on such a scale. Few people grasped, for example, the need for wholly unprecedented economic initiatives among victors and defeated alike—a lesson learned, it ought to be said, by the end of the Second World War. In sum, the Paris conference and Versailles settlement do not necessarily prove or disprove anything about the ability of liberal democracies to make and keep the peace. But they offer warnings for the political education of democratic citizens. Our texts, with their necessarily short, unanalytical accounts, will not much help students to grasp all this. Most offer the usual picture of Wilson the idealist undone by the vengeful national interests of Europeans, as though the United States had no national interests of its own. Here we arrive at a final and sensitive point. World War I and its aftermath mark the first decisive entry of the United States into world affairs.

One lesson is simply that any reasonable action is difficult amid the consequences of war.

For the political sophistication of American students preparing for self-government, how far should textbooks go in making clear what the rest of the world thinks of us? Again, people's beliefs about each other—whether sensible or not—are

themselves facts and forces to be taken into account. In any case, none of the texts points out that the British and continental Europeans felt they had made the greatest sacrifices in the Allied cause and that, on the contrary, America had profited (and profiteered) enormously, replacing them as the creditors of the world. No author says that Wilson and Clemenceau came to agree on the need for a League with teeth and for an Anglo-American-French military alliance to hold the balance of power against Germany—while Lloyd George and the American mainstream looked only for ways to avoid all commitments. None mentions the American betrayal of Wilson's promise, and signature, of the alliance with France. In sum, the textbooks do not help students to form a realistic perspective on America's image in the world of the 1920s or to understand why others concluded that we had not done very much to make the world safe for democracy

XV. TOTALITARIANISM, LEFT AND RIGHT

In actuality, the world had not been made safer for democracy, but more hostile. The Great War had speeded up developments already evident by 1914 that were to confront popularly elected governments with added challenges: the concentration of commercial, industrial, and financial power; the bureaucratization of public and private enterprise; new technological complexities of warfare; the cults of efficiency and scientific management; and new mechanisms of propaganda. In the realm of ideas, the progressive faiths dominant before the war—reason, universal law, liberalism, social democracy, trade unionism, gradualist socialism—were thrown into doubt. Many concluded that these ideas were powerless in the face of human aggression, irrationalism, the will to power, militarism, racism, integral nationalism, or plain economic greed.

In most countries, the war's direct effect added immeasurably to the problems confronting democratic moderates. Nowhere were the nation-based economies equal to the task of effective transition from war to peace. No government had dared to meet the costs of war as it went along. Debt burdens were staggering, feeding demands for reparations. Inflation stirred widespread despair; the purchasing power of wages and savings—and the pensions of war widows and the disabled—plummeted. Returning soldiers found no employment, no "homes fit for heroes." The grand promises could not be kept.

Relations between labor and management were embittered; class hatreds resurfaced. The untaxed wealth of profiteers enraged ordinary people, who believed that their governments had let the entire burden of war, in blood and money, fall upon

them. The failure of political leaders to prevent war, their incompetence in waging it, and their inability to conjure normalcy out of chaos encouraged a generalized political cynicism. Then, after a short moment of precarious prosperity in the mid-1920s, the deep economic dislocations of the war contributed to the greatest depression in history. The business leadership appeared to be no more competent than the politicians.

Since the texts do not present matters from the perspective of liberal democracy's trials, they cannot be expected to refer to such developments in any but general and scattered ways. But on the failure of liberals and democrats in Russia and Germany, and on the emergence of totalitarian Communism and Nazism, we should expect more.

What happened in Petrograd in 1917 and in Germany of the Depression is central to students' grasp of the conditions endangering free government.

What happened in Petrograd in 1917 and in Germany of the Depression is central to students' grasp of the conditions endangering free government. We should expect history books to make such conditions clear; to explain the reasons for democracy's failure; and to portray the tragic consequences of that failure with forthright descriptions of the totalitarian regimes that replaced it.

In the Russian Revolution, our texts all begin well by ascribing the collapse of the Czarist regime in the spring of 1917 to the effects of the war and to the government's own horrendous incapacities. But in every case, the work and weaknesses of the liberal Provisional Government—which planned for democracy but was overthrown by Lenin's Bolsheviks in the fall—are only briefly sketched. Kownslar gives it one line: "The revolutionary government that replaced the Tsar attempted to continue the fighting on the Eastern Front, but it had little success." Wallbank offers two short paragraphs, saying the Provisional Government "restored (sic) civil rights" and planned free elections, but lost support by continuing the war and refusing land reforms. Roselle, Mazour, and Beers are more detailed. Roselle describes the Provisional Government as led by liberals, middle-class reformers, and agrarian socialists who tried to create a more democratic government, with free speech, trial by jury, equal rights for women, local self-government, and universal suffrage. The Provisional Government lost power to Lenin and the Bolsheviks because it lacked prestige, it could not keep order in the rural areas, and it pressed on with an unpopular war.

Mazour says only that the Provisional Government's program was less attractive than the Bolsheviks' promises of immediate peace, land reforms, and factories given over to the workers. Beers cites Lvov's and Kerensky's liberal reforms—freedom of speech and religion as well as equality before the law. But the refusal of the government to end the war and to redistribute the land immediately and its failure to grant higher

wages and more food to the city workers led to its downfall, according to Beers. All of this is true, but students might well wonder how its leaders could have made so many "mistakes."

. . . students might well wonder how [Russia's] leaders could have made so many "mistakes."

The texts miss the opportunity to present a now-classic case of liberals and social democrats, the moderate Center, vainly struggling to create a free society in a poor and backward country drained by war and prey to extremists of left and right. The conditions could hardly have been worse for the sudden change from autocracy to Western-style constitutionalism. There was no democratic tradition and almost no experience with parliamentary government. The country was in the midst of a war from which soldiers and civilians alike had suffered appalling losses. Transport and food were short; competent administrators scarce. Order collapsed in the countryside as peasants seized lands and manor houses, killing or driving away the landlords. Army units rebelled or simply disbanded. In the capital, the Provisional Government had to depend on troops obedient to the workers' and soldiers' Soviet. Until nearly the end, most members of the Government represented the small, middle, and professional classes, and they were distrusted by workers and peasants alike. In their eagerness to prove that Russia could be the equal of her democratic allies, leaders of the Provisional Government determined to continue the war against autocratic Germany and to pursue land and industrial reform only in strict legal ways, with proper compensation.

The failure of the Provisional Government was an incalculable historical tragedy.

The failure of the Provisional Government was an incalculable historical tragedy. It is worth explaining fully what it had done and what directions it was taking at the moment of its overthrow. It had already decreed the eight-hour day and the rights of unions to organize, strike, and have the results of their collective bargaining sustained by the government. It had instituted freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion. It issued laws against racial persecution, abolished censorship and the secret police, legalized all political parties, and freed political prisoners. It planned for a meritocratic civil service and for free and universal public education to age 12. In addition, it had set the date for free elections, in which male and female voters alike were to choose a constituent assembly that would draw up a democratic constitution.

At the moment of its overthrow by the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government was composed of a majority of socialists and social democrats committed to peace and demobilization, land reforms that would give peasants their own holdings (Lenin promised the same, with no intention of allowing it once in power), government control of banking, and a broad program of social legislation based on the British and German models. The socialist parties other than the Bolsheviks were expected to

dominate the new Constituent Assembly and did, in fact, win more than 60 percent of the vote. Clearly, the survival of the Provisional Government and the subsequent Assembly would have meant a movement toward Russian social democracy.

The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 was a triumph of force and propaganda over the kind of gradualist social reform that Leninists, then and now, regard as their worst enemy. On the Communist Revolution and its aftermath, our texts (except for Kownslar, which offers no narrative on it at all) are somewhat more informative. They all say that the Bolsheviks were never the majority but that Lenin engineered their takeover of the Petrograd Soviet, to which most of the armed forces in the capital looked for orders. The four texts make clear that once in control of the guns, the Bolsheviks easily crushed the unarmed Provisional Government.

Roselle and Wallbank then relate Lenin's dispersal by force, in January 1918, of the only freely elected assembly in Russian history. Bolsheviks formed only a minority in it and, in any case, Lenin's revolutionary Marxism called for dictatorship by a disciplined party under his command. All texts present the course and outcome of the civil war and the early development of the U.S.S.R. Roselle, Mazour, and Beers mention Lenin's founding of the Comintern in 1919, with its call for worldwide revolution, but none cites the special venom he reserved for reformist socialists. Only Beers describes Lenin's revival of the secret police and his use of terror and liquidation of opponents. In the other texts, the later Stalinist dictatorship appears to be less a continuation of Lenin's rule than it was in fact.

In the other texts, the later Stalinist dictatorship appears to be less a continuation of Lenin's rule than it was in fact.

There are also serious problems in the textbooks' treatment of Stalin's totalitarian regime. Kownslar starts badly by comparing Stalin to "an absolute monarch," thus managing to distort two entire eras of politics at once. The account of Stalinist Russia occupies only three paragraphs, mentioning the abolition of labor unions, forced industrialization, and the great purges. It reports that Stalin set the army and secret police on his own people, killing between 5 and 10 million. Left out are the horrors of the forced collectivization of agriculture, the labor camps, the rise of a privileged elite, the scope and character of the purge trials, and the irony of the model constitution of 1936.

Wallbank begins curiously on Stalin, stating that "until the mid-1930s, he was careful to consult others and to act modestly," but then describes millions of peasants starving to death because of forced collectivization. Wallbank reveals the "Stalinization" of Soviet culture and the false promise of the Stalin constitution. A graphic paragraph portrays Stalin's "reign of terror" over the Russian people, the hundreds of thousands shot, and the millions sent to forced labor camps and

never heard from again.

Roselle's account of collectivization and industrialization notes the brutality, the ruthlessness, and the freedoms "trampled on in the race to reach statistical goals." Millions died of starvation or were killed by the troops sent to enforce Stalin's orders. Roselle is clear about the meaningless constitution of 1936, the rise of the "new class system" dominated by the new managerial elite, and the state's practice of consigning its opponents to slave labor.

Beers' treatment of the Stalin era makes several of the same points, but it omits the paper constitution of 1936. Along with an account of the purges, Beers includes a separate box on the farce of Bukharin's trial and execution. Beers is the only text that includes a brief general definition of totalitarianism, though it is made to seem a particular creation of Stalin's.

Mazour is somewhat briefer than the latter two and less incisive. On the collectivization of farmlands, the text states only that hundreds of thousands of the "wealthier peasants" were executed, jailed, or sent into exile. Mazour first describes Stalin's purges as targetting party officials "disloyal to him" but later allows that by 1938 nearly eight million had been arrested, deported, executed, or put to forced labor. Mazour's way of introducing Stalin's dictatorship is misleading:

> The czars had used secret police and spies to maintain their absolute rule. Now Stalin used similar tactics. Under Stalin, the Russians were still ruled by fear.

The passage wrongly suggests that Lenin and the Communist party had not previously—and often—used spies, secret police, arbitrary arrest, execution, and deportation to Siberia. Worse perhaps, it equates czarist and Stalinist terror as though Nicholas II's ramshackle apparatus was somehow to be compared with the dreadful efficiency and unprecedented scale of Stalin's assault on his own people.

It is a failure of all the texts that they make Stalin himself so personally responsible for Soviet totalitarianism, as though its central features were not inherent in revolutionary Marxist dogma. In principle, no means were too harsh, no cost was counted for the achievement of its exalted aspirations. Everyone not wholly subservient was an enemy; worst of all were those socialists ("social fascists" in later Communist jargon) who sought peaceful amelioration of working people's lives. Lenin could not have been plainer on these points, in word or action.

Partly in response to the threats (real and imagined) of Bolshevism and also out of the war's traumatic effects, there arose a second, fascist brand of totalitarianism, the most virulent form of which took shape in German Nazism. How well do

the world history texts explain the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the character of the Nazi regime that followed it? As in the case of the Russian Provisional Government, no text explicitly sets forth the Weimar Republic's problem as one of democracy in trouble, from which students might draw certain political lessons. Nor does any text bother to say the obvious: that the coming of Communism to Russia and of Nazism to Germany inexorably shaped the dangerous world the students now live in. Even the best account of the failure of democrats in Russia and Germany leaves to the teacher the role of responding to the students' query, "What of it?"

To begin with the more complete accounts, Beers devotes two pages to the problems of Weimar and the rise of Hitler. The text cites the Republic's discredit for having signed the Versailles treaty and the Rightists' charge that Germany was not defeated militarily but stabbed in the back by Jews, liberals, and Communists. It also notes the repeated assaults made on the Weimar regime by extremists of Left and Right--but not the active cooperation between Communist and Nazi factions in attacks on social democrats. On economic problems, Beers offers that "the inflation of the early 1920s and, later, the Great Depression swelled the ranks of the discontented." Beers then turns to the nationalist, racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist appeals of Adolph Hitler, his promises of prosperity to every class, and the support he received from some business leaders. Beers stresses the Nazis' windfall from the Depression: "As unemployment rose, thousands of desperate people flocked to local Nazi party headquarters in search of a free meal and companionship."

Mazour and Roselle each allot about a page to the subject. The latter adds to Beers' explanation of Weimar's weaknesses the direct effects of world war: losses of men and wealth, the humiliation of defeat, the veterans' vain search for work, and the burdens of reparations on the economy. Roselle also notes the widespread fear of Communism among middle and business classes and stresses the importance of the Depression in finally opening the way to power for Hitler.

Mazour begins by explaining that Weimar was never popular, was thought of as Wilson's creature, and was blamed for signing a humiliating peace. Beyond the points made by Beers and Roselle, Mazour describes Hitler's appeal to the Germans' frustration, self-pity, and hatreds. Also emphasized is the impact of the Depression on middle class voters who earlier had seen "their savings destroyed" by inflation and who remained afraid of Communism.

Wallbank's and Kownslar's accounts are slightly briefer.

The former, however, reports the plight of the democratic, socialist Center assaulted by both extremes as "traitors" for accepting Versailles and implies that the Center was further undermined by inflation's ruin of the middle and lower bourgeoisie. The Republic's helplessness in the face of unemployment in and after 1930 alienated the young, comments Wallbank. To the more familiar points on anti-Semitism, Wallbank adds the envy felt by some Germans of the Jews' success in the professions and the arts. They were all the easier to picture as scapegoats for every ill Germany suffered.

Like Wallbank, Kownslar crams many major points into a brief page. But the text does not connect them to the particular fears and interests of individual groups, except in the case of the middle class, which turned to Hitler because it was "tired of inflation and afraid of a Communist revolution." To attract the middle class, Hitler "turned against the workers and unions," explains Kownslar, "because they were supporters of the Communist party." Kownslar does not add that this was only Hitler's claim—and largely untrue. There is no mention of anti-Semitism as part of Hitler's campaign to power, but Kownslar gives the Nazi persecution of the Jews, the Nuremburg Laws, and the Holocaust two vividly written pages immediately after.

What have the texts left out that could have better informed students on the death of Weimar?

What have the texts left out that could have better informed students on the death of Weimar? As suggested above, an explicit statement on democracy's fragility in the face of its own inability to satisfy people's hunger for national dignity and equality and for security in their work and property. The problems of the 1920s did not of themselves topple the regime, but they spread the hostility and indifference that left it open to the onslaught of a man possessed of peculiar genius and political force.

At the critical moment, few were ready to rush to the Republic's defense. Every group had reason to be angry or apathetic: patriots of all classes, the Junker aristocracy, the unemployed, the veterans with no role in society, academicians and the student generation, landowners and industrialists, workers whose wages were cut (and whose unions seemed powerless to resist), and vast segments of the middle and lower-middle classes, doubly shaken by inflation and depression but determined not to fall into the proletariat. And, not least, the respectable religious folk shocked by the lewdness and amorality of much of Weimar culture, in cabaret, theater, song, and film, which the Nazi "purifiers" could blame on Jews and Leftists. To Puritans and patriots, the Republic lacked dignity, probity, and competence; it was utterly without higher purpose. They wanted very much to believe in Hitler's promise to bring back the good old days of Germany's short-lived greatness, without

cost or disturbance to anyone but a few "non-Germans."

The horrors of the Nazi regime are for the most part effectively portrayed in all of the texts. As noted above, Kownslar devotes two pages of detail on the fate of the Jews, pointing out that they made up only one percent of the German population. He then chronicles the anti-Semitic laws, the violence of *Kristallnacht*, the ghettoization, and the hardly imaginable "Final Solution"—the extermination of 6,000,000 European Jews along with millions of Slavs and other victims deemed "inferior."

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The Holocaust is one subject upon which these texts cannot be faulted.

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Wallbank, like Kownslar, offers grisly pictures, plus a special boxed photo and description of Anne Frank. Roselle, Mazour, and Beers are briefer, but use graphic language and striking pictures. The Holocaust is one subject upon which these texts cannot be faulted, though they are less clear on the mass imprisonment and execution of Nazism's opponents, members of the resistance in Germany and elsewhere.

Finally, in dealing with the totalitarians, these authors miss the chance to compare Communist and Nazi ideologies and then to contrast them with the main tenets of liberal democracy. Of all our texts, only Beers has a paragraph on totalitarianism in general, and it does not deal with ideas. Fascist-Nazi ideology is only briefly touched upon in these books and is not explicitly contrasted to Communism, except for single short paragraphs in Mazour and Wallbank. With a little more detail, students could readily see why Communist ideas have been so much more widely attractive than those of Fascism-Nazism and why they present greater competition to those of liberal democracy.

Against the fascist insistence on one nation's or one race's superiority, the Communist poses universal human equality. Against fascist Social Darwinism and the glories of militarism and war, the Communist portrays a disarmed world united in peace. Against fascism's insistence on the strong leader and rigid hierarchies of power and privilege, Communism responds with a self-governing, classless society. In practice, of course, they have proved to be very much alike. At the end of *Darkness at Noon*, Koestler's Rubashov asks which uniform his executioner wears.

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It is not often said that the Communists and fascists have certain ideas in common.

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It is not often said that the Communists and fascists have certain ideas in common, too. Foremost is their common hostility to liberal and social democracy, with its political give-and-take. Sure of their ultimate truths, and arrogantly utopian, they are contemptuous of the individual mind and spirit; they reject the skeptical, open-ended liberal ideal of learning. Language is not an objective vehicle for arriving at truth with others; it is a device to inculcate dogma or to stir emotion and action. While fascism allows private property to the docile, both reject free

120

enterprise in favor of state direction of the economy. The liberal democratic notion of the individual as central and sacrosanct—hence the whole panoply of civil rights and freedoms—is dismissed. History and society are moved not by individuals, but by state, nation, or leader according to fascism and by the economic forces of history, hurried along by the initiated few, according to revolutionary Marxism. All of this ought to be a fundamental part of a student's political education.

Less often noted, moreover, are those ideas the totalitarians have in common that pose genuine moral challenges to liberal democracy. Both attack its materialism, its self-indulgence, its profit-driven frivolity, the amorality of its popular culture, and the corruption of its politics. Both fascists and Communists claim their readiness to sacrifice for the good of the future; they accuse the liberal system of seeking only the comforts of the moment. Democracy betrays its own vaunted morality, they argue, by refusing to accept its responsibility to future generations and to the wider world of its time. Such questions are not ordinarily raised in textbooks, but perhaps they ought to be, particularly at those moments when democratic countries have not appeared at their best, as when they failed to guard their security and honor in the 1930s.

The textbooks also neglect to note that great numbers of citizens and some leaders in Russia and Weimar Germany could not see that the totalitarian "cures" being proposed were infinitely worse than the ailments of their own societies. They lost faith in a Center that did not seem to be holding. In leaving this point unmentioned, the texts again fail to dramatize the perils of moderate democrats caught between Left and Right. Their earlier lapse, in not stressing those forces undermining the Russian Provisional Government in 1917 and the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s, deprives students of insights they need in order to recognize conditions that are hostile to free governments.

APPEASEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY

XVI.

In the 1930s, the Western democracies repeatedly failed to take a firm stand against Italian and German aggression and failed also to rearm sufficiently to deter Hitler from going to war. No one doubts that Hitler was the aggressor. But the conventional wisdom is that the weakness of the democracies, France and Britain in particular, must be held partly responsible for the coming of World War II. Winston Churchill called it "The Unnecessary War." The lesson drawn ever since is the need to maintain at least an equal balance of military power and to meet each act, or threat, of aggression with determined resistance—armed force, if need be. Only thus can aggression be stopped and a major war prevented.

Some British and French statesmen were saying so at the time, but they were unable to carry the public or their governments with them. Why not? Why should there have been such resistance to an argument that seems self-evident now? Was it, as some say, a failure to cherish democratic values and institutions, a refusal to risk anything—including tax money—to defend themselves against their enemies? Was it simply a selfish indifference to the fate of others—Ethiopians, Spaniards, Austrians, Czechs, and the domestic victims of the dictators? And the wishful thought, as Churchill said, that the crocodile would eat them last? Was it, in sum, essentially a failure of character and intelligence that democratic people can hope to educate themselves out of? Or were the circumstances of the 1930s such that we would be unjust and unrealistic to suppose that anyone would have acted differently? Finally, does the era have anything useful to say about the problem of making foreign policy in a democracy?

Textbooks should pose such questions at the start, to engage students and to set forth the drama and the significance of appeasement. World War II tore a great hole into the middle of the century. Before it was over, the world entered the age of atomic war, the Soviet Union had mastered half of a Europe once more devastated, tens of millions of soldiers and civilians were dead, the Cold War of superpowers was launched, and most of the colonial world was in revolution. Could all of this have been avoided if only the democracies had held firm? What were they thinking of?

(O)ur textbooks by their nature are not organized around the adventures and misadventures of democracy.

Once more, our textbooks by their nature are not organized around the adventures and misadventures of democracy, so we cannot expect deep explorations of these questions. But is there enough hard material offered so that the teacher may do so? Certain basics would be necessary: first, a clear narrative of the advances of the Axis dictators and, in each case, the nature of British and French responses (or lack thereof). Next, an exploration of reasons for the passivity of the democracies—including a discussion of the economic, social, and political conditions that preoccupied them at home—together with the prevailing orthodoxies of thought about foreign and military policy in the 1930s. And, finally, to stir debate and some critical thought, a fundamental question: Given their many problems and their set notions about war and diplomacy, is it reasonable to expect the democracies to have acted differently? Or, given similar circumstances, would they act differently in the future?

None of the texts, even those with the longest accounts, succeeds in laying quite enough groundwork. It is not a matter of space but of selection and organization of material. Of them all, Beers' four pages headed "The Road to War" (Chapter 33, "The World at War") are closest to adequate. But their impact is lessened by problems of organization. Several victories enjoyed by the dictators appear only in prior chapters: Hitler's unanswered violation of the Versailles treaty when he rearmed in 1935 (justified, Hitler said, by the size of the Soviet army); Britain's agreement to a naval treaty with Hitler in 1935, even though they both violated Versailles; Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia; and the League's collapse. Beers' main narrative of aggression and appeasement, then, begins with Axis intervention in the Spanish Civil War. In France, the Popular Front government failed to intervene to rescue the Spanish Republic lest it antagonize the French Right (and the British, though Beers does not say so). Unhappily, Beers' explanation of the fierce social and political conflicts in France occurs two chapters earlier, so the projection of the Left-Right split into every foreign policy issue is not clear. Next, the Beers text relates Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and Franco-

British inaction on this double violation of Versailles and Locarno. It cites the British belief that Germans had a right to occupy German national territory and the French refusal to act without British support.

Following the account of Hitler's annexation of Austria, Beers has a section headed "The Policy of Appeasement." This first lays out a number of British attitudes: horror over the carnage of the first war, the pacifism that followed, the remoteness of Europe to the British, the fear of Soviet power, and the feelings of guilt over the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany in 1919. Beers adds that many Frenchmen shared such views. Moreover, they were resigned not to act without British help. And French morale and determination were sapped by internal hatreds. American isolationism is also mentioned, though not linked as it could be with British and French hesitations. That Beers puts all this before the Munich crisis makes that surrender easier to understand. The rest of the story follows, from Prague to the Nazi-Soviet pact to the invasion of Poland.

Starting with this material, teachers could develop a foreign policy lesson on appeasement along the lines suggested below. But none of the other texts provides enough background. Mazour and Roselle, like Beers, also weaken their presentation by placing French and British domestic problems in prior chapters. In Mazour, they appear three chapters earlier, as does France's building of the Maginot Line (without noting that it implied a defensive military strategy at odds with French obligations to eastern allies), and the signing of the Franco-Soviet pact, (without remarking that it divided the French bitterly). Hitler's re-armament of Germany and his reoccupation of the Rhineland (without explanation of French inaction) also appear here.

Mazour continues with the 1931 Japanese attack on Manchuria and Italy's defeat of Ethiopia. (But the text does not explain the role of Britain and France in first demanding, then abandoning, League sanctions; thus the League appears to act by itself.) The Spanish Civil War follows; then comes Hitler's annexation of Austria and the Czech crisis. Under a section headed "Appeasement at Munich," Mazour says that "Chamberlain and Daladier were eager to avoid war at any cost." There is no further explanation of the foreign policies of the Western democracies.

Like Mazour, Roselle scatters the relevant material, but he offers less than two pages on the "Prelude to General War." The Rhineland coup and French inaction are passed over without explanation, there is but a single sentence on events in Austria, and the only comment on the Munich crisis is that war was "temporarily avoided by *appeasement*—that is, by giving in

to Hitler." The reasons are nowhere examined.

Wallbank's Chapter 32, "World Depression and War, 1929-1945," is better organized and starts well by observing that Hitler did not bring on World War II by himself:

> After World War I, the nations of Europe faced major problems in trying to return to peacetime economies. Partly because of these problems, Britain and France could not agree on a common policy toward Germany. As a result, the restrictions against Germany in the Treaty of Versailles were not well enforced. Hitler was quick to take advantage of Anglo-French disagreements to build up German power and follow an aggressive foreign policy.

The League's failure to act against Japan's aggression in China is explained by other countries' preoccupation with the depression, their desire to trade with Japan, and the British and French aversion to war after their huge casualties in 1914-18. After single sentences on German re-armament, the Ethiopian War, and German remilitarization of the Rhineland, Wallbank remarks only that British and French public opinion "was strongly against war." Through the Spanish War, Austria, and Munich, there is no other explanation beyond the British desire to avoid war at all costs.

Kownslar's Chapter 28, "Creating World War II," is not very helpful, starting with the misinformation that after World War I the "European countries did everything possible to prevent a renewal of German strength." Kownslar does not say that the Britsh did not share French fears of Germany, that they followed different policies, but that the French nonetheless were convinced that the two had to stand together against common enemies. The narrative of Hitler's violations and aggressions occupies only two paragraphs. Appeasement is mentioned ("The British and French treatment of Hitler was called *appeasement.*") But there is no explaining it beyond British and French beliefs that Hitler would "reunite (sic) only former German (sic) territories."

A closer look at appeasement is necessary if students are to appreciate the problem of making foreign policy in an open society.

A closer look at appeasement is necessary if students are to appreciate the problem of making foreign policy in an open society, especially since the term is still so commonly used and abused in our political discourse. The issues are certainly not beyond the comprehension of high school students. They will instantly recognize most of the popular attitudes of the 1930s and easily grasp what is meant by a "prevailing orthodoxy"—an assumption so widely shared that to question it is to elicit either a yawn or a scolding. Let them put themselves in the place of a statesman like Winston Churchill, to measure what chance they would have had at turning public opinion around on the issues of

re-armament and risking war with Hitler.

What was the condition of the public mind in Britain and France at the time? Beers and Wallbank suggest a few points, but let us add more, arranging them under three broad headings: first, general ideas and mind sets; second, favorite ideas of liberals and the Left; and third, favorite ideas of conservatives and the Right. First under general ideas and mind sets is the obvious fact that most people do not usually think about foreign policy at all. The British and French—as well as the Americans—had compelling reasons to be obsessed with the problems of depression at home and with its political, social, and personal ravages. The depression not only helped the dictators to power, it distracted their victims.

Next, many said that Hitler could not really mean to risk war only 20 years after the outbreak of World War I. It would be obviously so horrible, not least for the Germans. Hitler must have been bluffing, or he must have been arming only to keep Germans employed. There was no need to arm in response and, besides, arms produced in the mid-1930s would be obsolete if war should ever come later. People also still had faith in formal international agreements. If Hitler had violated the Treaty of Versailles, it was because the Treaty was unjust and had not been freely agreed to by Germany. As a German, Hitler had no choice, but whatever he himself signed, he would surely honor.

Then, there was a general misunderstanding of totalitarianism, still a new phenomenon on earth—and many newspapers played down the accurate accounts of Nazi bestiality sent back by their own correspondents in Berlin.

The British and French were aware that the United States was deeply isolationist; this time there would be no rescue from abroad. There was also a generally shared conviction that it was simply too expensive to re-arm; people recalled the dreadful inflation and the soaring government deficits born of the war. Re-armament would thwart attempts at economic recovery, the experts said (in those innocent days before they discovered that building arms produced the look of a healthy economy).

Many people alternately felt secure or afraid, or both at once. That is, neither the British nor the French feared actual conquest. There was the Channel; there was the Maginot Line. But fear of air bombardment was common. Its horrors were the stuff of that decade's science fiction—and ever implied in Hitler's repeated threats, artfully couched in offers of treaties to ban the bombing of cities.

Finally, there was, as Beers and Wallbank point out, the deep pacifism born of the slaughter so fresh in people's memories, a deep pacifism affecting every class and rank in British

and French society, reaching even into the military. None of the texts gives sufficient attention to the deep revulsion to war's carnage as depicted, for example, in Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, published in English in 1929, a year after its appearance in Germany.

Among liberals and the Left ran the convictions that wars were caused by munitions makers' thirst for profits and that disarmament was the only way to peace. Whatever needed doing on the international scene should be done by the League, not by nation-states. Moreover, Germany had been wronged by the Versailles settlement, which had been forced upon her. Britain and France had no moral standing to condemn others, however reprehensible, until they ceased their own oppressions of colonial peoples and their working classes at home. Let tax money flow to programs promoting employment and social welfare, not to arms.

Many conservatives and the Right rejected the League, refusing to contemplate any international commitment until the immediate interests of their nations were touched. They called for businessmen to run governmental and foreign affairs, men of practical experience who could make deals with foreign leaders, including Hitler—who surely was practical enough to see where his own business interests lay. They distrusted career diplomats and academicians who claimed to know Europe and who theorized over balances of power (had these not brought the first war?) or moralized over fascist thuggery. Conservatives were convinced that Communism was the greater menace; whatever weakened Hitler might also endanger the capitalist West. Nazi oppressions were exaggerated by Jews and Leftists to divert public attention from Communist expansionism. And there were the lessons of recent history. The conservatives in Britain distrusted the French, as the French in general distrusted the British who, in turn, had long ago abandoned any pretense of enforcing the Versailles treaty. Many on both sides (not only conservatives) were sure that the first war could have been avoided had they not been entangled with the Russians.

To one extent or another, all of these attitudes also affected American public opinion. In addition, there was substantial support for Mussolini and Hitler, particularly in the early 1930s, among Italian-Americans and German-Americans. There was generalized suspicion of the League as an alliance of the victors, bent only on freezing the *status quo*, and lingering resentment of the British and French refusal to pay their debts. And both liberals and conservatives feared the government controls, the curbs on free expression and free enterprise, that another war would bring.

■ These bundles of views have three characteristics in com-

mon: first, the search for economy, especially lower taxes and less sacrifice; second, the failure to understand the character and aims of the Nazi regime; and third, the refusal to face the need for maintaining a military balance of power against potential enemies. Unless most of these prevailing orthodoxies could be overturned, the only choice for democratic governments was to appease and to hope for the best. But for a politician to challenge received truth, daily repeated by the press, is to risk political suicide. Can one expect political leaders to open themselves very often to attack from simplifiers who already have public opinion on their side?

What, then, are the lessons of the 1930s that the textbooks might have suggested? First, that the popular notions of the time were often direct consequences of people's experiences from 1914 onward. It would be as useless to rail against them as to scold the tide for coming in. They had every reason to think they were applying history's lessons, as we think we do today. Second, that political leaders will, quite understandably, usually make the choices that are easiest to explain, given the prevailing notions of the time. Third, that they are likely to risk making counterarguments only if they have some assurance that the public is educated enough to the world's complications to understand what they are trying to say. Fourth, that the level of historical and political education required is sure to be high, because each particular episode of foreign policy must be examined afresh and on its own. There are no easy analogies.

What, then, are the lessons of the 1930s that the textbooks might have suggested?

Moreover, it is usually necessary to keep several, often paradoxical, ideas in mind at once. For example, a country must sometimes appease a potential enemy and arm against him, all at the same time and often at great cost. In the 1930s, appeasement was probably necessary to prepare the democratic peoples to fight. To nourish morale at home (and to maintain good relations with allies), governments had to try to satisfy the seemingly legitimate demands of Germany. However regrettable it may seem to some, this requirement that democracy's cause for war be just is undetachable from the democratic vision itself. The national honor of democracies rests upon it. This is what Churchill meant when he pleaded, in the 1930s, for "arms and the covenant," that is, British willingness to bear the costs of rearmament and willingness to bear the costs of negotiation, too.

Without question, another lesson from the era of appeasement is that democratic foreign policy is likely to cost more than others—an important lesson to keep in mind in the post-war world, as many Americans do today. But it is a lesson undiscoverable in these textbooks, for none provides a close, discriminating look at the motives and conditions behind appeasement.

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD SINCE 1945 XVII.

Almost any study of the peoples of the globe, unless it were downright misleading, would contribute something to education for democracy. Knowing ourselves and others as the end of the 20th century draws near is part of any citizen's education. But for that solid comprehension of democracy's adventure we want students to acquire, textbooks ought to provide particular information on the world since 1945. First, a dependable account of the origins and character of the Cold War. Second, the democracies' response to the Cold War and to the larger consequences of the Second World War. Third, a coherent view of democracy's progress and prospects in the many new nations created out of the collapse of European imperialism and throughout the Third World generally. Finally, a summing up of the present situation for free government and human rights in the world and of the long-term challenges they must expect to face.

Generally, our texts do quite well on the first and second requirements, providing fairly objective treatment of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. They are less helpful in sorting out the forms of government and political practices of the new and poorer nations. And they do not offer any summary of where democracy now stands or what the future may hold in threats or opportunities. In general, their treatment of world history since 1945 is hasty, without clear lines of organization or analysis of significant questions.

To begin with the Cold War, only Kownslar's account is misleading. Inexplicably, the text claims the Cold War began before World War II, when "communism became a dominant political system in many Eastern European countries." The

basic fact of the Red Army's advance and occupation of Eastern Europe is absent, and students are told only that the Soviet Union "was able to gain influence over some of the Eastern European states." Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain is defined as an "invisible boundary" behind which "the eastern group [of nations] favored the policies of the Soviet Union." Yet Kownslar is later quite forthright on the meaning of the Berlin Wall and on the Soviet crushing of resistance in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Kownslar's entire closing portion is marred by a confused organization that first covers the United States at home to the present, then describes a wide range of world events only in relation to American foreign policy, and only thereafter pulls the student backward in time to begin separate chapters on Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The whole unit, called "Your World," gives the impression of a rush to the finish, lacking any organizing theme or questions. The geographical coverage, country by country, merely piles up facts in dizzying fashion. Ostensibly designed for weaker students, avoiding ideas throughout, this text may instead add obstacles for them—and put burdens on any teacher desiring to reach further than a daily quiz. Its problems are not lessened by an 80-page "Book of Readings" at the end. Its snippets are too brief and too randomly chosen to be useful, except for occasional titillation. They are witness to the author's lack of central themes and significant questions.

All the other texts offer adequate accounts of the Cold War. None pretends to take up the revisionist debate; each is content to state the obvious. With its armies in occupation of all Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union had determined to rule the whole area, contrary to wartime promises and to the clear desires of the populations. Elections were rigged and even the most cooperative non-Communists were purged or exiled. The added threats to Greece and Turkey stirred the Truman Doctrine of "containment," a word all but Kownslar use and explain. All, including Kownslar, describe the Berlin blockade and the Wall, with the armed interventions of the Soviet Union. Most emphasize the Hungarian tragedy, adding pictures to the narrative.

All of the texts deal forthrightly with the Marshall Plan and NATO.

All of the texts deal forthrightly with the Marshall Plan and NATO as the basic responses of the Western democracies to the economic ravages of war and to the need for a new balance of power in Europe. But none takes the opportunity to contrast these actions to the inaction of the period after World War I. Notably in the economic sphere, the United States and other democracies had absorbed the lesson of total war's massive dislocations. They saw that all economies, including that of the unscathed United States, would suffer grievously once more (as

they had in the 1920s and in the Depression) without massive efforts to restore productivity and purchasing power. None of the texts mentions the benefits of the Marshall Plan to our own postwar economy, though it is a striking example of enlightened self-interest in democratic policy making on economic matters. Likewise, no text contrasts NATO to the American (and British) pre-war refusal of commitment to defend Western Europe. Democratic peoples were, after all, applying what they saw as lessons of history to defend their common freedom and values.

The textbooks' accounts of our wars in Korea and Vietnam are brief and unobjectionable, though not always connected to the doctrine of containment that has dominated American foreign policy since the late 1940s. The importance of Korea to the strategic situation of the United States and to Japan is not discussed. On Vietnam, all but Kownslar describe Ho Chi Minh as a Communist leader bent on unifying Vietnam under revolutionary Marxism, and they are also clear on the social inequities and lack of reform in South Vietnam. They do not, however, suggest the dilemma these two facts posed for United States policy and American public opinion. All of the texts set forth the repressive nature of the triumphant Communist regime and the flow of refugee "boat people" to escape it. And all but Kownslar and Roselle find time to relate the horrors of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge as they practiced genocide on their own Cambodian people.

As they turn to the many new regimes of the postwar world in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and to the troubled countries of Latin America, the texts' performance falls off sharply. Of them all, Beers is the most satisfactory in paying attention to the fate of political democracy and human rights. He is explicit, for example, on the "trials of Indian democracy"—the hunger and poverty of a population soaring beyond the nation's capacity to produce food and new jobs. On the other hand, Indians have been tenacious in clinging to democratic forms and British-style civil rights, in contrast to the military dictatorship of Pakistan. Mazour, Roselle, and Wallbank draw less clear distinctions in this case, and Kownslar draws none. It is disappointing to find these textbooks failing to address the force of ethnic, religious, and nationalist hatreds, in India and elsewhere, which make the achievement of stable, democratic societies so much more difficult.

Also disappointing are the too-brief accounts of the Chinese Revolution, its background in the 1920s and 1930s, its relation to the Second World War, its twists and turns and significance. Most texts are relatively bland on Mao's great and violent Cultural Revolution, saying at the most that it brought disorder or "disrupted Chinese life" (Beers and Roselle). Only Kownslar, in

■ ***Also disappointing are the too-brief accounts of the Chinese Revolution.*** ■

a short biography on Mao in a separate, closing section of the book, cites experts who accuse him of killing as many as a million Chinese "whom he regarded as unnecessary or unfit to be ruled by him," and Kownslar adds that political prisoners had no "protection of law as enjoyed in the United States."

On the other hand, Kownslar forgets entirely to include postwar Japan, either in the closing Asia chapter or in the chapter dealing with the United States and Asia. The great drama of American-sponsored democratization in Japan is left untold. The other texts include it, but rather blandly, without bringing forth its remarkable features. Wallbank gives it a boldface heading, "Japan Lost an Empire and Became a Democracy," but only two sentences of text. Beers, Mazour, and Roselle all devote at least two pages to postwar Japan. Beers describes the constitutional system, the American-style court system, and a strong bill of rights, as well as a new egalitarian system of education emphasizing democratic principles. He adds those reforms distributing land and business ownership more broadly, closing with "The Japanese Economic Miracle." Roselle, too, describes the new political and educational systems, though more briefly. And Mazour is briefer still on democratization, though stressing the need for greater care in United States relations with its "faithful ally."

On Africa and the Middle East, our texts resort to cataloging detail, country after country, with bewildering rapidity and few organizing themes. Roselle races through accounts of more than 30 nations, with little comment on forms of government or political behavior, except to pause for a bit on Israel, tensions in the Middle East, South Africa, and the outrages of Idi Amin. Roselle fails to group, or to generalize about, the many problems of Africa that make attempts at stable, free government so difficult. Mazour begins with some general remarks on the character of African nationalism and later includes the problems posed for many of the new African nations by the diversity of their peoples, languages, and cultures and by their economic underdevelopment. But there is little analysis of political forms and their workings.

Kownslar, as noted above, offers no organizing themes and nearly nothing on political methods, except for a striking half-page on Idi Amin's atrocities. Wallbank does suggest problems general to Africa—lack of political experience, internal disunities, multiplicity of languages, and insufficient education—but does not present them as particularly vexing obstacles to liberal politics. Again, Beers is the most helpful. His chapter on Africa devotes four pages to analyzing the problems of nationalism, including lack of education and experience; internal rivalries along ethnic, religious, and language lines; lack of capital;

uneven climate; poor soil conditions; overpopulation and famine; and the slum life resulting from too-rapid urbanization. All this precedes, and explains, a section called "Search for Political Stability," which makes clear that, while most African nations began by writing democratic constitutions, very few have been able to combine freedom and stability for very long.

On the Middle East, there is little difference among the texts. All recount in reportorial, abbreviated *Time* or *Newsweek* style the establishment of Israel, the ensuing conflicts, the Camp David agreements, the Iranian revolution, the hostage crisis and the violence in Lebanon. The same is true of their narratives on South and Central America. One surprising exception is Roselle, which fails to deal with contemporary Latin America at all—a disqualifying omission for a text in world history. In all the other texts, the familiar themes of our daily newspapers and nightly newscasts are presented. The Cuban revolution, the Bay of Pigs, and the missile crisis are objectively covered, as are most of the major events in the larger countries of South America.

In no text, however, is the plight of democratic reformers, caught between the extremes of Left and Right, made explicit or dramatic enough. The general conditions keeping them weak are listed—the deep cleavages between the wealthy and the poor, endemic political corruption, the power of the military, population explosions and food shortages, economic instability, the effects of Cuban revolutionary activism, the legacies of past American interventions—but they are not helpfully linked to the Center's struggle to survive. One of the best chances to connect current problems with those of the past is lost.

In no text is the plight of democractic reformers, caught between the extremes of Left and Right, made explicit.

Beers, overall the best of the textbooks, offers a more analytical account of Latin American problems than the others. Following it is a helpful explanation of the social and military bases of Left and Right in the region—and the frequent splits within the middle class, though the absence of a viable center is again not made explicit. Beers closes with an unhappy summary of violations of human rights in Latin America by all sides. From this, any student-reader could easily comprehend the obstacles ahead, and the time and changes required before democracy can fairly be expected to thrive.

Mazour's treatment is next best, with nearly comparable material on problems of population, urbanization, housing, and economic underdevelopment. Wallbank, although much briefer, is incisive on the deep-seated economic and social problems of Latin America and on the critical need for stable and predictable world prices if these nations are to improve their rates of investment in productive enterprises. Wallbank is also more candid than others on the character of dictatorial regimes. Castro is described as behind guerrilla and terrorist movements in the

Western hemisphere. American support for Allende's overthrow in Chile and the brutality of the subsequent Pinochet regime are also recounted. Kownslar is unanalytical, brief, and overdetailed but similarly candid on Cuba and Chile. Unhappily, the texts providing the fullest coverage are bland and even evasive in their judgments of regimes and of American policies toward them.

Curiously, the spread of free government and human rights finds no mention in their recital of better things to come.

As noted at the beginning, none of the textbooks provides a conclusion dealing specifically with the present situation of liberal democracy in the world: where it thrives, where it struggles, where it has yet to be born. From the materials just reviewed, it is obvious that teachers and students could form impressions about the more obvious cases, from Japan to the Soviet Union, from Canada to Chile, from Israel to Uganda. But closer analysis is missing in most cases, because the central theme is missing. It follows that the long-term challenges to be expected in the future are not explicitly related to the particular abilities, or disabilities, of democratic governments to meet them. Some texts conclude with foreboding, stressing the dangers from the population explosion, pollution, the waste of resources, energy shortages, technological unemployment, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear war. But they do not try to suggest whether governments will tend to move toward more freedom or to more authority as they struggle to cope with such threats. Other texts end with optimism, stressing the benefits and better life to be expected from the continued progress of science, medicine, and technology. Curiously, the spread of free government and human rights finds no mention in their recital of better things to come.

CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY'S UNTOLD STORY

From all that has been said about the performance of these five books, the conclusion must be evident. Without carefully selecting themes to concentrate upon—leaving out a good deal from any text surveyed here—and adding effective auxiliary materials, teachers would find it impossible to focus on the evolution of democracy. These world history texts leave the story of democracy largely untold. Its ideas and principles are left unclear, incomplete. Its origins, adventures, needs, and significance are nowhere systematically presented. Relying on such books alone, teachers cannot teach, and students cannot grasp, the compelling story of people's struggles for freedom, self-government, and justice on earth.

With certain exceptions noted above, the textbooks lose chance after chance to develop the political sophistication of students. From the very start, students find little reason for the study of history or the connection its study might have with intelligent citizenship. The texts do not tell them, and the same is true, as we shall later see, of schoolbooks in United States history and even in American government. The uses of history are neither explicit nor implicit as the narrative proceeds. Although each period, from ancient Greece to our time, could offer vital lessons to democratic citizens, such lessons are for the most part absent.

The history of the Greeks is recounted without their political ideas and without the differing views of human nature that underlay them. Sections on Roman history fail to include the vigorous debate among historians over the causes for societal decay. Judaism and Christianity find very little space—substantially less than do non-Western religions and ancient cultures—

and the texts uniformly fail to explain the moral imperatives in which democratic ideals find their roots. All of the texts are silent on the medieval, feudal origins of constitutional government. Free government's need for a balance of power in society, and its origins out of that balance, is thus left behind from the start—and not thereafter rescued by the story of the 17th century English Revolution.

Enlightenment ideas, central to our early republic and to the French Revolution, are, with the exception of the Beers text, presented inadequately and without relation to their notions of human nature and human needs. In like manner, partly in consequence, the ideologies of the 19th century—Conservatism, Liberalism, radical republicanism, socialism, and nationalism—are left unclear, though they are crucial for understanding the world since 1800. Their assumptions, fears, and hopes are still with us today, shaping our issues and limiting our choices.

What helps, and what hurts, the development of political democracy and what are the special problems of democratic moderates assaulted by extremists of Left and Right?

What helps, and what hurts, the development of political democracy and what are the special problems of democratic moderates assaulted by extremists of Left and Right? Some answers could begin with the contrast between English parliamentarism and French absolutism in the 17th century, but these are not even attempted in the texts. Nor are they explicit in the narratives of the French Revolution, the best place to launch such lessons. They are nowhere to be found in the textbooks' accounts of the tragic collapse of democratic experiments in the face of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 or the Nazis' seizure of power in 1933.

The First World War's terrible interruption of political democracy's progress and of general economic and social amelioration in Europe is not made explicit. The war rendered the world far less safe for democracy, but the subsequent rise of Left and Right totalitarianism is only vaguely related to the war's effects, as are the failures of the Western democracies to prevent a second and greater conflict, shaping the world in which we live. Essential to students' perspective on world affairs would be a critical re-examination not only of appeasement in the 1930s but of the "lessons" repeatedly drawn from it. It is axiomatic that each episode in foreign policy must be studied on its own, not as an easy-to-read copy of some other episode. Some of what was learned from 1914 was germane to the 1930s; much of it was not. The same is no doubt true of what was learned from the 1930s in relation to crises already undergone and yet to come for us.

For democratic, sovereign citizens, a sophisticated grasp of their own history and of other people's history and culture is indispensable. Unhappily, the history of democracy is not effec-

tively presented in these textbooks. But neither are other significant themes. Even to follow the thread of modernization is difficult, given the oversupply of fact and the rarity of interpretation. Clearly, these textbooks demonstrate in themselves the impossibility of presenting a coherent, compelling version of world history in a single course. To persist in the attempt is to persist in failure, courting student boredom at best and student alienation at worst.

Two major changes are required, to begin with. The first is to expand the history curriculum, as argued earlier. The second is to produce textbooks that reflect the authors' clear choice of critical questions and themes to follow through. For the education of citizens, one of these must be the origins, development, and problems of democracy in the world. One way of presenting it, and of revising texts to make it easier, has been offered here. There are other ways, and teachers should be encouraged to draw from many sources as they put together their own courses, best suited to their own strengths and interests—and to those of their students.

Critics of world history, both friendly and unfriendly, have suggested added themes to pursue, other ways to organize texts and courses. One is modernization, the worldwide application of technology. To avoid an excessively Western approach, this theme could be conceived as the transition from traditional to modern societies. Still another is the origins and evolution of the world's most influential religions and ideologies. Another is the story of economic, military, cultural, and religious interaction and exchange among the major civilizations of the world.

Another, still popular and implied in the onward-and-upward language of high school textbooks, is history as human progress, in which modernization is accepted as mainly beneficent. But only some is, and much certainly is not. A critical view of modernization, in which students are stirred constantly to draw distinctions, would be more realistic and more interesting, though perhaps controversial in some quarters.

In quite another mode, world history could as well be taught, at least part of the time, to reveal the ever-shifting forms of human aggression, greed, exploitation, cruelty, pride, and folly. Each has assumed so many guises, stratagems, and fine words of justification that students might be fascinated. True, as the world has modernized, technology has allowed a larger audience of relatively comfortable, untroubled onlookers. But the essence of the game has not changed since the start of recorded history. Such negativism may be unwelcome in modern social studies. Still, it can be argued that political democracy is all the more necessary if we *cannot* count upon an inevitably rising curve of progress and human refinement. To

But the essence of the game has not changed since the start of recorded history.

the extent that human failings persist, that evil and stupidity abide, any degree of free self-government we can manage is all the more precious.

It has been disappointing to find the textbooks so often bland and evasive over controversial issues.

Whatever the set of themes to be chosen for a given course or text—and there should be one or two to go along with the story of democracy—it is imperative that they be honestly presented. It has been disappointing to find the textbooks so often bland and evasive over controversial issues. It has been disappointing at times to find them critical only of Western (and sometimes Soviet) societies and actions, as though it would be "ethnocentric" to hold Third World peoples to the same standards we apply to ourselves. The texts are too frequently pious, reverential, and uncritical about non-Western religions, values, and cultures, as though human failings were not common to all mankind. It is hardly a promising approach to "global consciousness," much less to sensible views of history and politics. Ugly treatment of the weak or poor, strangers and minorities, children, women, and the aged needs to be honestly pictured—regardless of the race, the religion, or the culture at issue.

It is a cardinal principle of historical study that one's wish and preference must always give way before fact. We wish, for example, that the new nations of Africa would be free, peaceful, and prosperous, somehow to right the moral balance of the evil done them by imperialism. But the fact is that many are political and economic disasters, bringing suffering to their own people and to their neighbors. Coups, assassinations, civil war, genocide, lawlessness, and famine are as much the fruit of inept, sometimes barbarous, leadership as of outside forces, old or new.

To tell the truth about the failure of others in the world in no way asserts that we were, or are, superior creatures.

Honestly to face what goes wrong, at home and abroad, and then to search for explanations regardless of their messiness, is indispensable to informed citizenship. So is historical perspective. To return to the African example, under what conditions is it reasonable to expect the emergence of stable democratic societies and how much time is reasonable to allow? Historical perspective reminds us that it took centuries for democracy to evolve in the West, even under relatively favorable circumstances. To tell the truth about the failure of others in the world in no way asserts that we were, or are, superior creatures. It is inexcusable to be any less than wholly candid about everyone equally; doing so can only hold back the slow, hard-won advance of political good sense.

Finally, and to repeat, even the perfect text would hardly be sufficient by itself. It has been said often enough that the whole social studies curriculum requires change. But beyond books and curriculum are the teachers and teaching conditions. One cannot convey the drama and perspective of history without having been taught the subject well. Better education for

democracy calls for revision of teacher preparation in the colleges and universities. The history major itself is too often incoherent, without pattern or sequence. Many university courses in history and related subjects lack their own organizing questions and themes that would help students to conceptualize the courses they will later teach.

Perhaps at once the most crucial and the most difficult reform will be to change the conditions of teaching. To prepare materials and class discussions along the lines suggested here will require time. To carry out discussions and to reflect on student papers require still more time. Somehow schools must be restructured to allow teachers the time, energy, privacy, quiet, and authority they need to offer significant learning in effective ways. Any improvement in American education would require such changes, but the importance, the subtleties—and pleasures, too—of education for democratic citizenship demand them.

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